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Abstract
Health care now accounts for just under 10% of national income in most developed OEeD
countries. Yet, despite its importance in the overall economy, the factors that drive health care
expenditure remain only imperfectly understood. This thesis shows that the determinants of
health care expenditures are simply too diverse amongst different countries to be brought within
a common denominator such as GDP, as it has been argued for decades. It also shows that the
assumption that health care is a homogeneous good across countries is over-simplistic and
arbitrary, and finds ample evidence showing that health care is not a luxury good, as widely
suggested. The contribution of the thesis is on methodological, theoretical and empirical
grounds.
In terms of methodology, the thesis shows that there are significant flaws in several areas that
influence our thinking concerning the determinants of health care expenditures and offers
alternative ways of analysis and appraisal. Flaws were shown in: the relationship between health
expenditure and GDP; the importance of factors such as ageing; the macroeconomic context and
the burden of disease; the measurement of key variables used in empirical analysis such as
health spending, national income, technology, and health prices; the method of analysis that has
been pursued; and the conversion factors used to translate prices and monetary variables across
countries into a single and comparable denominator.
The thesis makes a theoretical contribution of the analysis of health care expenditures,
assuming that health care is at least a quasi-public good. The proposed conceptual framework
explicitly links the determinants of health care expenditures to the theory of public finance
and allows flexible adjustments by decision-makers to account for changes in technology,
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prices, and the macroeconomic environment. The impact of the macroeconomy on health
spending is assessed by evaluating whether the rate of growth of income has any influence on
the demand for health and whether the fiscal deficit impacts on health spending and to what
extent. The proposed framework incorporates technology and this is an advance from the
published literature, which has almost invariably considered technology to be a residual
factor. Finally, the thesis recognises that the lag structure of the model, the availability of
data, and knowledge of the relationship between disease and need for services are not
sufficient to test for the impact of lifestyle and disease factors on health spending.
The empirical investigation provides conclusive evidence of the non-importance of GOP in
explaining health care spending trends over time. Consumption is shown to be a predictor of
health expenditures; technology is an important cost-push factor across countries; the
macroeconomy exerts, in general, significant pressure on health care expenditure; however,
the impact of health care reforms does not show any significant impact on health care
expenditures; and the number of doctors per capita has little or no association with health
care expenditures.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
This thesis is about paying for health care. Health care now accounts for just under 10% of
national income in most OEeD countries. For many years health care spending rose faster
than national income itself, although more recently it has stabilised in many countries (Table
1.1) although at the expense of shortages, rationed services and queues in some. Yet, despite
its importance in the overall economy, the factors that drive health care expenditure remain
only imperfectly understood.
Other than the USA, health care in industralised countries is predominantly publicly funded
and the share of public spending on health exceeds 65 percent of the total outlays (see Table
1.2). The main methods of financing health services are from social insurance contributions
or general taxation, except in the USA and (until recently) Switzerland, where voluntary
health insurance contributions are the main sources of health service finance[ 1], albeit with
considerable government involvement. Additional funds come from patient contributions in
tenus of co-payments, co-insurance, and/or deductibles.
The central role of government, even in the USA and other countries that have a significant
private health insurance sector, shows how the funding of health care is, among other things,
[1] In Germany and the Netherlands, there exists the possibility for high earners to opt out of the publicly
funded health insurance system and contract with a private insurer. This is nevertheless optional and a
significant proportion of those who can opt out of the publicly funded system, opt not to do so. Switzerland also
has a significant public sector financed predominantly out of social insurance contributions, particularly after
1996, when the revised health insurance law came into force, requiring all permanent Swiss residents to
purchase compulsory health insurance policies for which the premiums are community- rather than risk-rated
(as was the case in the pre-1996 era). In other countries, the out-of-pocket element is quite significant (Greece,
Italy, Portugal).
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a macroeconomic issue and relates to the availability of resources and their distribution
among various activities by government and those acting on its behalf. The same applies to
the US and Switzerland for the part that is publicly financed. For the part that is not publicly
financed, the key issue relates to setting insurance premia and the extent to which these can
increase without affecting employees' willingness to pay and affordability, and employers'
competitive position in the market.
Table 1-1 Health care as a % of GDP (1970 - 2000)
Countries 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000
Austria 7.7 6.4 7.2 8.7 8.2 8.3
Belgium 6.6 7.2 7.7 8.1 8.8
Denmark 9.1 8.9 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3
Finland 6.5 7.1 8.1 7.1 6.9 6.8
France 7.4 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.6 9.4
Germany 6.2 8.7 8.9 8.7 10.2 10.6 10.5
Greece 6.7 7.6 8.1 8.3 9.3 8.7
Ireland 8.6 7.6 7.1 7.3 6.4 6.1
Italy 5.2 7.3 6.9 8.2 7.8 8.4 804
Japan 4.6 6.6 6.7 6.2 7 7.6
Luxembourg 5.9 6.1
Netherlands 8.1 7.8 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.7 8.1
Portugal 2.7 5.9 5.9 6.6 7.7 7.8
Spain 3.6 5.2 504 6.9 6.9 7.1
Sweden 8.7 8.7 8 8.4
Switzerland 8.5 904 lOA
U.K. 5.6 5.8 6.2 6.9 6.7 7
USA 6.8 8.6 10 12 13.1 13.6 13.7
Australia 704 7.8 8 8.5 8.5
Canada 7.2 8.3 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.5
Source: OECD Health Database, 2001.
A major reason for the attention that health care expenditure has attracted over time is the
significant upward pressure on health care costs in most developed countries. Health
spending has often risen much faster than GDP. Furthermore, pharmaceutical spending, a key
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part of health spending, has often increased faster than either GDP or overall health spending,
particularly after 1980 (OECD Health Data, 2000).
The rate of increase in health care costs is an important issue because all resources are scarce
and must be used rationally and efficiently. This is a traditional problem of optimal resource
allocation under a budget constraint [2]. Although this has always been the case in economic
decisions, where demand (or desire) always exceeds supply (or availability of resources), two
developments have made the problem of increasing health care spending more difficult to
address.
The first was the realisation that economic growth in most OECD countries slowed down
significantly in the 1980s compared with the euphoric 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.
At the same time, governments have had to implement counter-cyclical fiscal measures to
neutralise the effects of negative growth when in recession, and pursue fiscally prudent
policies that would restore a balanced budget when in a boom. At the same time, it appears
that upward pressure on health spending has not slowed down - quite the contrary. While
growth in health spending in the 1960s could be more than offset by GDP growth, this was
not the case in the 1980s and much of the 1990s. Many hypotheses have been put forward
regarding the reasons for the escalation of health care costs, including the ageing of the
population (Abel Smith, 1996), the impact of new technology (Evans, 1983), the intensity of
the services provided (US Congress, 1997), and also the relationship between income and the
demand for health (Abel Smith, 1963; Abel Smith, 1967).
[2] Optimal resource allocation can be interpreted in terms of technical or allocative efficiency. Within the
context of health care, the former means that maximizing health gain subject to a budget constraint, would result
in societal losses, i.e. some individuals would lose out. Within the same context, the latter implies that scarce
resources can be used in such a way so as to maximize health gain from their use without societal losses. The
concept of allocative efficiency underpins Pareto optimality.
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Table 1-2
H IthC
Public and Private Health Care expenditure as a % of total
E di 1970 1999ea are xpen tture: -
Countries 1970 1980 1990 1995 1999
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
Austria 63.0 37.0 68.8 31.2 73.5 26.5 72.3 27.7 72.1 27.9
Belgium 87.0 13.0 83.4 16.6 88.9 11.1 69.9 30.1 71.3 28.7
Denmark NA NA 87.8 12.2 82.6 17.4 82.6 17.4 82.2 17.8
Finland 73.8 26.2 79.0 21.0 80.9 29.1 75.5 24.5 75.7 24.3
France 74.7 25.3 78.8 21.2 78.2 21.8 77.7 22.3 78.1 21.9
Germany 72.8 27.2 78.7 21.3 76.2 23.8 78.1 21.9 75.3 24.7
Greece 42.6 57.4 55.6 44.4 62.7 37.3 54.5 45.5 56.8 43.2
Ireland 81.7 18.3 81.6 18.4 71.7 28.3 72.5 27.5 77.1 22.9
Italy 86.9 13.1 80.5 19.5 78.1 21.9 67.4 32.6 68.0 32.0
Luxemburg 88.9 11.1 92.8 7.2 93.1 6.9 92.4 7.6 92.9 7.1
Netherlands NA NA 69.2 30.8 67.7 32.3 72.0 28.0 68.5 31.5
Portugal 59.0 41.0 64.3 35.7 65.5 34.5 65.3 34.7 66.9 33.1
Spain 65.4 34.6 79.9 20.1 78.7 21.3 78.0 22.0 76.9 23.1
Sweden 86.0 14.0 92.5 11 89.9 10.1 85.2 16.8 83.8 16.2
Switzerland 57.8 42.2 63.3 69.4 68.4 31.6 72.3 27.7 73.4 26.6
U.K. 87.0 13.0 89.4 9.9 84.3 15.7 84.9 15.1 83.3 16.7
USA 36.3 63.7 41.5 58.5 39.6 60.4 45.6 54.4 44.5 55.5
Australia 67.4 32.6 62.8 37.2 67.4 32.6 67.4 32.6 69.3 30.7
Canada 69.9 30.1 75.6 24.4 74.6 25.4 71.2 26.2 70.6 29.4
New
Zealand 80.3 19.7 88.0 12.0 82.4 17.6 77.2 22.8 77.5 22.5
Source: OEeD Health Database, 2001.
The second consideration was that economic policy-makers had to take tough decisions in the
light of ever increasing pressure on health spending in relation to sluggish GDP growth.
Other priorities existed which were given as much importance as health in the light of
changing circumstances. An emphasis on investment in education, vocational training, and
technology are prime examples of the changing paradigm in international competition and the
determinants of competitiveness of nations. Under these circumstances, cost containment and
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the search for macro-efficiency and micro-efficiency have been the cornerstones of health
care reform in developed countries (OECD, 1992; OECD, 1994; Mossialos & Legrand,
1999).
All these make the achievement of health systems goals resemble a constrained maximisation
problem as shown in Box 1, where the maximisation of health status is subject to four
constraints: firstly, a resource constraint, stemming from macroeconomic budgetary
limitations; secondly, a welfare system constraint, arising from difficult choices in allocating
scarce resources between "competing" welfare services, which present equally pressing needs
(e.g. pensions and education); thirdly, a health challenges constraint, originating from
evolving patterns in lifestyles and the incidence of disease and new, and often more complex,
ways of responding to disease; and, finally, a constraint relating to consumer expectations,
arising from the pressures that rising expectations impose on what consumers/patients expect
health services should cover and deliver.
Box 1
The Problem of further Improving the Health Status
of EU Populations
Maximising Health Status
subject to:
a. macroeconomic constraint
b. welfare system constraint, excluding health
Co health challenges constraint
d. consumer expectations
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There are two aspects of the macroeconomic constraint: a supply aspect and a demand aspect.
On the supply-side, the macro economy has been unable to deliver consistently high growth
rates, which makes the pursuit of fiscal prudence essential in order to maintain
macroeconomic balance. This also includes additional exogenous factors, such as the
introduction of a single currency in European Union countries, which has necessitated the
implementation of tight fiscal and monetary policies in the Euro-zone, in the period prior to
its launch (Kanavos & McKee, 1998). On the demand-side, health systems face the challenge
of providing care for ever increasing need, although the often cited infinite need may be a
myth according to some (Frankel, 1991). For many health systems, the 1960s and 1970s were
the decades of expansion with expansion to universal coverage in several developed countries
while extending coverage and introducing further choice in others (OECD, 1994). At the
same time as countries increased coverage and attempted to increase responsiveness to
population needs, they faced the need to contain costs as the demand for health care kept
rising faster than the rate of increase in total income. Consequently, cost containment and the
pursuit of micro-efficiency have been two of the most important thrusts in health policy
making over the last two decades and, as a result, health care in many developed countries
has become more "managed" (Mossialos, Kanavos & Abel Smith, (1997); Mossialos &
LeGrand, (1999)).
There are also lateral pressures on publicly funded health systems, particularly those arising
from the funding of other welfare services which are part of the national budget and have also
seen their share of GDP increasing over time. Publicly funded pension schemes (Pay As You
Go - PAYG) are an interesting case in this respect because they will almost certainly exert
considerable pressure on national resources in the near future for two reasons: firstly, because
the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries in PAYG schemes is changing as populations age in
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the developed world, and that questions the sustainability of current schemes and their modes
of funding; secondly, the current level of provision of public pension systems, in some
countries, may imply that for similar benefits to accrue to future pensioners, contribution
rates will have to rise considerably with severe implications for employment costs. It has
been estimated that most industrialised nations will need considerably higher contribution
rates to sustain current patterns of benefits (Chand & Jaeger, 1996). For instance, significant
pressure exists on public finances from PAYG schemes as a proportion of GDP in countries
such as Germany, France and Italy compared with the US and the UK, which rely
predominantly on funded schemes [3] (Kanavos & McKee, 1998). However, it is also true
that volatility in global capital markets poses severe problems for countries with
predominantly funded systems, so that PAYG may become more important in countries that
have reduced its importance, if widespread poverty in old age is to be avoided.
Health challenges are equally important and increasingly complex. Developed countries face
changing patterns of disease, with major implications for health services (Kanavos & McKee,
1998). There are two such challenges. First, some infectious diseases, most obviously HIV,
pose a considerable threat to the extent that there are few or no effective cures. In addition,
there is growing resistance to antibiotics, for instance, methicillin resistant staphylococcus
aureous (MRSA}, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), and trimethoprim-resistant
salmonella. Antibiotic resistance is not new, but what is new is the scale of the problems
(Orton, 1997). The cost implications of these developments include the need for more costly
antibiotics, the need for additional drug testing, and for more prolonged hospital stays, as
well as the use of isolation facilities.
[3] Of course, pressure would increase also in the case of fully funded systems if financial markets tumble and
display zero growth for long periods of time, which may cause pension fund companies to coIlapse. The role of
government in this case is to have set in place an adequate regulatory framework to predict these situations and
avoid crises from occurring.
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Second, many non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes and conditions of the central
nervous system are gaining in importance. These reflect ageing populations and changes in
lifestyle. The co-existence of neuro-degenerative disease has important implications for the
cost of providing care for many other disorders. (Gray & Fenn, (1993); Gray, (1995);
Chisholm, Knapp et al., (1997); Freer, (1985); Kind & Sorensen, (1993); McCrone & Weich,
(1993); Torgenson, Donaldson et al., 1996» as populations in the developed world age
gradually and available treatments are more palliative than curative. Finally, traffic accidents
present a major cause of death in the age groups of 25-44 years (Atlas of Avoidable Deaths,
EC, 1997). For example, Greece and Portugal present death rates which are three to four
times higher than the rest of the North of Europe. A considerable proportion of these deaths
could be prevented if the emergency care system could function more effectively.
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that an understanding of the determinants of
health expenditures lies in the identification of factors that affect them over time within
individual countries and the implications for policy that targeting of these factors would have.
Some countries such as the UK have begun incorporating the future impact of health, fiscal
and macroeconomic challenges into their decision-making process with a view to planning
strategically their health care resources (Wanless Report - UK Treasury, 2002).
1.2 The purpose of this thesis
1.2.1 Methodological and policy imperatives
The previous section has outlined briefly a number of simple observations linking health
spending and certain variables, notably income, as measured by GOP, other macroeconomic
factors (for instance levels of deficit, debt and inflation), health system-related factors,
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population ageing, lifestyles (for instance aspects of diet, tobacco and alcohol consumption),
technology, and epidemiology, among others. Over the past two decades or so, upward
pressure on health care expenditures has placed health policy firmly on the political arena in
the majority of developed countries. As a result, there is increased interest in comparing
results within countries, but also, increasingly, across countries. International comparisons of
health care expenditures and their determinants go back to the early 1960s but have since
been used more widely. This interest has intensified over the past two decades.
Nevertheless, simple one-way observations at a specific point in time can say little about the
determinants of health care expenditures within a country over time, let alone a group of
countries. They may allow general cross-country comparisons about the share of national
resources expended on health, but they do not reveal anything about the extent to which these
resources are sufficient to meet their objective or are efficiently used. Furthermore, they
ignore the robustness of the models and comparability of the data. Thus, they are
observations reflecting the casual link between variables without being placed in a conceptual
framework. However, doing this can have the effect of reducing domestic political debate
about the adequacy of health spending within any particular country to a banal level (Judge,
1997), essentially deflecting attention away from more informative analyses that would focus
attention on the determinants of variations in the coverage and composition of health
services, including micro-efficiency and resource allocation (Kanavos &Mossialos, 1999).
Despite reservations, frequently expressed in the literature, about the benefits of comparative
studies (Klein, (1991); Abel-Smith, (1994); Judge, (1997», a stream of research has emerged
where the use of cross-sectional or pooled data has resulted in three main findings (Kanavos
& Mossialos, 1997): Firstly, income, measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
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is the single most important determinant and predictor of health care expenditure and the
income elasticity of demand for health care exceeds unity, which effectively means that
health care is a luxury good. Secondly, as countries move towards higher levels of
industrialization, the share of GDP spent on health care rises; this implies that health care
expenditures may be increasing ad infinitum. And thirdly, a more detailed analysis of the
determinants of health care expenditures has suggested that, regardless of the method, type of
model and variables used, the key results remain robust over time.
1.2.2 Taking the debate further
Within this framework, the thesis will take the debate further than where it currently stands
and will contribute to the literature on the determinants of health care expenditures on three
counts: firstly, in conceptual and theoretical terms, secondly, in terms of methodology and of
statistical analysis, and, thirdly, in terms of inferring the policy relevance of the results
produced. In doing so, it investigates the extent to which macroeconomic, organisational,
technological, demographic and lifestyle factors playa role in explaining levels of spending
on health in individual countries and in groups of similar countries. By examining the
relationship between these variables and health spending over a period of time, the thesis also
aims to unveil the dynamics of factors influencing health spending. Finally, the thesis aims to
identify whether the same factors have similar effects across a number of countries in the
developed world.
Concerning the first element identified above, the thesis will build a demand function for
health care and analyse the difficulties in estimating it, both within as well as across
countries. In doing so, the thesis will seek to identify a theoretical foundation for analyzing
this demand function. In any analysis it is important to establish a conceptual framework and
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examine to what extent these concepts can be operationalised to provide the critical link
between empirical observations and developments in health care systems. Comparative
analysis can arrive inductively at a theory after a lengthy examination of evidence from
multiple countries, permitting generation and testing of a hypothesis (Rose, 1991). However,
the empirical analysis of the relationship between health expenditure and GDP has never
been linked to a theoretical framework. In the existing analyses, all health expenditure, both
public and private, is treated as a behavioural variable, similar to private consumption and
expenditure. To some extent, therefore, the results are based on an empirical observation that
largely reflects Wagner's Law, namely that an increase in national income causes an increase
in public expenditure, mainly through an increase in demand for public services. But clearly,
"the diverse institutional and regulatory features of a health care system cannot be captured
fully by a simple measure of that kind" (Leidl, 1998). An additional conceptual problem is
that authors use aggregate macroeconomic demand functions, while the interpretation of the
results has usually been based on foundations of microeconomic theory. This assumes the
possibility of summing all linear household demand equations to a single total market
demand equation. While this is possible, it can only be fulfilled under certain rather strict
conditions, assuming, among others, the same or similar consumption rates for all
households, the same or similar public/private mix, and the same or similar mix of health
services across countries. Consequently, the interpretation of income elasticities of demand
should be treated with caution, as it does not necessarily follow that whatever is found at the
microeconomic level is going to be replicated at the macroeconomic level (Deaton &
Muellbauer, 1980).
Second, the thesis will make a contribution in terms of methodology and estimation of the
. determinants of health care expenditures. Aside from the theoretical foundation and
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conceptual framework, the validity of an empirical observation relies greatly on the
credibility of the data, the method used and the robustness of the analysis. The quantitative
literature on the determinants of health care expenditures raises a number of important
methodological issues pertaining to the data and their comparison across countries, the type
of conversion factor employed (exchange rates or Purchasing Power Parities - PPPs) when
performing cross-section or pooled cross-section analysis, the prices of health services inputs,
and the method of estimating health production functions. The thesis will analyse these
pitfalls, and by using data similar to those that have already been used in the literature it will,
first of all, offer an alternative but robust methodology of estimating the determinants of
health care expenditures, secondly, it will show that there are variables whose importance has
been ignored to date, and, thirdly, it will arrive at results that are strikingly dissimilar to the
ones that have already been produced. Furthermore, a taxonomy of potential determinants of
health expenditure will be provided, together with suggestions for their inclusion in empirical
analysis. An additional aim of the thesis is to emphasise the importance of methodological
issues when conducting international comparisons of determinants of health care
expenditures and to contribute to the discussion on the development of a theoretical
framework.
Third, the thesis will explore the policy implications of the methodological and empirical
findings, particularly those that have been concerned with health care being a luxury or a
necessity. The policy implications have rarely been explored in the literature[4] and few
explanations have been given as to what health care being a luxury actually means in applied
policy terms. The thesis will take on board findings such as the one that follows:
[4] One such case is Newhouse (1993), Health Economics, where the care vs. cure argument is discussed as a
likely interpretation of an income elasticity of demand greater than unity. Even in this case though. practical
policy conclusions are not derived.
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",.. Demand for health services has been increasing consistently over the past thirty years
more than national income in real terms, whilst at the same time real CD? growth rates
have fallen considerably in the 1980s and 1990s compared with the 1960s and 1970s. The
differences in the expansionary process of health care expenditures in conjunction with
CDP growth, are reflected in income elasticities of demand for health care. In Europe, for
instance, during the period from 1960 to 1970 this elasticity was 1.37 implying faster
expansion of the health sector in comparison to the average economic growth. This was
also combined with strong economic growth in all European countries. In the 1970s the
two oil shocks and the ensuing recession contributed to the average income elasticity of
demand for health care in Europe falling to 1.25. Finally, the 1980s brought a new era in
the international health systems by imposing cost control and cost containment policies.
The expansionary process of health expenditures was further curtailed in Europe where
the corresponding income elasticity of demand averaged 1.08 (DEeD, 1995). Meeting
therefore an ever increasing demand for health services from a total pool of resources
which does not grow as fast, contributes to the national economies' budget deficits and
overall indebtedness ... ",
The validity of these findings will be considered and, in addition, answers will be proposed to
a series of other questions, as follows:
• What are the determinants of public and private health care expenditures? Does the
conclusion that health care is a luxury good hold if we disaggregate total health care
expenditure into public and private health care expenditure?
• Are there other determinants influencing the level of health care spending and if so
what are they, and how do they affect spending? Are the factors that affect health
spending common across countries, or are there qualitative differences among them?
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How should empirical research account for the diversity of health systems in the
empirical analysis of cross-country comparisons?
• On the basis of available results from the empirical literature, is it the case that health
care spending will grow faster than GOP ad infinitum? Does current GOP growth
reflect future changes in health spending? If this is true, is there a cut-off point beyond
which health spending will stabilise? What factors would determine such a cut-off
point and what is their relative importance?
• What are the results of implementing health care reforms in different countries? What
is their dynamic impact on health care spending?
• Is there a theoretical framework which could, partly, explain the empirical
observation of health expenditures rising faster than GDP? To what extent can the
empirical findings contribute to policy developments?
• Is there a macroeconomic theory of determinants of health spending, based on the
micro foundations of health care delivery?
These are important questions that the empirical literature has, at best, addressed only partly.
The thesis will investigate the determinants of health care expenditures according to the
framework set out above. Twelve developed countries, members of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will form the basis of the analysis. The
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The statistical analysis benefits from a
single-country model, as the only reasonable way of analyzing the determinants of health care
expenditures over time and comparing the results across countries. With regards to time-
series analysis, co-integration analysis is performed. Data have been used from the 2000
OECD Health Database, which allows estimation for the period 1960 through 1997. In
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addition, some macroeconomic data series from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF)
International Financial Statistics (IFS) have been used.
1.3 Limitations of the analysis
The thesis offers a number of advances on the current literature on the determinants of health
care expenditures. However, several limitations also exist. These, as well as an explanation of
how they are tackled, are outlined below.
First, the analysis that follows is an aggregate macroeconomic analysis, rather than one
examining the micro economic determinants of health care expenditures, i.e. analyzing a
health production function at a household level. Performing a microeconomic analysis would
not be feasible within the remit of the current framework and would require a different
approach and analytical framework, as, one of the objectives of the thesis is to introduce
modifications to the current macro-economic models and test them empirically.
While the analytical framework is macroeconomic rather than microeconomic, the thesis
recognizes that there is a discrepancy in the results obtained from each of the two approaches
with regard to the determinants of health care expenditures, so that most studies at household
level in developed countries do not show an income elasticity of demand greater than unity.
Whilst recognizing this, the purpose of the analysis is not to perform a macro-micro
comparison, nor to add to the debate as to why this discrepancy exists. Indeed. explanations
for this discrepancy have already been offered and these are reviewed in chapter 2.
Second, by performing a time-series analysis. the availability of some data series is severely
compromised, for instance, lifestyle and habit variables, which have a delayed impact on
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population health. While the non-availability of these variables is, in principle, problematic,
from an econometric perspective their impact may already be captured by other variables
used in the models. For instance, in the case of diet and lifestyle variables (e.g. fat intake per
capita, tobacco, and alcohol consumption per capita), their impact on population health is
delayed, but the precise lag structure is poorly understood. However, measures of mortality
over the period under investigation (1960-1997), should reflect the composite effect of these
factors to some extent.
Third, data on some variables (technology being an example) are not available over long
periods of time, in which case proxies are being used. In this way, what is relevant is not
excluded, but included with what is measurable.
1.4 Thesis outline
The thesis comprises 7 chapters in total, including the present, introductory chapter. Chapter
2 provides a literature review of the determinants of health care expenditures. The chapter
explores the relevant literature on the determinants of health care expenditures that stretches
as far back as the beginning of the 1960s and aims to provide a critical overview of the
aggregate analyses of the determinants of health care expenditures over the period 1960-
1999; to explore the way that the relationship between national health care expenditures and
important economic, social, and demographic variables has emerged from the international
literature over this period; and to evaluate the current thinking on the determinants of health
care expenditures as well as identify outstanding gaps in our knowledge.
Chapter 3 provides an expose of key methodological problems in the estimation of health
care expenditures, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In particular, it
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provides a critique of the theories that have been used to justify the empirical research and
calls for a more robust theoretical framework; it assesses the relative advantages and
disadvantages of different estimation methodologies (cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional,
and time-series analysis), that have been used to estimate determinants of health care
expenditures, with a view to resolving the issues of robust empirical estimation and the
availability of policy-relevant conclusions; it highlights the imperfect nature of existing
conversion factors and discusses the usefulness of different conversion factors employed in
cross-country comparisons; and it discusses the use of health prices and price indices in the
literature, with a view to recommending an appropriate price index for cross-country
comparisons.
Chapter 4 continues the discussion of methodological problems in the estimation of health
care expenditures. In particular, chapter 4 analyses methodological problems in the
measurement of key estimation variables, such as health expenditures and gross domestic
product; it explores whether alternative and more robust measures of a country's income than
gross domestic product can be identified; it critically appraises certain measures of population
health status that are commonly used in econometric analyses such as mortality, life
expectancy, and ageing from a conceptual perspective and discusses the extent to which these
can be used from a methodological perspective; and it identifies further potential
determinants of health care expenditures that have not been (widely) used in the literature (for
instance, technology, and the impact of other macroeconomic factors).
Chapter 5 develops a theoretical framework that builds on the arguments developed in
previous chapters. In doing so, it takes account of the theoretical and methodological points
raised in chapters 3 and 4, establishes a theoretical framework for the aggregate determinants
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of health care expenditure and discusses ways of estimating it empirically. In particular, it
develops the conceptual theoretical framework and empirical model; it presents the variables
employed in the empirical model; it discusses the countries chosen for empirical analysis, the
data sources and the estimation techniques that will be used; and it briefly summarises the
theoretical and empirical advances made with the current framework.
Chapter 6 provides an empirical investigation of the theoretical model and hypotheses
developed in chapter 5. Consistent with the hypotheses developed in chapters 3, 4, and 5, the
analysis pursued in this chapter relies on time series, does not use any denominator for
monetary values, and examines the determinants of health care expenditures on a country-by-
country basis and for each of the 13 countries individually. Two streams of empirical
investigation are followed in this chapter: the first includes GDP for purposes of comparison
with the published empirical literature to-date, and also addresses empirically the question of
whether health care is a luxury good, namely, whether the income elasticity of demand,
measured by GDP, is greater than unity. The second pursues the inclusion of total
consumption, as an alternative measure of national wealth and income, in the empirical
investigation and is therefore consistent with the analytical framework presented in the
chapter 5. The empirical evidence is also presented in two stages: the first presents
conventional time-series analysis, in particular, the first order autoregressive correction,
whereas the second builds on the theory of and empirical evidence on trends in time series
and co-integration analysis.
Finally, chapter 7 draws the main conclusions of this thesis, provides a discussion of policy
implications and highlights areas for future research on the subject.
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CHAPTER 2 DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH CARE
EXPENDITURES: A LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
To understand the determinants of health care expenditure it is necessary to begin with a
review of the accumulated thinking on this topic so far. This chapter explores relevant
literature that stretches as far back as the beginning of the 1960s. The objectives of this
chapter are threefold: first, to provide a critical overview of the aggregate analyses of the
determinants of health care expenditures over the period 1959-1999; second, to explore the
way that the relationship between national health care expenditures and important economic,
social, and demographic variables has emerged from the international literature over the past
40 years; third, to evaluate current thinking on the determinants of health care expenditures
and identify outstanding gaps.
Section 2 of this chapter specifies the search strategy followed in obtaining the literature for
this thesis, including the types of literature incorporated, the period under investigation,
inclusion criteria and keywords. Section 3 traces the historical development of research on
the topic and provides some general observations on the overall research results. It also
discusses the quality of the data on which comparisons between countries are made. Section 4
examines literature on the statistical relationship between national income and health care
expenditures and discusses the sensitivity of the results obtained to: (a) the type of analysis,
namely cross-sectional, time series or pooled cross-sectional, and (b) the type of model
employed. It also examines the increasing sophistication of models required to deal with
growing numbers of variables, and defines explicitly the problems they seek to solve. Section
5 discusses the statistical relationship between health care expenditures and variables other
than national income. Section 6 places the literature on the determinants of health care
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expenditures in developed countries, in a wider context by looking at its applicability to a
developing country perspective. Section 7 analyses the use of conversion factors such as
exchange rates and purchasing power parities (PPPs)[5] and the extent to which results
obtained are sensitive to the use of each of these measures. Finally, section 8 draws together
the main implications of this review.
2.2 Search methodology
In order to fulfil the above questions, the search strategy entailed three key elements: firstly,
the identification of keywords, secondly, the selection of coverage, and thirdly, the selection
of time period.
The following keywords were used:
• Determinants of health care expenditures
• Macroeconomics of health care
• Macro econometrics of health care
• Ageing and health care expenditures
• Technology and health expenditures
• International comparisons of health care expenditures
• Co-integration approach in health care
• Co-integration and determinants of health care expenditures
• Health production function
• Econometrics and health production function
• Income elasticity and health expenditures
5 Both Health-PPPs and GDP-PPPs. Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) can provide a set of international
exchange rates based on relatively stable country-to-country cost-of-living differences with respect to real
services and commodities commonly available in the domestic economy of each nation. The GDP-PPP is based
on a hypothetical common basket of goods, but other market baskets or specific individual comparison goods
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• Demand for health care
• Health - GDP relationship
The coverage of the research is international, including both developed and developing
countries, although, the analysis in subsequent chapters covers only a selection of developed
countries. Finally, the period under investigation is 1959 - 2000. The following databases
were searched:
• MEDLINE
• PUBMED
• BIDS/lSI
• CINAHL
• EMBASE
• EUROPA
• Additional (official) literature was obtained from the Office of Official Publications
of the European Union and Statistics Netherlands.
• The catalogues of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) Libraries were also
searched and several book/chapter titles were obtained in this way.
The type of literature that emerged covered the range of possible publications, including:
• Articles in peer reviewed journals (health economics-related and health policy-related,
both qualitative and quantitative)
• Books
• Chapters in books
• Official reports by international agencies (e.g. EU, ILO, OECD)
(also known as numeraires) would also provide possible bases for comparison. One such specific PPP is the
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• Official reports by national governments
• Unpublished papers and reports both from government agencies and individual
investigators
The literature has subsequently been categorized and appraised in terms of:
• First, the quality and robustness of the evidence (strong, moderate or weak) over time
and across countries and
• Second, the relevance to the subject under investigation (high, medium, low)
Finally, common themes have been identified, in accordance with the above two appraisal
criteria and gaps have also been identified in the existing evidence-base.
2.3 Historical context and general observations
2.3.1 Historical context
Information on health expenditures has evolved quite considerably over the past 40-45 years,
mostly in developed countries and less so in developing countries. The earliest
comprehensive international study was published in 1959 by the International Labour
Organisation, and compared medical payments under social insurance schemes with
payments under voluntary (private) health insurance schemes in the USA. Several years later
Abel-Smith (1963, 1967) was the first to try to standardise cross-national data by defining the
constituent components of health services, listing the main sources of finance, and laying
down a standard classification of expenditures which he applied to 15 industrialised
countries. These efforts were followed by some studies, comparative in nature (Simanis,
1973; Simanis, 1990), which led to the development of what is now known as the OEeD
Health Database. The database contains time-series information on health care expenditures,
inputs to individual health systems, as well as some outputs, and is prepared using standard
Health-PPP.
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definitions (OECD, 1989; OECD, 1993) The database, which is now updated annually, relies
on information supplied by the member countries of the organisation (currently 30). Although
the data are standardised according to the OECD's guidelines, they inevitably reflect national
variation in methods of variable measurement, data collection and reporting. The data have
been the subject of intensive econometric analysis of the determinants of health care
expenditures using cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional and time-series perspectives. As a
medium of analysis the database is very user-friendly and provides a single point of access
for data on developed market economies. Nevertheless, the national variations in variable
measurements, data collection and reporting result in analyses offering little cross-country
comparability, which, in tum compromises the usefulness of such analyses from a policy
perspective.
2.3.2 General observations from the empirical literature
The range of empirical models used to analyse the determinants of health expenditures in
both developed and developing countries has been quite diverse. While the early literature
focused on the simple relationship between national income and health spending, subsequent
research attempted a more in-depth analysis of the determinants of health expenditures by
incorporating additional variables, such as demographic factors (e.g. male or female life
expectancy, infant mortality, the share of population aged 65 and over, the share of
population aged 16 or under), lifestyle variables (such as the consumption of alcohol or
tobacco), and variables related to the organisation and financing of the health system (e.g.
financing method, provider payment methods, cost-sharing, etc).
A variety of different analytic frameworks was used including cross-sectional, time-series
and pooled cross-sectional analysis. Much consideration has also been given to the
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appropriateness of the technique(s) used. As cross-sectional (and, subsequently, pooled cross-
sectional) analysis dominated the empirical literature, one of the most important issues was
the use of a conversion method, whereby financial variables from each country were
expressed in a common currency. The debate here focused on the use of exchange rates,
purchasing power parities (PPPs) and average wage earning power.
Regardless of the methodology, the key results remain the same over time, namely that
variations in national income, as proxied by GDP, explain much of the variation in health
care expenditures. Furthermore, the majority of the empirical studies have concluded that
health care spending rises faster than national income, making health care a luxury good.
Although this result appears to be broadly consistent over time and independent of the
statistical method used, there are occasional "discrepancies" dependent on the functional
form and/or the conversion method used. Thus, depending on the type of model, and whether
exchange rates or purchasing power parities (PPPs) are used as conversion factors, the result
is not always greater-than-unity income elasticity of demand. Table 2.1 provides a descriptive
account of published literature, the type of model used and econometric analysis performed,
and the corresponding income elasticity found. These results are reviewed in more depth in
the following sections.
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T bl 2 1 E .a e - stimates 0 ncome asticities 0 ea t are xpen itures
Author(s) and year Type of model (form) Type of data Income
Elasticity
Univariate approach
Abel Smith (1967) Linear Cross-section Luxury: 1.3
Kleiman (1974) Log-linear Cross-section Luxury: 1.2
Newhouse (1977) Linear Cross-section Luxury: 1.31
Luxury: 1.26
Cullis and West Linear Cross-section Luxury
(1979)
Maxwell (1981) Linear Cross-section Luxury: 1.4
Parkin et al. (1987) Exchange rate conversions Cross-section Luxury: 1.12
Linear Normal: 0.8
Semi-log Luxury: 1.57
Exponential Luxury: 1.19
Double-log
PPP conversions Normal: 0.9
Linear Normal: 0.8
Semi-log Luxury: 1.12
Exponential Luxury: 1.00
Double-log
Culyer (1988, Log-linear Pooled cross- Luxury
1989) section
Schieber (1990) Log-linear Pooled cross- Luxury: 1.2
section
Gertler & van der Log-linear Cross-secti on Luxury: 1.3
Gaag (1990)
Gerdtham and Double-log Cross-section Luxury: 1.24
Jonsson (1991) Exchange rate conversions Luxury: 1.43
GDP PPP conversions Luxury: 1.43
Health PPP conversions
Milne & Molana Log Cross-section Luxury: 1.74
(1991)
Getzen & Poullier Log-linear Pooled cross- Luxury: 1.51
(1991) section
Getzen & Poullier Log-linear Pooled cross- Luxury: 1.4
(1992) section
Murthy (1992) Double-log (corrected for
heteroscedasticity) Cross-section Luxury: 1.34
Exchange rate conversions Luxury: 1.57
GDP PPP conversions Luxury: 1.19
Health PPP conversions
Multivariate approach
Leu (1986) Log-Linear Cross-section Luxury: 1.18
Modell Cross-section Luxury: 1.36
Model2 Cross-section Luxury: 1.21
fI El fH I he E d·
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Model3
Double log
Gerdtham, Modell Cross-section Luxury: 1.44
Soegaard, Model2 Cross-section Luxury: 1.296
Anderson & Model3 Cross-section Luxury: 1.327
Jonsson (1992)
Gerdtham (1992) Log-linear Pooled cross Necessity: 0.74
section
Hitiris and Posnett Linear & log-linear
(1992) Exchange rate conversions Pooled Luxury: 1.026
GOP PPP conversions Luxl!_ry:1.16
Viscusi (1994) Log-linear Pooled
Exchange rate conversion Luxury: 1.1
PPP conversion Luxury: 1.1
Gerdtham et al.
(1992b) Double-log Pooled Luxury
Gerdtham et al Log-linear Pooled Necessity: 0.66-
(1994, 1995, 1998) 0.82
Saez & Murillo Double-log Time-series by Necessity: 0.72-
(1994) country 0.8i
Luxury: 1.042-
1.8692
Barros (1998) Quadratic Pooled Necessity but
not
significantly
different than 0
Roberts (1998) Log-linear Pooled Around 1 or
significantly
higher than 1
depending on
model
Murillo et al. OLS, ML, Cointegration Time-series Luxury
(1993)
Grubaugh and Double-log Pooled Necessity: 0.7
Santerre (1994)
Hansen and King OLS, Co-integration Time-series No long-run
(1996) relationship
between HCE
andGDP
Gerdtham et al. Double-log Pooled Necessity
(1995)
Blomqvist and Log-linear, Co-integration Cross-section Luxury
Carter (1997) Time-series Around 1
Pooled Necessity
McCoskey and Panel Unit Root Tests using Pooled There is a long-
Selden (1998) the IPS tests run relationship
between HCE
and GDP.
38
Hitiris (1997) Log-linear Pooled Luxury: 1-1.2
Kanavos and
Yfantopoulos Double-log Time-series, Necessity for
(1999) country-by-country individual
analysis countries
Notes: 1 for the Netherlands (0.82) and the UK (0.72).
2 For Germany (1.052), Belgium (1.042), Denmark (1.223), Spain
(1.869), France (1.235), Ireland (1.431), Italy (1.517), and
Luxembourg (1.773).
Source: Author's compilation from the literature.
2.4 The relationship between National Income and Health
Expenditure
2.4.1 The issues
Three important distinctions among the studies are emphasized in the following discussion.
which account at least partly for the diversity of results obtained. The diversity relates largely
to the value of income elasticity of demand. Although an elasticity greater than unity is
commonly found, as noted above, lower-than-unity income elasticity has also been found on
several occasions.
The first distinction pertains to whether the studies used:
• cross-sectional data,
• time-series data,
• pooled data over time but excluding the effects of time and country dummies, or
• pooled data over time and accounting for time and group dummies.
The second distinction is whether they used the single variable approach, where health care
expenditures (HCE) are regressed on only gross domestic product (GDP), or the multivariate
approach where non-income regressors are also included. The third distinction is the method
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used to convert the data in national currencies for the purpose of international comparison
and the fourth distinction relates to the use of different functional forms of the model (linear,
log-linear, double-log, quadratic, etc).
2.4.2 The bi-variate approach: evidence on the statistical relationship
between health care expenditures and income
The earliest studies used the single regressor approach, thereby investigating only the
statistical relationship between health care expenditure and income, whereas subsequent
studies used the multivariate approach and more sophisticated econometric techniques. Given
the accepted wisdom that health expenditures are affected by national income, studies in the
1960s, 1970s, and many in the 1980s used the single-variable model, thus examining the
aggregate relationship between income and health care spending in a group of countries using
a cross-sectional approach. Variables such as the age structure of the population, the
financing of the health care system, the method of reimbursing providers, the prices of health
inputs, and other aspects of health care delivery were assumed to have little importance.
These first generation studies adopted an aggregate macroeconomic approach, which appears
to have been based on Wagner's Law (1883), which states that as national income increases,
government spending also increases mainly due to an increase in demand for public services.
More specifically, the above relationship examined could be formalized as:
GIY = f (YIN) (1)
where G, represents government spending, Y represents total national income, GN represents
government spending as a proportion of total national income, N represents population size,
and YIN represents income per capita, respectively.
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One important finding of earlier empirical studies is that the health care/GDP ratio increases
as the country advances to higher stages of industrialisation and standards of living. The early
literature in the area dates as far back as 1963, to the pioneering work of Abel-Smith for the
World Health Organisation [6]. Abel-Smith examined the following relationship for 15
countries:
Total Health Expenditure/Income = f (per capita income) (2)
In these studies it was shown that, after adjustment for inflation, exchange rates and
controlling for population, GDP is a major determinant of health expenditures.
The stream of literature that followed this observation focused on whether health expenditure
rises faster than GDP, by examining the statistical relationship between GDP per capita and
health care expenditure per capita (bivariate regression). Following Abel-Smith's two studies,
a third study using cross-sectional regression analysis to explore the same issues was
conducted by Kleiman (1974). Applied regression analysis was employed with a log-linear
model and the income elasticity of demand was found to be greater than unity.
Newhouse (1977) regressed annual per capita income (GDP) data on per capita medical care
expenditure from 13 developed countries, working in US$ at annual average exchange rates,
although the year selected was not the same for each country, varying between 1968 and
1972. The model used was linear, examining the relationship between health expenditure per
capita (dependent variable) and GDP per capita (independent variable).
6 This drew on Abel-Smith's earlier work for the Royal Commission looking at future trends in health care
expenditures in the UK.
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HEI = -60 + 0.079GDP" R2 = 0.92 (3)
While the Newhouse study had no theoretical foundation and merely examined the
relationship between two macroeconomic variables, the conclusions reached (health care
having an income elasticity of demand greater than unity and per capita income explaining
most of the variation in health spending [in fact 92% of it - see equation (2) above]), had
considerable implications on two counts. Firstly, all factors other than income were
considered to have negligible impact and secondly, because health care was found to be a
luxury good, it was argued that a marginal unit of health care would contribute more towards
care (or subjective components of health) rather than cure (physiological health). The latter
result is " ... consistent with the view that in the developed countries, medical care services at
the margin have less to do with common measures of health status, such as mortality and
morbidity and more to do with services that are easily measured such as relief of anxiety,
somewhat more accurate diagnosis and heroic measures near the end of life ... " (Newhouse,
1977, p. 123). This is a fascinating issue, given that we now include humanity within quality
of care and recognise that poor quality care may deter access by those in need. Although the
explanation offered was rather intuitive, it did not really emerge as a clear-cut result from the
analysis performed. Following Newhouse, Cullis and West (1979) applied regression to
cross-sectional data, using a linear model, supporting the luxury good hypothesis. Indeed, the
authors concluded that "empirical evidence indicates health care to be a luxury good that at
the margin may contribute little to physiological health, for developed countries at least".
Secondly, the higher-than-unity income elasticities of demand, based as they were on
microeconomic theory, were in conflict with earlier and later studies using microeconomic[7]
7 Household or personal level.
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or intermediate [8] data. In these studies the income elasticities had generally been low, and
almost always less than unity (Andersen & Benham, 1970; Grossman, 1972; Newhouse &
Phelps, 1974; Muurinen, 1982; Okunade, 1985; Wagstaff, 1986; Manning et al, 1987; and
Gbsemete & Gerdtham, 1992). The same applies to studies that have used state or province-
level data from the USA or Canada. Studies of this type include, among others: (a) Feldstein
(1971), who examines income and hospital expenditure from 47 US states between 1958 and
1967 and finds an income elasticity of demand of 0.5; (b) Fuchs and Kramer (1972),
examining income and physician expenditure from 33 US states for 1966 finding an elasticity
of 0.9; (c) Levit (1982), examining the relationship between income and total health
expenditure in 50 states between 1966 and 1978, finding an elasticity of 0.9; (d) Baker
(1997), who looked at the relationship between income and Medicare health care expenditure
in 3,073 US counties over the period 1986-1990 finding an elasticity of 0.8; and (e) Di
Matteo and Di Matteo (1998), who examined the income-health expenditure relationship in
10 Canadian provinces over the period 1965-1991 finding an income elasticity of demand of
0.8. The reasons for this macro-economic versus micro-economic discrepancy are examined
in section 2.7 below.
The model estimated by Newhouse (1977) is an over-simplified model, employing
macroeconomic data to arrive at microeconomic conclusions. The main finding has,
nevertheless, been confirmed in a number of other studies, such as Schieber (1990), Gertler &
van der Gaag (1990), Getzen & Poullier (1991) and (1992) and Milne & Molana (1991). All
these studies use the same broad approach, testing the health-GDP relationship at aggregate
level.
8 Regional, implying state-level or provincial data, rather than national.
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Newhouse's model has, however, been subject to several criticisms. One is that it mis-
specifies the model by omitting variables and adopting an inadequate functional form (Parkin
et al 1987). An additional line of criticism relates to the use of exchange rates as conversion
factors. Parkin et al (1987) replicated Newhouse's regression, for 18 OECD countries, using
1980 data and experimenting with different functional forms (linear, semi-log, double-log,
exponential) and using different conversion factors (exchange rates and purchasing power
parities - PPPs). They found the model was sensitive to the choice of functional form, since
different models yielded elasticities greater or smaller than unity (see table 2.1, column 4). It
was observed, nevertheless, that semi-log models consistently imply that health care is a
necessity, whether PPPs or exchange rate conversions are used, and, similarly, the
exponential form results always imply that it is a luxury, It appears, therefore, that the results
obtained are self-fulfilling prophecies, as in the conventional Engel curve literature such
forms are deliberately used as being the most appropriate for goods which are a priori
believed to be luxuries or necessities. The second finding was that the choice of conversion
factor also resulted in considerable differences in the size of the income elasticity of demand.
In all functional forms, PPPs would render lower value elasticities, and where the central
estimate of the elasticity was above unity, it was not significantly higher than one (Parkin et
al, 1987, p. 118).
A number of other studies followed which broadly confirmed Abel-Smith's (1963, 1967) and
Newhouse's (1977) initial results, among them, Maxwell (1981), Gerdtham et al (1988),
Culyer (1988, 1989), Cullis and West (1979), Gerdtham and Jonsson (1991a), and Parkin et
al. (1987). These studies differed in incorporating additional independent variables, other
than GDP per capita. Some also addressed several of the points made by Parkin et al.
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Using GDP-PPP conversions, Culyer (1988, 1989) estimated individual country and pooled
cross-sectional and time-series models respectively for OECD countries using 1985 OECD
data. He found a strong positive relationship between health care expenditures and GDP over
time. Gerdtham and Jonsson (1991a) used a cross-section from the 1985 OECD data, and cast
doubt on the robustness of the results obtained by Parkin et aI. They obtained an income
elasticity of 1.43 even when they deflated the per capita health care spending by a Health-
specific PPP index, rather than benchmark PPP index based on the general basket of goods
and services (GDP-specific PPP). The significance of using a Health-specific PPP index is
that, at least in theory, it is specific to variations in the prices included in a basket of health-
related goods and services, whereas a GDP-specific PPP index is a much more general
measure of variations in prices of all goods and services included in the index, which also
includes health goods and services, but which only make up a very small proportion of the
total. All PPP indices, whether Health-specific or GDP-specific are constructed on the basis
of a basket of goods and services which is "representative" of household consumption in each
country and broadly comparable across countries[9].
Some studies used the linear form, some the log-linear and others the double-log specification
of the expenditure equation. When different functional forms and/or estimation techniques
were used on the same data, the results changed (see Parkin et aI., 1987). ,. The preference for
the log-linear form over the linear form is "based on the contention that the linear model
biases the health-expenditure to GDP elasticity towards luxury good values, particularly if
inflation has a disproportionate impact on health expenditure (Hitiris 1997, p. 4)." A
logarithmic function stabilizes data and the relationship between variables and is therefore
considered to be optimal for analytical purposes. Gedtham and Jonsson (1991) replicated the
9 Despite the arguments about a Health-PPP index being representative, we show in chapter 3 that this is far
from being the case. This also shows a further inherent problem in empirical research of this kind: the fact that
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simple one variable approach used by earlier studies with updated data, using a cross-section
of22 OECD countries in 1985. They estimated the double-log form and found the health care
income elasticity to be greater than 1 regardless of whether exchange rates, Health-specific
PPPs, or GDP-specific PPPs are used for monetary conversions. They used an established
functional transformation (a Box-Cox transformation, Box & Cox (1964» to decide upon the
most suitable functional form to use, and concluded that the double-log function relating
health care expenditure and GDP was "the most adequate in cross-sectional comparisons of
health care expenditure (Gerdtham and Jonsson, 1991, p. 230)", therefore yielding the best
fit.
The above studies consistently found income elasticities of demand for health care that are
greater than 1, suggesting that health is a luxury good. Table 2.1 summarises the results.
Given that about 90% of the variance in medical care expenditures across countries was
found to be explained by income, the authors concluded that factors other than income are not
likely to be important determinants of a country's health care expenditures.
Parkin et al (1987) used different functional forms and different conversion factors to
comment on results obtained by other authors. This enabled them to comment on several
issues including the cost of inputs versus volume of services, the type of analysis, and the
assumptions made, as well as providing a response to Newhouse's comment on the
caring/curing dichotomy. First, they confirm the strong positive relationship between GDP
per capita and health care expenditure per capita defined using Purchasing Power Parities
(PPPs). Second, they show that the percentage of health care spending in GDP and per capita
GDP itself are weakly associated, when the former is defined by GDP-PPPs. Third, they
there is an over-reliance on what is readily provided, without much scrutiny on the methodology used.
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show that expenditure on medical care is more responsive to GOP per capita than are various
measures of staffing (numbers of doctors, nurses). Fourth, they argue that, because staff
levels vary less than expenditure, much of the variation is in price per unit, supporting the use
of Health-specific PPPs. As well as identifying certain model misspecifications in previous
research, they also show that income elasticity can vary according to the type of deflator
used. Thus, an income elasticity of 1.18 is calculated when the deflator is the exchange rate,
whereas it drops to 0.9 when the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is used as a deflator. Finally,
they also question what then was an accepted view that the additional expenditure is buying
"caring" rather than "curing".
Newhouse (1987) criticises the approach taken by Parkin et al (1987) and questions their
conclusion that variations in health care expenditure reflect primarily variation in factor
prices on the grounds that staffing ratios do not strongly respond to income; instead he argues
that if one used hedonic (i.e. quality adjusted) prices, US staffing ratios would probably vary
more strongly with expenditure. In defending the "care rather than cure" conclusion, he
argues that significant literature supports this earlier finding. Finally, he seems to place more
value on the finding that income elasticities from international cross-sectional comparisons
substantially exceed zero, rather than the income elasticity exceeding unity. This appears to
be a departure from the earlier stance that income elasticity of demand is definitely greater
than unity. Finally, Milne and Molana (1991) have experimented with the impact of prices on
the robustness of the income elasticity of demand and find that for the OECD countries health
care can be described as a luxury good, although the income effect is absolutely compensated
by variations in prices. Milne and Molana reject Newhouse's (1977) estimates and point out
that Parkin et aI's (1987) results correspond to an excessively restricted model.
47
There are several drawbacks associated with these studies. Most of them utilized cross-
sectional data drawn from a single year because data were not available that spanned multiple
years. Of the studies listed above, only a few used pooled data over time. Among them were
Culyer (1988, 1989), Schieber (1990), and Getzen and Poullier (1991, 1992). The data sets
were very small, the econometric models were not equipped to control for individual country
differences that may cause variations in health care expenditures, and comparable data across
countries were not readily available. According to Parkin et al. (1987), "all income elasticities
from single-variable equations are unreliable (p.120)." In addition, the absence of variables
other than income may have led to specification bias from omitted variables and caused large
income elasticities.
As already noted, when comparing results over time and among countries at the same time,
adjustments are necessary to make monetary variables as comparable as is possible. Most of
these studies converted financial data using exchange rates. Parkin et al. (1987) showed that
the results differ significantly when different criteria are employed. They used a cross-section
of 18 countries published by the OEeD in 1985 and regressed health care expenditure per
capita on GDP per capita for 1980 and health expenditures as a percentage of GDP per capita.
They first used exchange rate conversions into the U.S. dollar, and then they used the
purchasing power parities (PPPs) index for health care published by the OEeD. The results
obtained when using exchange rate conversions were consistent with results from other
single-variable studies. Namely, they found that the income variable accounts for a large
proportion of the variation in health care expenditure. The income elasticity at the mean was
also found to be greater than one. On the other hand, when PPPs were used, the income
elasticity dropped to 0.90, implying that health care is a necessity good. Parkin et al. (1987)
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concluded that "international comparisons of commodities which are based upon exchange
rates are at best approximations (p. 113)."
Similar results were obtained in additional pieces of research that used pooled cross-sectional
data from several OEeD countries and for a number of years (Gerdtham, 1991). A number of
studies in the 1980s and 1990s incorporated the work of Grossman (1972) who provided the
theoretical framework for the microeconomic approach in his theory of consumer utility
maximization and demand analysis. As a result, the use of pooled time-series data became
more frequent but was not without problems as the following sections suggest.
2.4.3 Conversion factor instability: Exchange Rates and PPPs for the
Comparison of Health Care Expenditure across Countries
When performing cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional analysis across countries, health
care expenditures and GDP have been converted into a common currency either through
market exchange rates, or through the use of purchasing power parities (PPPs) [10]. The
debate here focuses on which of these two methodologies is more suitable for comparative
analysis and generates more robust results. In this context, Parkin et al (1987), and Gerdtham
& Joensson (1991a, 1991b), have drawn attention to the importance of the conversion factor
used to enable comparisons to be made between expenditures denominated in national
currencies.
Parkin et al (1987) have argued against the use of exchange rates as deployed by several
earlier authors (Kleiman, 1974; Newhouse, 1977; Cullis & West, 1979; Maxwell, 1981; and
Leu, 1986), on the basis that they may not adequately reflect relative purchasing power across
10 These can be either GDP-based PPPs, or health-related PPPs.
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countries and that their use attaches little weight to non-marketed commodities such as health
care. In that context, Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) have been used, which are thought to
reflect purchasing power across countries and also enable differentiation between health and
GDP parities (Health-PPPs and GDP-PPPs, respectively). In particular, the use of Health-
PPPs for health care expenditures is crucial in that, if the relative price of health care
increases with per capita income, this will lead to an overestimation of the pure health care
income elasticity as assessed by simple exchange rate conversion or with GDP-specific PPPs.
There is also a stream of literature from international trade theory proposing good arguments
for a relationship between the relative price of health care and per capita income (Kravis et aI,
1982; Bhagwati, 1984; Kravis et ai, 1988). On the basis of a sample of 18 OECD countries in
1980, the use of different conversion factors, i.e. exchange rates and Health-specific & GDP-
specific PPPs, yields different estimates of income elasticity of demand for health (see Table
2.1). This stream of literature concludes that although GDP-specific PPPs offer significant
conceptual advantages over exchange rates, neither is a theoretically correct conversion factor
in that context. However, the question of suitability of GDP-specific versus Health-specific
PPPs is not addressed.
On the other hand, Gerdtham & Jonsson (1991) reported results for a similar sample of 22
OECD countries using 1985 data, testing the same relationship between health expenditure
and income by using a linear multiplicative functional form. They suggested that the value of
the estimated income elasticity is invariant with respect to the use of GDP-PPPs or Health-
PPPs, while the use of exchange rate adjustment leads to a slight fall in the estimated
elasticity, but remains well above unity. Thus, Gerdtham & Jonsson (1991) found no
perceptible conversion factor instability (using exchange rates, GDP-specific PPPs, and
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Health-specific PPPs to convert per capita health care expenditure) with respect to the
magnitude of the health care income elasticity.
Murthy (1992) pointed out that Gedtham & Jonsson's (1991) results reported above might be
biased due to heteroscedasticity [11] in the residuals. He re-estimated Gerdtham & Jonsson's
models with exactly the same data and corrected for heteroscedasticity, by employing the
White heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator (White, 1980). Contrary to
the finding by Gerdtham & Jonsson (1991), the income elasticity presented by Murthy was
not significantly greater than unity in the case of per capita health care expenditure deflated
by Health-specific PPPs (see table 2.1). This finding suggests that health care is perhaps a
necessity rather than a luxury, Thus, the income elasticity is not identical for the two PPP
conversion factors. This elasticity measure is sensitive to whether exchange rates or PPPs are
chosen. In a nutshell, it appears that Murthy confirms Parkin et al's (1987) finding of
conversion factor instability, using a larger sample and a different year.
However Gerdtham & Jonsson (1992), in a response to Murthy (1992) apply further tests for
heteroscedasticity, but cannot detect it, which leads them to conclude that the income
elasticities of demand exceed unity with all conversions and that these results are robust as
estimated (see table 2.1). They also confirm another point raised by Murthy, namely the
existence of outliers in the sample, and the fact that they influence the regression results. It is
concluded that it is important to examine for sensitivity to changes in the sample or the
estimation procedure [12].
11 Heteroscedasticity in a model arises when the variance of the disturbance factor may not be constant for all
observations in a cross-section model. In this case, the conventionally calculated t-statistics of the regression
coefficients may be overstated.
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Kravis et al (1978) pointed to the greater ability of PPP compared with exchange rates to
evaluate the true volume of health care expenditure and income. Milne & Molana (1991), in
support of Parkin et al (1987), argued that when prices are allowed to play an unrestricted
explanatory role, the income elasticity turns out to be significantly greater than unity for
health care expenditures. They found that for OECD countries health can be described as a
luxury good although the income effect is absolutely compensated by variations in prices.
However, as Karatzas (1992) argued, this conclusion is questionable and that the empirical
evidence is not uniformly supportive. He found a real income elasticity for health
expenditures which is smaller than unity. It also emerged from his findings that the use of
exchange rates, instead of PPPs, resulted in a smaller-than-unity income elasticity for real
health expenditures during the sample period.
It emerges, therefore, that there is considerable uncertainty in the literature as to which
conversion method (exchange rate, Health-specific PPPs, GDP-specific PPPs) yields robust
results, and whether these results are reliable across countries and over time. It is important to
note that all the empirical literature summarised so far tested the simple relationship between
health care expenditures (per capita) and GDP (per capita), without the inclusion of other
explanatory variables on the right hand side of the models.
All these studies also use cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional data. Murillo et al (1993)
and Saez et al (1994) used times series data by country and continued the tradition of GDP-
specific and Health-specific PPPs, by converting aggregate health expenditure and GOP
figures from national currencies into a common denominator by using Health- and GOP-
PPPs, respectively. They correctly point out that health spending and income per capita may
12 The authors do that by using other estimators when outliers are present in order to show the sensitivity of results
to sample changes or estimation procedure changes.
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not be stationary and, hence, may be subject to underlying trends that would affect the nature
of the results obtained with linear regression analysis. By using dynamic econometric
modelling, they concluded that GDP PPPs can be taken as a universal price index that can be
applied to convert both GDP and Health data. They also found a greater-than-unity income
elasticity of demand.
2.4.4 Final remarks on the bi-variate approach
The empirical evidence summarised in the previous sections spans over 30 years and
comprises a gamut of investigations ranging from simple observations on the relationship
between health care expenditures and income to sophisticated econometric analysis. The
following remarks can be made at this stage:
First, the vast majority of the surveyed literature does not take into account the fact that
health care expenditure is an element ofGDP. This may have an impact on the validity of the
obtained results, regardless of whether a cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional or time-series
approach is used. This may offer an explanation as to why researchers using the same data
sources and statistical analysis (cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional), but for different
years, arrive at different, and, often opposing, results.
Second, if time series analysis is employed, there is a strong probability that the data from
most countries will have underlying trends, a phenomenon common across macroeconomic
time-series, which leads to biased model estimates which offer no explanatory validity.
Robust analysis should de-trend the data in order for regression estimates to have of any
value or policy relevance.
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Third, it appears that a great deal of effort has been expended on determining the best
conversion factor for cross-country comparisons. This is a key point, since it relates to a great
extent to the perception of health care as a non-tradable "good", the price of that service
relative to the aggregate price level in the economy, and the volume of health services
produced. There appears to be some consensus in favour of using PPPs instead of exchange
rates, although research seems to suggest that because of the nature of health care, Health-
PPPs ought to be used to deflate health care expenditures, and GDP-PPPs to deflate income,
rather than using GDP-PPPs for both health expenditure and income variables.
2.S The multivariate approach
The multi-variate approach to the investigation of the determinants of health care
expenditures recognises that the bi-variate approach is problematic due to omitted variables
and the bias in the income coefficient that results. Several studies have tried to address the
determinants of health care expenditure in a more comprehensive and robust way. Cross-
sectional, pooled cross-sectional and time-series analyses have been employed. This section
summarises the evidence from all three statistical approaches.
2.5.1 Multivariate cross-section analysis
2.5.1.1 Empirical evidence
Leu (1986), using cross-section data from 19 OECD countries (excluding Luxembourg,
Iceland, Japan, Portugal and Turkey), tested for significance of variables other than per capita
income. His model included institutional factors and factors related to health outputs. Other
variables in his analysis included, first, exogenous variables, such as the proportion of
persons under 15 and over 65 (to test the hypothesis that the young and the old tend to use
more health care than others), and urbanisation (to test the hypotheses that the risk of
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contagion is higher and time and travel costs are lower in cities); second, a variable to reflect
the extent of public sector provision of health services, to test the hypothesis that an increase
in the size of public share would increase total spending. This makes use of well-known
results in public choice theory. Leu also suggested that health expenditures should increase as
the fraction of health expenditure that is public increases, assuming implicitly that this
fraction reduces the price to consumers. Finally, he used a number of dummy variables to
capture features dominant in individual health care systems, for instance a dummy for the
National Health Service in the UK and New Zealand, where centralised budget control might
have a restraining effect, and a dummy for direct democracy in Switzerland, on the grounds
that controlling health care expenditure might be easier if voters had greater direct control
over government choice and tax levels.
It was found that income provided an explanation for most of the variation in health care
spending, with an elasticity of demand exceeding unity (See table 2.1). Additionally, a
statistically significant relationship was found between health care expenditure and
demographic as well as health system-related variables (e.g. population under 15 years,
urbanisation, the ratio of public financing to total financing, the ratio of public beds to total
beds). The signs of the parameters were also found to be as expected, although with mostly
small coefficients. The strongest results were: (a) a 10% increase in the public to total bed
ratio would increase health care expenditure by 8-9%, and (b) the NHS dummy suggested
that an NHS-type system would lower health care expenditure by 20-25%, ceteris paribus.
Leu's analysis has remained controversial, particularly as regards the institutional variables.
Indeed, Culyer (1988) noted that private sector bureaucrats are not necessarily better
controlled than their colleagues in the public sector that costs in the private sector may be
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larger due to advertising and selling costs and that market pressures may be less reliable than
professional ethics and regulation. Culyer (1989) also suggests that both of Leu's hypotheses,
i.e. that both public finance and public provision increase expenditure, depend on a passive
response from the financing agent, who adjusts the supply of finance to the quantities and
prices of health care services. It is further suggested that the financing mechanism, in
particular, the degree of open-endedness of finance and the lack of budget restriction, would
be more relevant than the distribution of finance and provision between public and private
institutions. The conclusion of this discourse appears to be that the impact of the fraction of
finance and/or provision that is public on health care expenditure cannot be determined a
priori. However, countries with more closed health care financing systems are anticipated to
have lower expenditure. Despite the reference made to public choice theory, the a priori signs
of the variables proposed by Leu remain in doubt and other investigators, have not been able
to replicate these results. This may be partly due to the fact that the year or the period of
analysis typically changes amongst investigators as does the functional form used in the
analysis (e.g. linear, log-linear, double log). The combination of the two may produce
different results altogether.
Gerdtham et al (1992a) performed a cross-sectional analysis of nineteen OECD countries,
using data from 1987, and estimated a double log linear model as follows:
LnHCEpc = In bl + b21nGDPpc + b31nRPhc + b41nDOCpc + bslnIP +
b61nPF + b7FEE + BsGLOBAL + b91nFP+ bioinAGE +
bllinURB + e (4)
The model included GDP per capita (GDPpc), variables representing socio-demographic
conditions (age structure of population (AGE) and urbanisation [(RB)], institutional factors
such as the share of total health expenditures used in inpatient health care (IP), preponderance
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of fee-for-service in outpatient care (FEE), share of public health finance (PF), number of
practicing physicians per capita (DOCpc), a female participation ratio (FP) (measured as
labour force/population aged 15 to 64 years), and a dummy variable capturing other
institutional variables, such as global budgeting in hospital care (GLOBAL).
2.5.1.2 The results of the multi-variate cross-section analysis
All three models found a greater-than-unity elasticity (see table 2.1). The authors' "preferred"
model had five variables: GDP per capita, urbanisation, fraction of public financing, fraction
of in-patient care expenditure, and the dummy variable for countries with fee-for-service
payment. This accounted for 95% of the variance and nearly all variables had the expected
sign. In contrast to Leu, an increase in the fraction of public financing by 10% was associated
with 5% lower health expenditure, while a 10% increase in the fraction of in-patient care had
a positive impact on health expenditure of around 2%. Thus, it was argued that a greater
degree of public penetration offers a better opportunity for the control of health care
expenditure, as the two variables were negatively related. The fee-for-service dummy
variable indicated that health expenditure was about 11% higher than in countries where that
arrangement dominated, thus confirming what was believed to be the case. None of the
demographic variables except urbanisation was significant and this had an unexpected
(negative) sign.
2.5.2 Multivariate pooled cross-section analysis
Pooled cross-sectional analysis enables the testing of country and time-invariant effects and
the larger number of observations is advantageous statistically. A number of studies have
employed pooled cross-sectional analysis and this tool has, over time, enabled the testing of
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diverse models with a large number of regressors and the use of several dummy variables in a
single model.
Gerdtham (1992) used data for 22 OECO countries for the period 1972-1987, exploring
several models with dynamic adjustment of health expenditure to movements in exogenous
variables and different lag structures. A reduced number of explanatory variables were
specified: GOP, inflation, share of public financing, and the proportion of the elderly (over 65
years of age) in the population. Static as well as restricted error correction models were
specified and tests were carried out using five different panel data models, i.e. two-way
country and period fixed and random effects models, one-way fixed and random country
effects models, and strict ordinary least squares (OLS) without country and time dummies.
An important conclusion was that country or time-specific effects had important implications
for the results. Indeed, permanent non-identified country and time-period effects were found
to influence health expenditures and had a significant impact on the income elasticity of
demand. An important finding was that the estimated elasticity of health expenditure with
respect to GDP was 0.74 (significantly lower than unity), in static equilibrium models and
using both country- and time-period dummies), but the remaining variables were
insignificant.
Hitiris & Posnett (1992) re-estimated the models of Newhouse (1977) and Leu (1986), using
a sample of 560 pooled time-series and cross-sectional observations from 20 OECO countries
for the 1960-1987 period using an OLS estimation. All models were estimated both in linear
and log-linear form. Their estimation method took into account cross-sectionally
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heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive disturbance terms [13] and the degree of
autoregression varied among cross-sections. The model that was used was
DCE (real per capita health care expenditures) =
= f (GDP, real per capita gross domestic product;
POP65, the proportion of the population over the age of 65;
PUBL, the proportion of DCE that is publicly funded) (5)
The results obtained confirmed the importance of GDP as a major determinant of health
expenditure, with an estimated income elasticity of at or around unity (1.026 with an
exchange rate conversion and 1.16 with a PPP conversion; see table 2.1). The importance of
some non-income variables is also confirmed, although the direct effect of these factors
appears to be small. In particular, the share of population over 65 and the share of public
health expenditure were found to be statistically significant. The authors also suggest that
since the relative price of health care [14] is related to the structure of the national system of
health finance and delivery, such factors may also enter indirectly as determinants of health
spending. However, evidence from cross-sectional studies suggests that the effect of relative
price on health expenditures is not significant (Gerdtham & Jonsson, 1991b; Milne &
Molana,1991).
Viscusi (1994) explored the impact of health promotion on mortality. The working
hypothesis employed was that health promoting policies intended to reduce mortality might
in fact increase it as the resources it consumes leads to a reduction in citizens' disposable
income, which, in tum, increases the risk of mortality. This implies that it is important to
estimate the marginal expenditure per statistical life lost. Viscusi proceeds from the following
13 A significant problem in time-series econometric analysis is autocorrelation in the residuals (the disturbance
term), a flaw that leads to biased parameter estimates, whose explanatory power is, in tum, very poor.
Estimation methods exist that correct for this problem and this is one of the approaches used.
14 Assuming that PPPs are used for the conversion of prices, the relative price of health care can be defined as
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relationship between the expenditure that will generate the loss of a statistical life and the
marginal value of life:
Marginal expenditure per statistical life lost = Marginal value of
life/Marginal propensity to spend on health (6)
One approach to estimating the marginal expenditure per statistical life lost is, first, to
estimate the marginal propensity to consume health care out of income, using OECD data,
and then to use this figure as a denominator in equation (6) above, in conjunction with a
value-of-life in the range of $3-$7 million. In the estimation of the marginal propensity to
spend, Viscusi used panel data for 24 OECD countries for the years 1960-1989 and a log-
linear weighted least squares model of health expenditures, including GDP and
unemployment rates, with and without 29 year dummies and 23 country dummies (two-way
fixed-effects models). Health expenditures and GDP were converted using both exchange
rates and Health- and GDP-PPPs. In accordance with previous studies the results showed that
GDP alone had a very high explanatory power, and that the unemployment rate was an
insignificant factor. The estimated income elasticity of demand in the two-ways fixed-effects
models was about 1.1 (see table 2.1) irrespective of whether health expenditures and GDP
were converted into a common denominator by exchange rates or PPPs [15].
One further study by Gerdtham and Jonsson, published in three different locations (1994),
(1995) and (1998), employs pooled cross section analysis for 22 countries, over the 1970-
1991 period examining the effects of different types of institutional arrangements (a series of
(Health PPP/ GDP PPP).
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dummies attempting to capture organisational factors, such as share of public beds, share of
co-payments, renal dialysis per million population, doctors per 1000 population, fee-for-
service reimbursement of doctors, and dummies related to the type of health system in place,
whether integrated, or public reimbursement, among others), and non-institutional factors
(GDP, proportion of population over 75, proportion of population less than 5, female labour
participation ratio as % of active population, unemployment rate, alcohol consumption and
tobacco consumption) on health care expenditures. The findings include, among others, an
income elasticity of demand below unity for models correlating total health spending with its
determinants, but also for models correlating components of health expenditures (in-patient
care, ambulatory care, pharmaceutical spending) with their determinants. The relationship
between the various components of health spending and GDP is found to be statistically
significant. It was also found that an increase in tobacco consumption by 10% would increase
health expenditure by 1.3%. Tobacco consumption is considered in these studies to be a
proxy for other behaviour that leads to higher health expenditure. However, no lags are
considered when including the tobacco variable in the model, which is surprising given the
lengthy lag period between initiating smoking and acquiring disease.
The authors also find institutional factors (methods of paying physicians, the existence or not
of gate-keeping) of great importance in the determination of total health spending. The
authors admit that many of the findings were unexpected, particularly those concerning the
institutional dummy variables. For instance, public reimbursement systems were found to be
the least expensive, with public integrated systems about as costly as public contract models
of health care. This is contrary to other empirical evidence (Hurst, 1992). Furthermore,
countries with budgetary ceilings on inpatient care appeared to have higher total expenditure,
15 Further from this estimation, the estimated marginal propensity to spend was around 0.1, which implies that
the marginal expenditure that will lead to the loss of one statistical life ranges from $30 million to $70 million.
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while larger numbers of doctors appeared to be related to lower overall expenditure.
Additional confounding factors seem to be at play here, which the above research simply
could not capture.
Further studies using this methodology have included work by Barros (1998), Roberts (1998),
and Hitiris (1997) who have dealt with the same issues as the previous studies, but in a
different way. Barros used data for 24 OECD countries and for the 1960-1990 period.
Contrary to Gerdham et al (1994, 1995, 1998), he concluded that the existence of gatekeepers
and the type of health system have played no significant role in containing health expenditure
growth. Furthermore, aging, and the relative size of public financing have not contributed to
the growth of health expenditure. The income elasticity of demand was found to be lower
than but close to unity, which is in line with the result found in previous pooled cross-
sectional studies. Roberts (1998) used data from 20 OECD countries over the 1960-1993
period and estimated static and dynamic models of determinants of health care expenditures,
by including both institutional and non-institutional factors in her analysis. A positive and
significant long-run elasticity of public financing was obtained, consistent with Leu (1986)
but different from Gerdtham (1992) and Barros (1998). In accordance with Gerdtham (1992)
and Barros (1998), the effect of population ageing was not significant. The relative price of
health care was also not significant. The income elasticity of demand for health care was
found to be around unity or significantly higher than unity, depending on the model used.
Hitiris (1997) applied pooled cross-section analysis to a sample of 10 European Union (EU)
countries, arguing that" ... since health care expenditure depends primarily on the level of
economic development and the structure of the population, only convergence in economic
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performance and the standards of living can lead to convergence of health expenditure
standards ... " (Hitiris, 1997, p. 1). He estimated the following model in log-linear form:
where in the I-th country and t-th year, HC is per capita health expenditure, Y is per capita
GDP, P is the dependency rate (population aged 0-19 plus population aged 65 and over taken
as per cent of population aged 20-64), G is the share of health care expenditure in total public
spending, I is the rate of inflation (1985=100), D is a country dummy variable to account for
differences in countries' health service systems, and u is an error term. Hitiris pooled time-
series and cross-sectional data from 10 European Community (EC) countries consisting of
observations for 1960-1991, and deflated the data using the PPP conversion (both GDP- and
Health-PPPs). The estimation technique used involved a double transformation of the
observations to remove autoregression and time-wise heteroscedasticity before applying
generalized least squares. All the main explanatory variables were found to be statistically
significant, and the estimated income elasticity ranged from 1.0 to 1.2. One of the main
criticisms of his analysis is that he did not take into account the literature on prices and the
extent to which they differ between countries having different levels of wealth (Maxwell,
1981; Kravis et al, 1982; Kravis et al, 1988).
2.5.2.1 The key findings of pooled cross-section analysis
Pooled cross-sectional analysis has yielded interesting results over time, some of which were
consistent with expectations and some not. The results obtained, both expected and
unexpected, may have been due to either poor functional form or misspecification. Most of
the pooled cross-sectional studies, particularly those making extensive use of dummy
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variables, suffer from considerable problems, which limit their ability to capture the
determinants of health care expenditure and thus to contribute to policy analysis and
development.
One such problem, particularly applicable in the case of fixed effects models, is that too
much of the cross-sectional variation may be attributed to the dummy variables representing
specific countries and/or time periods, rather than to the regressors which attempt to capture
the influences of economic and institutional factors. A second problem is that various authors
seem to be making assumptions about the state of health care systems in different countries,
without taking into consideration break points in the data and/or the introduction of reforms
that change organisational structures in different systems. Third, it is questionable whether
behavioural variables, such as tobacco consumption, can be included in levels since, as noted
earlier, it is known that the impact of tobacco consumption on human health involves a
significant lag, the precise structure of which will vary depending on levels of exposure to
other risk factors. Fourth, the interpretation of individual effects in a pooled cross-sectional
analysis that makes excessive use of dummies is rather problematic. For instance, budget
ceilings may be correlated with health expenditure because policy makers in different
countries may respond to higher expenditure by implementing spending caps. And, finally,
there appears to be a close relationship between several of the dummy variables. In this case,
one variable will appear to be non-significant, even if it has contributed to a significant effect
found for the related variable. This is a well-known problem in applied econometrics, called
multi-co linearity, and calls for a closer examination of the size of the model in terms of
robustness and parsimony.
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The failure by many authors to take account of these problems is likely to explain the
diversity of results obtained, with a great variation in the value of the income elasticity of
demand, ranging from significantly lower than unity, to significantly higher than unity.
2.5.3 Multi-variate time-series analysis
2.5.3.1 The importance of co-integration
At a casual level, many observed time series seem to display non-stationary characteristics.
For economic time-series non-stationary behaviour is often the most dominant characteristic.
Some series grow in a secular way over long periods of time, and others appear to wander
around as if they have no fixed population mean. Growth characteristics are especially
evident in time series that represent aggregate economic behaviour, such as gross domestic
product and industrial production. Random wandering behaviour is evident in many financial
time series, such as interest rates and asset prices. Similar phenomena arise in data from other
sectors, such as communications and political science, one example being opinion poll data
on presidential popularity. In health care, macroeconomic time series, such as total health
spending, or public expenditure on health care or some element thereof, such as hospitals,
may also display trends making them non-stationary. The implications of trends in
macroeconomic time-series are that any statistical interaction between two or more such
series yields biased results and, therefore, leads to wrong (policy) conclusions. Evidently,
therefore, any attempt to explain or forecast such series requires a mechanism to capture the
non-stationary elements in the series, or for the series to be transformed in some way to
achieve stationarity. Yet this is often difficult to achieve. The problem is particularly delicate
in the multi-variate case, where several time series may have non-stationary characteristics.
Testing for stationarity in macroeconomic time-series is therefore very important and should
not be omitted. Where stationarity is absent, but can be achieved through a transformation of
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the statistical relationship, analysis requires a specific type of analysis, called co-integration
analysis. Other than simply analysing the relationship between two or more variables, co-
integration analysis examines their long-run relationship.
The literature on the formulation, estimation, and testing of models for potentially co-
integrated economic time-series is truly vast, bordering on a complete discipline in its own
right (Banerjee et ai, 1993); (Hamilton, 1994); (Hendry, 1995); (Johansen, 1995); (Hansen &
Johansen, 1998); Hatanaka, 1996). It is therefore important that statistical analyses
investigating the relationship between macroeconomic variables may first need to test for
trends in the data and integration between different variables, before embarking on
econometric analysis [16].
2.5.3.2 The empirical evidence
A number of empirical studies emerged In the mid- to late-1990s using co-integration
analysis. These studies used expanded data sets to study the long-run equilibrium
relationships between non-stationary time-series. Many of them were devoted to a more
thorough investigation of the issues of non-stationarity in the health care expenditures and
GDP time-series. Some used conventional tests such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test of unit roots and the Engel-Granger co integration test, but the most recent ones used
dynamic modelling and panel unit root tests on health expenditure, GDP and other variables
for OECD countries. In general, the results from this type of studies found health care income
elasticities of less than unity, and one study found no long-run relationship between health
expenditure and GDP. These studies include those by Saez and Murillo (1994), Grubaugh
16 A more detailed analysis of co-integration and the context in which it is used in this thesis can be seen in the
relevant chapter on methodology.
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and Santerre (1994), Hansen and King (1996), Blomqvist and Carter (1997), McCoskey and
Selden (1998), Kanavos and Yfantopoulos (1999), and Getzen (2000).
Saez and Murillo (1994) use time series analysis on a country-by country basis, employing
co-integration analysis to investigate the income - health expenditure relationship. Their
contribution lies mainly in two areas. First, the extent to which Health-PPPs can be used and,
secondly, the robustness of the results obtained in the light of omitted variables. They provide
empirical evidence about the causes of discrepancies in the estimation of the actual values of
income and price elasticity of health care expenditure. Their finding is that although GDP-
PPPs can be taken as a universal price index, this is not the case for Health-PPPs, the problem
being that the latter's components do not share common trends. Furthermore, specification
errors in general and the omission of relevant explanatory variables in particular seem to be
the major causes of discrepancy with the results of previous studies. They also found a strong
positive relationship between income and health care expenditures, but that the elasticity is
around or slightly above unity (see table 2.1).
Grubaugh and Santerre (1994) compared the relative performance of the US health care
system to those of other DECO countries. Using data from Health Care Systems in Transition
published by the DECO in 1990, the OECD National Accounts (various years), and the
OECD Labor Force Statistics (various years), they complete a panel data set of 12 OECD
countries (other than the U.S.) to estimate the following health expenditures equation for the
period 1960-1987:
Yjt = aXjt + Vjt
V jt = error term
(8)
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where Y is the log of health care expenditures per capita, and X is a vector of variables
representing GDP per capita, population density, real education expenditures per capita,
female labour participation rate, per capita real expenditures on alcoholic beverages, per
capita real expenditures on tobacco products, the percentage of the population over age 65
and under age 15, a time trend, and country-dummy variables. They found evidence of
autocorrelation and therefore used the Beach-McKinnon maximum likelihood procedure
adjusted for estimation of pooled cross-section and time-series data. The estimated income
elasticity of demand was 0.7.
Hansen and King (1996) contended that the strong positive correlations that Culyer (1988,
1989) and Hitiris and Posnett (1992) observed between health expenditure and GDP could be
the result of non-stationarity in the respective time-series. They estimated the same model as
Hitiris and Posnett (1992) with the addition of the share of population under 15 years
(POP 15), and the relative price of health care (RELP), using the OEeD 1990 data set for 20
countries for most variables covering the period 1960-1987. They tested for non-stationarity
of the time-series of the variables in their model using the conventional Augmented Dickey
Fuller (AOF) test and found them to be integrated of the following orders:
• health expenditure and GOP were integrated of order 1 [1(1)] or of order 2 [1(2)];
• the relative price of health care (RELP) was integrated of order 0 [1(0)] or of order 1
[1(1)]; and
• the share of population over 65 years (POP65) was integrated of order 1 [1(1)] in
general.
The above results mean that if models that contain such variables as (a) health expenditure,
(b) GDP, (c) the relative price of health care and (d) population, are run in levels, they yield
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biased estimates which have little usefulness for policy analysis because these variables are
non-stationary[ 17].
The authors used the Engle-Granger (EG) co-integration test to test for a stationary linear
relationship between the non-stationary variables and found no evidence of co-integration for
17 out of 20 countries, and could not reject the hypothesis of no co-integration for 2 other
countries. Their findings suggested that there was no long-run relationship between health
care expenditures and GDP, or between health expenditure, GDP and the non-income
variables in their model. However, they pointed out that "the interpretation of the ADF and
EG tests should be treated with some caution" and that both are "subject to important caveats
(p. 123)." Namely, they stated that the "null hypothesis of non-stationarity was probably not
rejected as often as it should have been (p. 133)", probably due to the smallness of the sample
size which implies a low power of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test.
Blomqvist and Carter (1997) estimated the health expenditure income elasticity in the context
of a long-run equilibrium relationship between non-stationary series, namely between GDP
and expenditures on health care. Their examination was spurred by the desire to explain the
discrepancies between the low income elasticities of health obtained from studies using
individual or family data, and the high income elasticities obtained in studies using aggregate
country data. They used time-series data for 18 countries over 32 years published by the
OECD in 1993 to address the issues of non-stationarity and co-integration, and to find out
whether pooling data is "a useful way of obtaining more precise inferences about the income
elasticity, and to consider again whether the evidence suggests it exceeds one (p. 211)." Their
model consisted of a log-linear relationship between per capita health care spending and real
171(1) means that a (time) series is stationary in first differences, but not in levels; 1(2) means that a series is
stationary in second differences but not in levels or first differences. Consequently, 1(1) variables must be
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mcome, and included country-specific dummy variables to account for many of the
institutional and demographic variables that were omitted due to the difficulty of constructing
comparable time-series for them. They analyzed cross-sections and replicated earlier results,
namely income elasticities above unity. They also analyzed individual country series using
conventional tests of unit roots and co-integration, and could not reject the null hypothesis of
no co-integration for some countries. Then they proceeded by using the test of the null
hypothesis of a unit root recently developed by Levi and Lin (1993) and found that health
expenditure and GDP were integrated of order 1 [1(1)] around a linear trend. The next step
was to test for co integration between the series. As others had done before, one way to do so
was to employ the Engle-Granger test. But as was pointed out by Hansen and King (1996),
the smallness of the samples used in the study may greatly lower the power of the Engle-
Granger test. Banerjee et al. (1993) suggested that using dynamic rather than static
regressions would reduce the finite sample biases of the Engle-Granger tests. Drawing upon
the former suggestion, Blomqvist and Carter estimated the following dynamic regression:
hit = CPO,I + CPI,tYI,t+ CPI,2Yl.t-t+ CPI,3YI,t-2+CPI.4hl,t-t + CPI,shl,t-2 (9)
(where hit is health spending)
to obtain the residual which they used in:
(10)
The null hypothesis is that 0=0 (0 being the coefficient of the lagged error term), and the t-
ratios used are computed using the Phillips and Perron (1988) procedure. A failure to reject
the null would indicate the failure of co-integration. The authors were able to reject the null
hypothesis of no co-integration at the 5% level for all the countries. They also employed a co-
differenced once in order to be included in models and 1(2) variables must be differenced twice.
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integration test developed by Shin (1994) and arrived at the same conclusion of co-
integration for all the countries. Then they pooled the series and applied the Phillips and
Loretan technique to all 18 countries jointly, and found that the variables were co-integrated
based on the Shin test. They also examined the residuals for autocorrelation using the Phillips
and Perron test and the Shin test. The results were mixed. On the basis of the Shin test, the
null hypothesis of unit root was rejected for all countries but Denmark and the U.K. Finally,
they conducted Wald tests and could not reject the null hypothesis that the pooling
restrictions are valid. But they noted that the results are suspicious due to the smallness of the
sample and concluded that "pooling restrictions are of very doubtful validity (p. 226)". In
other words, they postulated that income elasticities are not equal across countries and that
there is no evidence for a common trend reflecting technological progress. Their estimates of
income elasticities were lower than unity, and they contended that institutional factors are
important determinants of the varying country-specific effects, though they stated that the
specification of their model does not allow them to "draw any conclusions about which
institutional factors may be responsible for varying country-specific effects (p. 226)." Such
factors could be the share of inpatient spending in total health care costs, the share of public
sector financing, and use of the fee-for-service method of paying physicians, among others.
Unlike the country-by-country approach used by Hansen and King (1996), McCoskey and
Selden (1998) wanted to exploit the panel nature of the OECD data. Building upon previous
results, which did not reject the unit root null hypothesis for most countries when the
conventional Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests were used, McCoskey and Selden
instead employed a new panel data unit root test developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1996,
henceforth IPS). The null hypothesis is that all the series contain unit roots against the
alternative hypothesis that none does. They claimed that "the gain from imposing uniformity
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in this respect is increased power to reject the unit root null hypothesis (p.372)." The IPS t-
statistic is drawn from the ADF t-statistic; the justification for the IPS method is that it is
preferable to other panel unit root tests in that "it allows the data generating processes to vary
across countries with respect to ADF coefficients and error structures (p. 372)." Using the
Campbell and Perron (1991) strategy for choosing the appropriate number of lagged
difference terms for the ADF tests, McCoskey and Selden undertook a country-by-country
analysis and replicated the results obtained by Hansen and King, described above. However,
when they tested for the joint hypothesis that the OECD countries all have unit root series
against the alternative that none does using the IPS test, they rejected the presence of unit
roots. They acknowledged the limitations of the IPS test, such as the fact that it does not
account for the heteroscedasticity which health expenditures and GDP tend to exhibit over
time, but they pointed out that their results "mitigate concerns about the presence of unit roots
in models of health care expenditures and GDP (p. 374)". They referred to the need for more
robust tests, which are in fact already being developed. Nevertheless, they concluded that "in
the meantime, researchers studying national health care expenditures need not be as
concerned as previously thought about the presence of unit roots in the data (p. 375)."
Kanavos and Yfantopoulos (1999) investigated the effects of income, growth rates in income,
technology, and demographics on the levels of health spending in the EU countries. The
approach was a country-by-country, time-series approach, to avoid the methodological
problems associated with cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional analysis, and to avoid the
need for a conversion method. Using the 1996 OECD Health database which covers 35 years,
the model estimated is:
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where the demand for health at time t and in country i, proxied by total health spending
(HEX), and the rate of growth of total health spending are the dependent variables. The
independent variables are numerous. Variables representing demographic patterns (OEM) in
country i included the share of individuals aged 65 and above, male life expectancy, and
female life expectancy. Health status (HS) was represented by infant mortality. Advances in
technology (TEC) were proxied by the growth of pharmaceutical spending. Growth instead of
levels was used because of high correlation between pharmaceutical consumption in each
country. The impact of the macro economy (MACRO) was represented by the annual level of
GDP and the year-to-year rate of growth of GDP. Prices of various inputs (PRICE) were
proxied by the level of relative wage in the health sector and the change in the relative wage.
In addition, the total population, the total number of practicing doctors, the number of
inpatient care beds and the average length of stay in inpatient care were included as
independent variables to estimate the effects of the population, the medical profession, and
hospital variables. Tests for co-integration were conducted, and co-integrated relationships
between variables were found for all countries. In contrast with earlier studies, the results
suggested that, in many countries, GOP (as well as growth in GOP) fails to explain any
variation in health spending. In particular, GDP was not a statistically significant explanation
of the variation in health spending for Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Sweden, and the
U.K. Although statistically significant for the remaining countries under study, the income
elasticity was less than unity for Finland and Germany and around one for Spain and Greece,
and greater than unity only for Italy and the Netherlands.
73
2.5.3.3 The keyfindings of co-integration analysis
Much of the available literature has produced conflicting results, particularly in relation to
unit root tests, which have a major influence on the performed analysis. The conflicting
results regarding unit root tests are principally due to the fact that the work by McCloskey
and Selden (1998) omitted the time trends in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
regressions, whereas Hansen & King (1996), Blomqvist & Carter (1997), and Roberts (1998),
include time trends in the unit root tests. While it is not always essential to include time
trends in the ADF tests, it has been argued by Hansen and King (1998) that the omission of
time trends raises doubts about the validity of the results by McCoskey and Selden (1998),
since both health expenditure and GDP are trended. In this case, it is argued, the results
obtained by the three other studies are biased and subject to fatal methodological errors.
The co-integration yielded a number of other findings which appear to help with a broader
understanding of the determinants of health care expenditures. The first is that the elasticity
of demand appears to be at or (slightly) above unity, a finding which confirms the volatility
of results and the strong influence of methodology. One study (Kanavos and Yfantopoulos
(1999» finds an elasticity of demand significantly lower than unity in the majority of the
countries involved in co-integration analysis, whereas another (Saez and Murillo (1994»
confirms an elasticity significantly lower than unity for 2 of the 10 countries involved in the
study.
The second main finding is that the use of Health-PPPs is not necessarily indicated for time
series analysis, as its components do not share common trends, and that separate health
indices need to be derived from a system whose components share both short and long-term
co-movements (Saez and Murillo (1994».
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The third mam finding is that the importance of non-income variables has also been
confirmed, particularly that of the health price, but also that of technology, as well as the
importance of some inputs to the health system. The addition of health system-related
variables does not appear to reduce the significance of income as an explanation of the
determinants of health care expenditures.
2.6 The relationship between Health Expenditure and other
variables
Several other variables have been included in statistical analysis to determine their
contribution in explaining part of the variance of health care expenditures. Their inclusion
relies mostly on empirical grounds, rather than on the development of a solid methodological-
conceptual framework. In this section, we present briefly the available published results but
recognize that these present several methodological caveats. A detailed discussion of these
caveats takes place in chapters 3 and 4.
Previous work sought to capture the effects of demographic patterns through the inclusion of
a variable reflecting the share of population over 65 (or 75) and the share of population under
15, or the dependency ratio defined as the share of the population aged 0-19 and 65 and over
as a percentage of the population aged 20-64. Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Hansen and King
(1994), Gerdtham et al. (1992a, and 1995), Grubaugh and Santerre (1994), Hitiris (1997), and
Kanavos and Yfantpoulos (1999) used one or the other and most obtained a positive and
statistically significant impact on health care expenditures. Other authors controlled for
demographic patterns through country-dummy variables. Given that improvements in life
expectancy are likely to be related to the provision of better care (among many other things),
and given the current low levels of infant mortality, Kanavos and Yfantopoulos included
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male and female life expectancy. Male life expectancy was found to have a negative effect on
health expenditures, whereas the impact of female life expectancy was positive. Based on the
u-shaped relationship between age and public health care expenditures, Kanavos and
Yfantopoulos (1999) also examined the impact of the decreases in infant mortality rates
which OECD countries have witnessed during the past 4 decades on health care costs and
found it to be negatively related to health expenditure and significant in 7 out of 14 European
countries (members of the European Union) examined.
Variables reflecting the impact of lifestyles were employed by a few authors. Tobacco
consumption in grams per capita was found to be positive and statistically significant by
Gerdtham et al. (1995). Expenditures on alcohol and tobacco per capita were included in
Grubaugh and Santerre's study (1994). Whereas the effect of tobacco consumption on health
expenditures per capita was positive and statistically significant, alcohol consumption was
found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on per capita health spending.
However, there is no a priori reason for using the measures employed above (grams per
capita consumption; spending on alcohol); if anything, measures such as the proportion of
current smokers might be relevant as a potential determinant of health care expenditures at
macro level, provided that they are lagged. Less clear is the impact of an alcohol-related
variable when analysis is performed at macro, rather than micro, level.
Institutional variables were accounted for in some studies either with the use of country
dummy variables as in Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Blomqvist and Carter (1997), and Hitiris
(1997), or with the use of dummy variables representing the method of remuneration for
outpatient care (fee-for-service, capitation, or salary), and prospective or global budget
financing for hospitals as in Gertdham et al. (1992a, and 1995). The results were mixed.
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Technology was proxied by the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures in Kanavos and
Yfantopoulos (1999), and by a time trend in Grubaugh and Santerre (1994). Other variables
included by some researchers are the relative price of health care, the percentage of public
expenditures in total expenditure on health, real education expenditures per capita (to reflect
the technology of health production in the home), female labor force participation rate (home
production variable), urbanization (to reflect lower time and travel costs of health care
utilization in urban areas), population density (an environmental variable), and real education
expenditures per capita were used by some authors. The detailed list of variables and results
are reported in table 2.2.
Finally, few studies from either a developed or a developing country context have examined
public health expenditures and/or private health expenditures and their determinants
separately. One such study (Musgrove, 1983), using household survey data from six Latin
American countries, found that private care had a higher income elasticity of demand than
public sector health expenditures, thereby suggesting that private care is a luxury relative to
public care and that consumption shifts from public to private, ceteris paribus, as household
incomes rise. This may partly be attributed to differences in real or perceived quality, which
make public and private health care only imperfect substitutes[18]. "The finding that a higher
income shifts expenditure to the private sector is not generally observed at the aggregate
level, when countries outside Latin America are also studied" (Murray et al, 1994).
18 Of course, a key difference between this study compared with all the previous ones is that it uses household-
level data rather than aggregate data.
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Table 2-2 Variables used in models of determinants of health care
d·expen ttures
Study Dependent Independent Variables Results
variables
Leu 1986 HCE: per -GDP per capita. >0".
capita -Population < 15. >ob.
health care -Population >60, or 65, or 70. Never significant
expenditu- -Share of public financing. >ob
res. -The degree of urbanization: % of population >0'
living in towns over 100,00 inhabitants.
-Public beds. >08,
-NHS: to indicate centralized health systems. <0',
-Direct Democracy. <0".
Hitiris and HCE: per -Real per capita GDP. >0 and significant.
Posnett capita -Proportion of population over age 65. >0 and significant.
1992 health care -Proportion ofHCE that is publicly funded. >0 and significant.
expenditu- -A set of shift dummies to capture country- Mixed >0 and <0 results,
res. specific fixed effects. mostly significant
Gerdtham HCE: per -GDPpc: GDP per capita. >0".
et al. capita -Rphc: relative price of health care expressed <0.
1992a health care as a ratio of PPPs for medical care to PPPs for <Ob.
expenditu- GDP.
res. -DOCpc: supplier induced demand variable, >Oc.
represented by the number of practicing <0".'
physicians per capita multiplied by 1,000.
-IP: share of total health care expenditure used >0".'
on inpatient health care. >0.
-PF: share of total health care expenditure used >Ob.
on public expenditure.
<Ob.-FEE: dummy variable to represent fee-for-
service in outpatient care. Not significant.
-GLOBAL: dummy variable to represent
global budgeting in hospital care.
-AGE: ratio of population 65 years and over to
population 15-64 years.
-URB: share of population living in towns with
over 500,000 inhabitants.
-Female participation rates.
Grubaugh HCE: per -GDP per capita. >0".
and capita -Population density. <Oc.
Santerre health care -Real education expenditures per capita. >0.
1994 expenditu- -Female labor participation rate. <0.
res, -Per capita real expenditures on alcoholic <0".
beverages. >0'.
-Per capita real expenditures on tobacco <0.
products. >0.
-The percentage of the population over 65. >0',
-The percentage of the population under 15. Statistically significant
-A time trend. for 5 out of 11 countries.
-Country-dummy variables.
Hansen HCE: per -GDP: real per capita GDP. No long-run relationship
and King capita -POP65: proportion of population over age 65. between HCE, GDP and
1996 health care -POP15: proportion of population under age the remaining
expenditu- 15. indepedent variables, or
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res. -PUBL: proportion ofHCE that is publicly between HCE and GDP
funded. alone for most countries.
-RELP: relative price ofHCE calculated as the
ratio of a health services price index to the
GDP deflator.
Hitiris HCE: per -Per capita GDP. >ob.
1997 capita -Dependency rate represented by the >Ob.
health care population aged 0-19 and 65 and over as a
expenditu- percentage of the population aged 20-64. >ob.
res. -Share of health care expenditure in total <Ob.
public spending. >ob
-Durnmy variable to account for differences in
countries' health service systems.
-Rate of inflation (1985-100).
Blomqvist HCE: per -Real income. >0 and significant.
and Carter capita -Country specific dummy variables to account Share of inpatient
1997 health care for institutional and demographic variables. spending in total health
expenditu- costs, share of public-
res. sector fmancing, use of
fee-for-service method
of paying physicians are
important determinants.
Institutional
organization appears to
lead to particularly low
spending in Belgium,
Denmark, Iceland, Italy.
Japan and U.K.
Kanavos Total Technology factors proxied by >0 and significant in 12
and health -Rate of growth of pharmaceutical spending. countries.
Yfantopou- spending Demography factors >0 and significant in 8
los 1999 on health -Share of individuals aged 65 and above. out of 14 countries.
LHEX. Tendency to have a <0
-Rate of -Male life expectancy. effect.
growth of Tendency to have a >0
total health -Female life expectancy. effect.
spending Health status factors
D(LHEX). -Infant mortality. <0 and significant in 7
countries.
Macroeconomic factors Insignificant in 7
-Annual level ofGDP. countries.
-Year-to-year rate of growth ofGDP. >0 and significant in 6
Prices countries.
-Level of relative wage in the health sector. >0 and significant in 10
-Change in relative wage. countries.
Population
-Total Population. >0 and significant in 5
countries, <0 and
Medical profession significant in 5
-Total number of practicing doctors. countries.
>0 and significant in 5
Hospital variables countries. <0 and
-Number of inpatient care beds. significant in 4
-Average length of stay in inpatient care. countries.
No clear trend.
No clear trend.
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Gerdtham et al. -HCE: per capita Institutional factors 6 results
1995 health care -Dummy variables to represent methods of appeared to have
expenditures" remuneration in primary care, payment in significant
-Per capita inpatient care, direct budgetary controls in effects int he
hospital the ambulatory sector, remuneration in expected
expenditures. inpatient care, public integrated systems, directions on
-Per capita potential for free setting of medical care HCE:
ambulatory prices and over-billing, physicians as I. <0 effect of
expenditures. gatekeepers, direct payment by patient the use of
-Per capita before reimbursement by insurer. primary care
pharmaceutical -The proportion of average medical billing gatekeepers.
expenditures. paid for by public insurers or paid by public 2. <0 effect on
funds, the stock of practicing physicians per HCE in systems
1000 population, the stock of practicing where the patient
physicians per capita in countries with fee- first pays the
for-service payments, the proportion of provider then
inpatient expenditure of total health-care seeks reimburse-
expenditure, the proportion of public ment.
inpatient care beds of total inpatient care 3. <0 effect of
beds, public insurance coverage of the capitation
population, the proportion of coverage for systems.
ambulatory care of state and social security 4. >0 effect of
schemes, the proportion of coverage for share inpatient
inpatient care of state and social security spending to total
schemes, the proportion of coverage for spending.
pharmaceuticals of state and social security 5. <0 effect of
schemes, the average share of medical care public sector
billing paid for by public insurers in provision of
ambulatory care sector, the average share of health services.
medical care billing paid for by public 6. >0 effect of
insurers in inpatient care, the average share the total supply
of medical care billing paid for by public of doctors.
insurers in pharmaceuticals.
0·.
Socio-demogra~hic factors Not reported.
-Per capita GDP. Not reported.
-Female participation rate. Not reported.
-Proportion of population 75 years and over. >0'.
-Proportion of population 4 years and under. Not reported.
-Tobacco consumption, grams per capita. >0.
-Alcohol consumption, liters per person.
Technology factors
-Renal dialyses, rate per million population.
Notes:
a Significant at the 1% level
b Significant at the 5% level
C Significant at the 10% level
d Results are reported in this table only for overall health expenditures as a dependent
variable.
Source: Author's compilation from the literature.
2.7 The wider context of the determinants of health care
expenditures
In the developing world the examination of the statistical relationship between national
income and health care expenditures from a macroeconomic perspective in the developed
world has yielded interesting results on the determinants of health care expenditures. While a
macroeconomic (aggregate), developed-country perspective has been dominant in the
literature, partly due to easy access to data sources, in particular the OECD Health Database,
there are two further aspects to this issue: firstly, the determinants of health care expenditures
in developing countries and, secondly, the microeconomic (household) perspective, through
household surveys. Both aspects and their results are reviewed in the following sections.
2.7.1 Determinants of Health Expenditures in Developing countries
Most of the empirical literature in this field covers the OECD countries and has used the
OECD Health database extensively. However, a similar stream of literature has tested the
same hypothesis of the interrelationship between aggregate health expenditures and income
in developing countries (Dunlop & Martins, eds., 1995). In the case of developing countries,
however, data availability is much more limited as is the ability to use a large number of
indicators that describe the attributes of different health systems. At the same time, the
development of health expenditure data for the developing world has been less successful
(Murray et al., 1994), despite attempts by international agencies, such as the WHO, and
PAHO, national agencies, such as USAID, and private sector organisations, such as the
Sandoz Institute for Health and Socioeconomic Studies, to improve information by promoting
household surveys (Zschock et al, 1977; Robertson et aI, 1979) and publishing manuals for
estimating national health expenditures (Griffiths & Mills, 1982; Mach & Abel-Smith, 1983).
As a result, the available sources of information are ad hoc studies or development agency
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projects. Regional reviews drawing largely on these sources have been prepared for Asia
(Griffin, 1992), Africa (Vogel, 1989), and Latin America (1992).
Empirical research in developing countries uses almost exclusively household rather than
aggregate data. This in principle allows a close look at health expenditure determinants
without the simplifications made by aggregate data. Thus, cross-sectional samples from
household expenditure surveys in the mid-1960s found income elasticities of demand for
health care greater than unity for Kenya and Uganda (Massell & Heyer, 1969). The study on
health financing in Asia by Griffin (Griffin, 1992) has calculated the elasticity of health care
spending with respect to per capita GOP for the region as a whole to exceed unity. However,
the author does not specify how this figure is estimated, which countries are included in the
data set, or the period to which the figure applies. Additional estimates (Musgrove, 1983)
found an income elasticity ranging from I.S for ten cities in Latin America for 1968, to 1.17 in
Brazil for 1974. These results have been supported by another study (Murray et aI, 1994) using
cross sectional data for 138 countries clustered in eight groups. Data came from the WHO
Health for All Database, which relies on individual countries to report data. The analysis focused
on the relationship between per capita GOP and public health spending, where an income
elasticity exceeding unity was found. It was also established that governments which consumed
a larger share of GDP in total also had a higher expenditure on health.
Since the 1980s represented a period in which per capita income in many less developed
countries (LDCs) declined, one hypothesis is that health expenditures in these countries may
have also declined more than proportionately, particularly among the least affluent parts of
the population (World Bank, 1990). Evidence from a number of countries suggests that this is
the case (World Bank, 1993), and that the decline occurs both in private household
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expenditures and in government expenditures for health services, in response to drops in
income and tax revenues. In the South Pacific member countries of the World Bank, real per
capita health expenditures declined by as much as 75 per cent over the 1980s. Similar
declines were also reported in Africa (Vogel, 1989; Vogel, 1990), the Caribbean and Latin
America (Musgrove, 1987).
Although the studies cited above do not represent a fully comprehensive review, they suggest
that health care spending in developed and developing countries is elastic with respect to
income over the range of observations available. Table 2.1, summarises the nature of the
research conducted in this field and the results produced in both developed and developing
countries.
2.7.2 The Macro - Micro level divide
There appears to be a discrepancy between the macroeconomic (or aggregate) approach, the
empirical results that were presented earlier in this chapter, and the micro-economic (or
household) approach. While most studies at the macroeconomic level in developed countries
have shown an income elasticity of demand exceeding unity, most studies at the micro-
economic (household) level in developed and developing countries do not show this result.
Indeed, it has been found that the income elasticity of demand for health across households is
quite low in developed countries (Andersen & Benham, 1970; Grossman, 1972; Newhouse &
Phelps, 1974; Muurinen, 1982; Okunade, 1985; Wagstaff, 1986; and Manning et al, 1987) and
in developing countries (Gbsemete & Gerdtham, 1992).
Several alternative theories have been put forward to explain the discrepancy between
macroeconomic and microeconomic findings. A study using Canadian data, has attributed
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this discrepancy to non-price rationing, so that consumers buy less health care than they want
and can afford (Culyer, 1988), although this might implausibly imply that high income
consumers are more rationed than those with lower incomes. A second, plausible, explanation
might be that large health care expenditures are financed primarily by insurance rather than
by individuals, and insurance spending rises less rapidly with income. Again, however, from
a private insurance system point of view, it has been noted that insurance per se does not
necessarily explain the discrepancy between micro and macro income elasticity estimates, as
individuals in a private insurance system are restricted by the provisions of their insurance
plan (Blomqvist & Carter, 1997). If the higher income of rich families enables them to buy
more generous or comprehensive insurance plans than the poor then "there is no reason why
spending patterns across rich and poor families would look any different from spending
patterns across rich and poor countries" (Blomqvist & Carter, 1997, footnote I). Finally,
Newhouse (1977), explained this discrepancy as " ... price is probably not an important
rationing factor within many countries at one point in time, whereas it is important between
countries and over time". As such, and given that at the aggregate level countries face the
"full price" of medical care, one would expect a much stronger relationship between
expenditure and income than is obtained in microeconomic studies.
2.8 Concluding remarks
2.8.1 The main findings from the literature
This chapter has revealed the wealth of empirical evidence examining the interrelationship
between health care expenditures and a series of potential explanatory variables over the past
forty years. Looking at each type of analysis individually (cross-sectional, pooled cross-
sectional, and time-series) and at the results that have been obtained, it is fair to say that
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significant conflicts arise, both with regards to each type of analysis and across analytical
methods.
The main results of this literature stream can be summarised as follows:
First, the empirical literature comprises cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional and time-
series analysis. Whereas early investigations focus on the aggregate relationship between
health expenditures and GDP only (simple regression analysis), subsequent analyses include
further variables as potential determinants of health care expenditures (multiple regression
analyses), both institutional and non-institutional. Furthermore, the sophistication of
statistical analysis has increased over time, ranging from simple regression analysis, to
multiple regression modelling and dynamic specifications, such as co-integration and error-
correction models. In the majority of cases, it appears that national income per capita,
measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is the single most important
explanation of the variation in health expenditures and that the income elasticity of demand
for health care was found to exceed unity in the majority of studies, thereby leading to the
conclusion that health care is a luxury good.
This result is subject to qualifications, which mitigate its robustness across countries and over
time. The most important qualification seems to be related to the method of analysis.
Researchers have been experimenting with different types of econometric techniques, that is,
cross-sectional, time-series and pooled cross-sectional analysis; the results have been shown
to be sensitive to the methodology used. Income elasticity of demand exceeding unity was
common in bi-variate and multi-variate cross-sectional analyses, and less common in pooled
cross-sectional and time-series studies. Overall, the initial overwhelming evidence about the
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income elasticity of demand for health care being greater than unity began to fade in later
studies, so that hypotheses have been advanced that health care is neither "a necessity" or "a
luxury", but, somewhat implausibly, "both" since the income elasticity varies with the level
of analysis (Getzen, 2001). However, regardless of the value of the elasticity, income was
found to be positively correlated with health expenditure and statistically significant.
Second, other variables, in addition to income, were found to be significant explanatory
factors, including, among others, the number of doctors per capita, the relative price of
health, the number of beds per 100 population, the length of stay, infant mortality, the share
of elderly in the population, the share of people under 15 in the population, and the female
workforce participation rate. The results obtained, are however, contestable and relationships
are inconsistent. This reflects the absence of a theoretical framework underpinning the
empirical analysis and the multiplicity of hypotheses tested within a single empirical model.
Another concern is the use of large numbers of dummy variables. Authors make excessive
use of dummy variables without taking into account the well-known problems related to their
use, particularly the problem of interrelationships between dummies.
Third, researchers have also been using different conversion factors (exchange rates, Health-
PPPs, GDP-PPPs) in order to compare macroeconomic variables. The results are often
sensitive to the choice of conversion factor. The literature is conflicting about the validity of
different conversion factors, which seems to depend on the type of econometric analysis and
the year(s) the analysis takes place. Generally, it has been accepted that the use ofPPPs may
be superior to exchange rates, both in cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional analysis.
Again, this finding became the subject of considerable scrutiny, as the literature was not
conclusive, giving rise to debate on conversion factor instability. On theoretical grounds, the
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use ofPPPs as a conversion factor has been favoured over exchange rates, but the use of both
GDP-PPPs and Health-PPPs to convert GDP and health expenditures respectively was found
to be the most adequate methodology of rendering results that would withstand scrutiny,
although, again, the use of Health-PPPs was questioned on statistical grounds in a recent
time-series study. Overall, the empirical evidence has largely been inconclusive about
whether one measure is definitely superior to the other.
Fourth, there seems to be a discrepancy between "macroeconomic" (aggregate) studies and
"microeconomic" (household or regional) studies in what concerns the size of the income
elasticity of demand. In the latter, a value smaller than unity is typically obtained, in the
former, a greater-than-one value is the most common result with the qualifications mentioned
above. A variety of inconclusive, explanations have been offered for this discrepancy at
different times.
Fifth, while there is much published evidence on the determinants of total health care
expenditures, very little is known about the determinants of total public health care
expenditures and total private health care expenditures individually. Indeed, these have not
been explored at all over time. Yet, this seems rather surprising, since the dynamics of
publicly funded systems and privately funded systems, which very often co-exist in many
countries, may be different.
Sixth, there is a clear lack of a theoretical foundation to the statistical analyses performed in
this field, with no attempt to establish one other than the application of microeconomic
principles to analyses that are macroeconomic in nature.
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Seventh, several of the reviewed studies have drawn criticism because of misspecification
problems and variable omissions in the analytical models, but further issues remain
unresolved. These relate to the actual choice of variables and their comparability across
countries and over time. They also relate to the lag structure in individual models, which
often appears to be contrary to what (economic) theory would predict. A characteristic
example in this context is the relationship between income and health care expenditure. If one
accepts the validity of public choice theory, as many authors have done, then current levels of
health care expenditure should be determined by past levels of GDP plus the trend of GDP or
its growth, rather than current GDP levels. Yet, there is not a single study in the literature that
has tested this particular hypothesis.
Eighth, there appears to be a great deal of concern about the economic interpretation of an
elasticity of demand greater or smaller than unity and the robustness of econometric
technique in deriving one or the other, but what is conspicuous by its absence, is the policy
relevance of the findings obtained and how they could be translated into policy
recommendations for individual health systems or groups of health care systems.
Ninth, some authors have tested the significance of lifestyle variables and the impact they
may have on health expenditure. Incorporating variables such as per capita consumption of
tobacco, litres of alcohol per capita, or grams of fat per capita, is naive for two reasons: first,
the choice of variable is far too crude to yield results at the macro level. Second, lifestyle
variables impact human health with a (significant) time lag, which is also dependent on
exposure to other risk factors. The empirical literature has not included any lag structures in
the models used; neither has it included other risk factors to test for likely interactions.
Finally, a significant proportion of the empirical analysis seems to be driven by the
availability of data. This begs two related questions: first, can the available data be better
utilised so that it can make better sense for policy development? Second, what improvements
might we need in order to better analyse and understand the determinants of health care
expenditures?
2.8.2 The way forward on the determinants of health care
expenditures
In light of the above results, the thesis aims to progress in the following ways: first, it will
analyse methodological problems that, to date, have not been recognised by the literature and
that severely limit the predictive power of the analyses so far. These problems relate to the
measurement of key variables, such as GDP, health expenditure, and Health-PPPs, among
others. Second, it will develop a theoretical framework, which can be used in the analysis of
the determinants of health care expenditures. Third, in addition to the determinants of health
care expenditures, it will investigate more closely the question of the determinants of public
health care expenditures that has to date been completely neglected. Fourth, it will pursue a
time-series analysis of an aggregate demand function by country, which avoids the
misspecification and estimation problems that have been highlighted in the previous sections
and the methodological problems that will be explored in the next two chapters. This will also
make sense from a policy perspective and for the countries that will be included in the
analysis, as, to date, governments have not actively engaged in estimating the likely impact of
macroeconomic and health-related factors as well as projecting future resource requirements
in light of macroeconomic, demographic, technology and other changes. There are two
notable exceptions: first, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) annual budget assessments
in the United States and the recent Wanless report in the UK, on sustainable financing
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(Wanless, 2002). The latter is of particular importance, as it is the first ever evidence-based
assessment of the long-term requirements for the UK National Health Service, whereas in the
former case, the CBO routinely conducts budget assessments which also include expenditure
on health services.
In pursuing an aggregate (macroeconomic) type of analysis, its limitations are recognised.
The thesis will not address the question of the discrepancies between income elasticities of
demand in macro- and micro-economic studies, but the gaps and inconsistencies that the
literature on aggregate demand for health care has revealed. To that end, the thesis will use
the same data sources as those used by other researchers, but it will also point to the direction
of gaps in these data sources.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
ESTIMATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH CARE
EXPENDITURES: A WAY FORWARD - PART I
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored the large body of academic literature that has attempted to
analyse the determinants of health care expenditures in different countries and over time. This
body of literature dates from as far back as the early 1960s and is continuing to develop until
now. Other than noting the absence of a theoretical framework, chapter 2 highlighted a
number of conclusions from this literature. Among them were:
(a) a variety of different estimation techniques (cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional,
and time-series) have been used, each producing different results;
(b) There has been an empirical "search" for factors, other than income, that may
determine the variation in health care expenditures within or across countries and
over time;
(c) "Macro and micro" perspectives produce a discrepancy in the size of the income
elasticity of demand;
(d) A wide range of different conversion factors have been used, again generating
different results;
(e) Many of the models used appear to be mis-specified; and
(f) There is a general lack of policy-relevant conclusions and recommendations.
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As well as the many significant defects associated with mis-specification and poor functional
form, there are further intrinsic methodological defects, which have almost entirely been
ignored. The purpose of this chapter and the next is to explore the nature of these defects in
detail. Specifically, this chapter has four main objectives:
• first, it will provide a critique of the theories that have been used to justify the
empirical research and will argue the case for a more robust theoretical framework. In
a subsequent chapter (chapter 5) a theoretical framework for analysis will be
developed.
• Second, it will assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of different
estimation methodologies (cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional, and time-series
analysis), with a view to deciding which one offers the best possibility of robust and
policy relevant empirical estimates that would also allow cross-country (cross-system)
comparisons.
• Third, it will highlight the imperfect nature of current conversion factors and then
discuss the usefulness of different conversion factors employed in cross-country
comparisons
• And, finally, it will discuss the use of health prices and price indices in the literature,
with a view to deciding on which of these indices would be most appropriate in cross-
country comparisons.
Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework employed so far by those undertaking
statistical analysis; section 3 analyses the problems associated with estimation methods,
conversion factors and health prices, and section 4 draws the main conclusions and looks for
ways forward.
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3.2 The theoretical framework
3.2.1 General observations
In any analysis it is important first to establish a conceptual framework and then to examine
to what extent relevant concepts can be operationalised. Although a testable hypothesis can
be induced from observations of the relationship between health expenditure and GOP, such a
theoretical framework has never been established. In the existing analyses, all health
expenditure (public and private) is treated as a behavioural variable, similar to private
consumption and expenditure. To some, extent, therefore, the results are based on an
empirical observation that largely reflects Wagner's law, namely that an increase in national
income causes an increase in public expenditure, mainly through an increase in the demand
for public services (Leidl, 1998).
An additional conceptual problem is that authors use aggregate macroeconomic demand
functions but interpret their results according to microeconomic theory. This assumes the
possibility of summing all linear household demand equations to a single total market
demand equation. While this is theoretically possible, it can only be fulfilled under certain
rather strict conditions, assuming, among others, the same or similar consumption rates for all
households, the same public-private mix, and the same mix of health services across
countries. Consequently, the interpretation of income elasticities of demand should be treated
with caution, as it does not necessarily follow that macroeconomic relationships will be
observed at a microeconomic level (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980). Thus, there has been a
confusion between macroeconomic and microeconomic approaches without defining whether
the so-called demand for health refers to an aggregate approach based on macroeconomic
thinking, or is simply derived from utility maximization, based on the Grossman hypothesis,
aggregating individual preferences and demands.
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3.2.2 The Macro-Economic Foundation
The early studies by Abel Smith (1963, 1967), Kleiman (1974), and Newhouse (1977)
adopted an aggregate macro-economic approach based on Public Finance and International
Economics. The law of increasing expansion of the public, specifically state-funded activities
was defined by Wagner in 1883, and was subsequently known as "Wagner's Law". He
estimated a statistical model based on a time series sample from a number of western
industrializing countries:
GIY = a + b {YIN}
where
GIY Government Share
G= Government spending
y= Income
N= Population
a and b are parameters to be tested
This basic conceptual framework has undergone subsequent refinement. Musgrave (1969,
1985) elaborated Wagner's law by arguing that in order to examine the hypothesis that
budget growth has been excessive, the concept of "correct" budget size must first be defined
and established. The argument here is that the appropriate share of the budget will change
over time due to demographic and technological changes, changes in relative costs, and the
growth of personal income. The optimal level of redistribution, in tum, may change with
changes in the distribution and level of income. It will also respond to changes in social
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attitudes, i.e. predominant views of distributive justice. Since there are many reasons why the
optimal share for budgetary activity may change, an observed increase in that share is not
necessarily a proof of excess [19]. Musgrave (1985) also examined the share of public
expenditure during different phases of socio-economic development, and tested a number of
hypotheses, namely the existence of voting bias and the behaviour of public officials as
"bureaucrats" as further sources of excessive budget growth. These factors imply institutional
inertia and the desire of civil servants to accumulate more power through increased resources.
Similar analyses have been carried out by many other authors (Rao, 1986; Rao, 1987;
Wagner, 1976; and Peacock & Wiseman, 1961, among others).
Although Abel Smith (1963, 1967), Kleiman (1974), Newhouse (1977) and others do not
explicitly refer to Wagner's Law or, in the case of the latter two, to Musgrave's early work,
the basic research question remains the same, namely how can one identify the causes and
factors that contribute to the expansion of the health sector? These three authors explored the
relationship between per capita health expenditure and per capita GDP, using a limited
number of statistical observations based on small samples (33 countries/observations for
1961, 16 countries/observations for 1968, and 13 countries/observations for 1968-1972,
respectively). Abel Smith (1967) depicts scatter diagrams for his chosen sample of 33
countries, including developed (USA, Canada, Sweden), less developed (Tanganyka, Ceylon)
and Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia). He approximates the Engel
Curve[20] by estimating various forms of the model:
19"Excess", given the nature of technological innovation and the changes in demographic structure is not a
notion that can be quantified with precision. Strictly speaking, it is the year-on-year change in the budget over
and above the rate of inflation.
20 The Engel curve lies at the center of the discussion on the income elasticity of demand. Appendix I to this
chapter discusses the Engel curve, how it is derived and what it means in practical terms. In a nutshell, the Engel
curve shows the relationship between a consumer's income and the quantity of a good bought.
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Total Health Expenditure! National Income =f(Per capita Income in (US $))
The analysis is restricted to a regression line fitted to a scatter diagram without making
reference to the estimated parameters.
Kleiman (1974) followed Abel Smith and used a sample of 16 developed and less developed
countries bundled together in a model. The relationship between per capita health
expenditures and per capita income was estimated and a high coefficient of determination
was found (R2 = 0.96), implying that 96 percent of the variation in per capita health care
expenditures across Kleiman's sample could be explained solely by per capita income. In a
similar vein, Newhouse (1977) used of a sample of 13 countries and also found a significant
relationship. His estimated income elasticity is 1.31 implying that health care is a luxury
good.
The literature on the determinants of health care expenditures developed further during the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The consistent message was that after adjustment for inflation,
exchange rates and population change, GDP per capita remained the main determinant of
health expenditure.
3.2.3 The Micro-Economic Foundation
In the micro-economic framework the evolution of health expenditures is explained with
reference to the theory of consumer's utility maximization and demand analysis. Grossman
(1972) provided a substantial theoretical framework to argue that the demand for health care
is derived from the demand for health, which is the outcome of a health production process
influenced by education, habits, diet and other lifestyle variables. The consumer of health
services is thus also a producer of a certain level of health status. The estimation and
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interpretation of income elasticities and other parameters related to the determinants of health
expenditures becomes a difficult task because, while it is feasible to derive micro-economic
implications from aggregate analysis, the necessary assumptions are extremely restrictive. In
particular, two restrictions are necessary in order to enable aggregation. The first requires that
the distribution of income is the same across the countries under study, and the second
requires that all consumers have identical utility functions. These restrictions are too
stringent, given evidence by Kleiman (1974) that income inequalities do affect the
consumption of health care, and that consumers display dissimilar preferences within and
among countries. In addition, it is necessary to assume that health care delivered is the same
in every country to enable aggregation where data from different countries are pooled. In
reality, countries differ considerably in their mix of inputs and outputs, in ways that cannot be
explained solely by definitional problems. Pooling a group of countries therefore "might lead
to biased estimates" due to the strong restrictive assumptions described above (Parkin et aI,
1987).
In general, the relationship between health care expenditure and the independent variables
examined in these studies is of the form:
HeE = f(y, D, X, L, S, G, J)
Where Y is income per capita, D includes demographic factors (e.g. population age
structure), X is a vector of other variables describing the stock of health care inputs (e.g.
number of physicians, nurses, hospital beds, etc), L is a vector of variables describing
lifestyles (e.g. consumption of tobacco, alcohol, exercise, consumption of fat, etc), S
represents organisational variables of the health care system, G is the share of public
expenditure relative to total health care spending, and I is the rate of inflation.
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In the subsequent analysis I explore criticisms of the basic micro-economic approach, which
are frequently ignored or even violated in a large number of empirical studies. Some authors
have recognised that previous findings in the literature, that health care is a luxury good, are
due to the application of microeconomic analysis to aggregate data.
The first economic assumption made by applied researchers is that utility functions are
homothetic. Homotheticity of utility functions implies that there are identical individual
preferences across countries; it also implies that the marginal rate of substitution between two
different bundles of commodities (x I and x2), is identical across countries, hence for two
OEeD countries, say France and Greece, it would hold that
Assuming that x1 is ambulatory care and x2 is hospital care, then homotheticity implies that
the rate of sacrifice of hospital care in order to get an extra unit of primary care, while
keeping utility constant, is the same across all countries. However, the development of
ambulatory and hospital care across countries is not the same and the spectrum of services
within primary and within secondary care varies significantly. Hence, goods x I & x2 are not
homogeneous across countries, and the rate of substitution is not really comparable.
Second, it is implicitly assumed that the proportions of various types of services (for instance
hospital care and primary care) are fixed, namely the ratio of Qhi/Qpi is fixed in all countries
involved in statistical analysis (where Qhi is the amount of hospital care in country i and Qpi
is the amount of primary care in country i). However, allocation of resources differs greatly
between countries. That implies different utilisation of services and, furthermore, different
98
methods of operation of the health system in different countries. Thus, the relative
development of primary and secondary care varies across countries. Specifically in European
Union (EU) countries, greater emphasis has been given to secondary care in the southern and
to primary care in the northern Member States. There are also many definitional problems,
with a condition managed in the primary (health) care sector in one country but in the
secondary (health) care sector in another, or even in different ways within the same country
and over time. Hence the rate of substitution between the two sectors cannot be identical in
all countries. In addition, there are different balances of institutional and household care in
different EU countries, which in a cross-section or pooled data analysis remain unaccounted
for. Again, the North-South divide within the EU highlights the differences, with some
northern countries having more developed institutional care, while the southern countries
have traditionally relied more on household care.
Third, a corollary of homothetic utility functions is that technology is treated as given. This
assumes that all countries have similar levels of technology, and that they all introduce and
assimilate innovations at the same time. For instance, a new surgical procedure pioneered in
the US becomes immediately available in all countries, or the uptake of new pharmaceutical
treatments is the same by all countries involved. Assuming that all this is happening,
decisions are taken in a (health) technology neutral environment, where technological
advances remain unaccounted for. It is nevertheless well established that the intensity of use
of technology as well as the uptake and assimilation of technological advances vary
significantly among countries. Furthermore, the technology of producing different types of
inputs such as doctors and nurses varies, and this can be attributed to different educational
standards across countries. Thus, for instance, the augmented human capital in nursing
personnel is very different among countries. In the Nordic countries and the UK, nurses have
99
typically assumed extended and increasingly technical roles. whereas in some Mediterranean
countries their role is more constrained. This is reflected in differences in basic and post-
basic educational curricula. In addition. the extent of substitution among professionals varies
due to differences in the production processes of health services. In some countries the
nursing profession has assumed an increasing amount of what previously was considered a
medical function. such as prescribing [21]. while in others it has a purely auxilliary function.
Fourth, with respect to the interpretation of results, a problem arises from the use of the Engel
curve interpretation. Engel curves record the relationship between income and the quantity of
a good X purchased. Homogeneity of demand is assumed as a direct result of the utility-
maximization assumption. If the fraction of expenditures devoted to X increases (declines) as
income increases, the good is labelled a luxury (necessity) good (Nicholson. 1995). The term
is also used for the relationship between income and expenditures on a good, which makes
the further assumption that prices are fixed. But Parkin et al. (1987) showed that price
variations have a major effect on the relationship between income and health care
expenditures. They regressed numbers of physicians, dentists, nurses and midwives, and
pharmacists per 100,000 population on GDP in order to isolate the relationship from price
effects. The results showed that "the suggestions that prices are unimportant no longer has
much justification (p.124)," because "levels of GDP per person are markedly less successful
in explaining variations in these real volume measures than they are in explaining differences
in expenditures (p.115)." The implication is that a multivariate model of health expenditures
must be used which accounts for price effects[22].
21 For instance nurse prescribers in the UK and a similar nursing function in Canada.
22 A further implication relates to the use of the Engel curve interpretation. The interpretations of results related
to Engel curves are based on a cross-section of incomes of individuals or households whose demand is assumed
to be homogeneous. The aggregate national data on health are not developed enough to be regarded as a very
highly aggregated econometric model of individual behaviour. Therefore, using the Engel curve interpretation
for estimates obtained from aggregate health care data is questionable.
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Fifth, it is assumed that relative prices are fixed (for instance hospital care prices and primary
care prices are fixed) and price ratios are the same in different countries. Thus, the relative
shares of expenditure are assumed to be fixed, so that, for instance, the ratio of
PhiQhilPpiQpi (where PhiQhi is hospital expenditure in country i, and PpiQpi is primary care
expenditure in country i) is the same in all countries. Fixed relative prices imply that the ratio
of prices remains the same across countries; this is based on the assumption that the markets
for all health goods and services are identical, which means that there is the same degree of
competitiveness as well as the same degree of bargaining power among professions. However
there are considerable differences among countries based on: firstly, the monopsonistic power
of the state which purchases goods and services offered by health care providers; secondly,
the monopolistic powers of the medical profession, which varies across countries; and thirdly,
in southern European countries there is a significant underground health economy[23], where
a considerable amount of health transactions, especially in surgery, take the form of informal
payments. Two striking examples from southern Europe are Greece (Abel Smith et aI, 1994)
and Spain (De Miguel & Guillen, 1989). Such transactions influence not only the absolute
level of fees given to specialists but also the price ratio of different inputs since payments to
other health professionals, e.g. nurses, are minimal. Thus, health care is not a homogeneous
good but very heterogeneous and this is something the empirical literature has largely
ignored.
Sixth, the distribution of income is implicitly assumed to be the same within and among all
countries. Yet, income distribution varies within each country. High levels of poverty may
23 The phenomenon of an informal health economy may be even more widespread in Eastern European
countries in transition and other parts of the world and a body of literature has been developed to account for
these and measure their extent. The choice of southern European countries in this context, reflects the existence
of this phenomenon in developed, OEeD economies.
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imply higher aggregate health need, the distribution of which must also be considered. In
particular, poorer social groups have been found to have higher rates of disease and
premature death in comparison with higher socio-economic groups (Le Grand, 1987; Le
Grand & Illsey, 1987; Benzeval, Judge & Whitehead, 1995; and Feinstein, 1993, among
others). In fact "there is now a very extensive international literature on health inequalities,
which, in brief, shows that in all industrialised countries, the poor are more likely to suffer
disabling ill-health and premature mortality than are the rich" (Leon and Walt, 2000).
Methodologically, the issue of income inequality would, in principle, require single country
analysis, unless data can be standardised across countries[24]. As Atkinson (1996) points out,
estimates of the degree of income inequality, are not comparable across countries. One can
thus draw few conclusions from the relative degree of inequality in different countries. Data
are drawn from national surveys of income inequality, many of which fail to account
adequately for non-cash benefits, transfers, and other relevant factors, and which often vary
in the extent to which they include the tails of the distribution.
Seventh, there is little or no reference to stock variables, whether with regard to the provision
of health care or to population health. Lifestyle and material circumstances are major
determinants of health and their consequences will inevitably have an impact on the level of
health spending. However, the nature of this relationship is far from straightforward and there
is a variable lag period, but in some cases, events around the time of birth may have
consequences that only manifest in old age. In recent years, there has been a much better
understanding of the complexity of these relationships (Leon and Walt, 2000), but this has
24 Issues such as type of income (gross versus disposable), or household size, or transfers, need to be
standardised across countries, if cross-country comparisons are to make sense. This is possible, but may be
resource intensive.
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not been incorporated by those who have sought to take account of the relationship between
lifestyle and health expenditure.
In summary, contrary to assumptions made about Engel curves and the homotheticity of
utility functions, the majority of empirical analyses have been atheoretical. Yet, economic
theory may help explain more clearly the factors affecting demand for health, and, hence,
health spending, and whether variation in health spending is underpinned by a particular
theoretical framework. The optimal approach is to develop a theoretical model and to test it
empirically. Furthermore, the empirical literature does not provide an adequate explanation
about why health care expenditures have continued to rise for a long time in most tax-, social
msurance-, and voluntary insurance-financed systems, either in pecuniary terms or as a
proportion of national resources (e.g. as a proportion of GDP). Whether the share of national
income devoted to health care will continue to rise ad infinitum is an issue that is not
addressed[25].
3.2.4 The value of the income elasticity of demand
As noted in chapter 2, the question of what is the value of the income elasticity of demand for
health care and whether it may exceed unity has become the subject of considerable debate.
Indeed, several studies focus solely on its size. While it can easily be derived from regression
coefficients, the interpretation of the income elasticity of demand can mislead. This is so
because what is interpreted as income elasticity of demand is not a true income elasticity of
demand. The conventional definition of the income elasticity of demand implies a percentage
increase in quantity of a good demanded, for a given percentage change in income, or:
25 Although, surely, it can never exceed 100% ofGDP in the long run!
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dQ/Q
€y = --------------
dYN
(1)
Where eY is the income elasticity of demand, dQ/Q is the percentage change of quantity
demanded, and dYN is the percentage change in income. The majority of empirical studies
relate changes in income to changes not in the quantity of health care demanded, but in the
amount of expenditure on health care. Expenditure on any good or service is equivalent to
price times quantity (P x Q). Therefore, the income elasticity of expenditure that results from
this relationship is not necessarily the same as the income elasticity of demand. If the income
elasticity of expenditure were to be the same as the income elasticity of demand, then we
would have to assume that prices (P) are constant. But prices do not remain constant over
time[26], which means that it is important to take account of how they change. This is usually
done by deflating real sums by purchasing power parities. Relative prices are important in
health care because, in line with other service sectors, increases in costs may be difficult to
offset against productivity increases and technological change.
3.2.5 Final remark on the theoretical model and way(s) forward
A causal relationship is widely assumed between health care expenditure and GDP. The
nature of this relationship is not, however, underpinned by a coherent theory, although it
implicitly draws upon elements of macroeconomic and micro economic theory. The lack of
conceptual framework means that statements about variation in health care expenditure
among advanced industrial nations are likely to be statements of tendency (Rose, 1991;
Btzioni, 1985). Furthermore, the acceptance of a causal relationship between health
26 Particularly health services and health goods are characterized by higher price inflation both because of the
~on-tradability of health services within markets and the absence of markets in many settings, and the
mnovativeness of new health care products (pharmaceuticals, diagnostics, medical devices. etc). which
frequently results in significant price premia over existing technologies.
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expenditures and GDP deflects attention away from the need for more informative analyses
that would focus attention on the determinants of variations in the coverage and composition
of health services, including micro-efficiency and resource allocation. As a result, the policy
relevance of the literature in this field remains very limited.
Chapter 5 will take this discussion further and will outline a conceptual framework that
would encompass the aggregate determinants of health care expenditures, which will
subsequently be tested empirically in chapter 6.
3.3 Key methodological problems in the empirical research
3.3.1 General observations
Aside from the lack of a theoretical foundation and conceptual framework, the validity of an
empirical observation relies greatly on the credibility of the data, and the robustness of the
methods used to analyse them. The quantitative literature on the determinants of health care
expenditure raises a number of important methodological issues pertaining to the data, the
type of conversion factor, the prices of health service inputs and the method of estimating
health production functions.
The literature on the determinants of health care expenditures has focused a great deal of
attention on the aggregate relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) and the level
of health spending. Both of these parameters are examined in more detail in chapter 4. The
early literature in the area (Abel-Smith, 1963, 1967), showed that, after adjustment for
inflation, exchange rates and population, GDP per capita is a determinant of health
expenditure and that most of the variation in health spending was attributable to variations in
real per capita income. This proposition was tested econometrically by many authors
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(Newhouse, 1977; Maxwell, 1981; and Leu, 1986, among others) and it was confirmed that,
in aggregate terms, spending on health rises faster than national income, hence the income
elasticity of demand for health care is greater than unity, thereby implying that health care is
a luxury good. There are three main issues arising from the research effort so far, relating to
the analytical methodology, the attempts to standardise data from different countries, and the
type of model used to analyse the variation in health care expenditures.
3.3.2 Estimation methodology
The choice of statistical technique used to analyse the determinants of health care expenditure
in different countries affects the way conclusions are drawn for policy analysis. As I
mentioned in chapter 2, three methods have been used and have claimed various degrees of
success in explaining variation in health care spending:
• Cross-sectional analysis
• Pooled cross-sectional analysis
• Time-series analysis
In particular, a large number of studies have examined the relationship between health
spending and income, occasionally adding other variables, among a number of countries at a
specific point in time (Newhouse, 1977; Leu, 1974; Maxwell, 1981; Gerdtham, 1988; Parkin
et al, 1987). Other studies used a pooled cross-sectional analysis, namely looking at this
relationship for a number of countries and for a number of years (Gerdtham, 1991; McGuire
et aI, 1993; OECD, 1995). Finally, very few studies exist so far that look at the determinants
of health expenditures on a time series basis for individual countries (Murillo et al, 1993;
Saez et aI, 1994). The main result so far is, in the aggregate, a confirmation of the earlier
empirical finding that health care is a luxury good across countries (see Table 2.1), both in
the developed and the developing world, and that health spending is largely determined by
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national income. However, the special features of the health care sector and the frequent lack
of available data for many variables have called into question the robustness of the results of
empirical research (Kanavos & Mossialos, 1999). In addition, the result does not appear to be
robust and, at times, a different choice of years or conversion methodologies produces the
result that health care may not be a luxury good. In addition, all empirical research to date has
ignored the correlation between health expenditures and GDP that may simply be due to the
former being a component of the latter. These factors all pose questions about the credibility
of the existing empirical results.
3.3.2.1 Cross-section analysis
Cross-section analysis has so far been used very widely. Over the years, the simple
relationship between health spending and income, underspecified as it is, has expanded to
include other variables, such as the proportion of elderly (aged 65 and above), the number of
working women, etc. The use of cross-sectional data in the literature brings together countries
with different initial conditions and, quite often, different income levels. It implicitly assumes
that all countries have similar technologies, similar health production functions and allocation
of resources, and the same public-private mix. The robustness of the results of cross-sectional
analysis also depends on the validity of the conversion factors and the comparability of the
original data. Given the points already raised, it is not surprising that the use of cross-
sectional data has produced different results at different points in time even when the same
countries are being studied. The results produced by Parkin et al (1987) and Gerdtham &
Jonsson (1992) are typical in this respect; both studies use Health- and GDP-PPPs, but the
former paper finds an income elasticity smaller than one using 1980 data, whereas the latter,
using 1985 data, finds health care to be a luxury good, with a demand elasticity considerably
higher than unity (1.43). The choice of conversion factor also gives different results: Parkin et
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al (1987) found that health care was a luxury when exchange rates were used as a conversion
factor, whereas it was observed to be a necessity when Health- and GDP-PPPs were used to
convert health spending and GDP respectively.
Cross-sectional analysis, although in principle useful, is static in nature in that it examines a
given relationship at a specific point in time and ignores dynamic effects and initial
conditions unless the same type of analysis is undertaken, at different points in time. As
health care reform has gained considerable impetus over the last fifteen years, decision-
makers would be interested in what actually works on a continuous basis, rather than any
static, short-term effects, which may be reversable in the medium- or long-term. Although
pooled cross-sectional and time-series analyses may often face similar disadvantages as
cross-sectional analysis, models that account for dynamic effects and initial conditions can
rectify this, thus making the latter two types of analysis attractive relative to cross-section
analysis.
3.3.2.2 Pooled cross-section data analysis
In recent years there has been considerable increase in the use of pooled cross-sectional
studies, which allow analysis of a sample of countries over a period of time. From an
econometric perspective the advantages of using pool cross-sectional data are well
documented in the literature (Chamberlain, 1982; Anderson & Hsiao, 1982; Hsiao, 1985;
Hsiao, 1986; and Baltagi, 1996). A pooled cross-sectional data set gives the researcher a large
number of observations (data points), increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the
collinearity among explanatory variables[27], thus improving the efficiency of econometric
27 Collinearity is a phenomenon, whereby an explanatory variable can be expressed as an exact linear
combination of the other explanatory variables. In this particular case, the explanatory variable in question is
redundant. In time-series and pooled cross-section analysis, it needs to be determined that: (a) the no-
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estimates. This, in tum, means that the variable coefficients obtained are more likely to be
robust and free of biases when countries are the unit of analysis, samples are often small, the
information provided by them may not be rich enough to meet the requirements of the model
specified, and that may give rise to the problem of multicollinearity and small sample bias. In
this case, the researcher can either (a) increase the sample information or (b) reduce the
information requirements of the model. In the case of the determinants of health care
expenditures, a simple way of increasing the amount of information would be to pool
countries over the same time period. Reducing the information requirements of the model can
be done, for instance, by imposing prior restrictions on the parameters and their coefficients.
For example, the value of a certain parameter in the model can be assumed to be zero.
Pooled cross-sectional data, by offering many more degrees of freedom, can reduce the gap
between the information requirements of a model and the information provided by the data.
Furthermore, it may be very useful in the particular case in econometric research where the
real reason for certain effects is omitted variable bias. By utilising information on both the
intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the relationships being investigated, it is
possible to control to a certain extent the effects and problems of missing or unobserved
variables. On the other hand, pooled cross-sectional analysis is not without its disadvantages.
One such disadvantage may be the danger of amplifying measurement error problems.
Measurement error problems can, in tum, lead to biased estimates through selection bias
(Nickell, 1981; Anderson & Hsiao, 1989). Furthermore, the methodological problems of
assembling data on heterogeneous systems are still not dealt with regardless of the type(s) of
modelling techniques available.
multicollinearity assumption holds and (b) that the dependent variable is exogenous to the independent
variables.
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3.3.2.3 Time-series analysis
Compared to a cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional analysis, a country-specific time-
series approach may have advantages in that it focuses on explaining a health production
function within an individual country and may provide information on dynamic patterns and
the consequences of policy over time. In this respect, the effects of specific policy decisions
and relevant underlying trends or habits can be incorporated into the analysis and their effects
evaluated. One of the main advantages of time-series analysis is, therefore, that it can account
for effects that may take time to appear in a health production function.
For the reasons already discussed, a time-series methodology is coupled with a single country
approach. Policy analysis should aim for knowledge about the exact consequences of
macroeconomic change, income and its distribution, the structure of health service provision
and levels and distribution of health for the propensity to spend on health. This, we would
argue, is achieved by studying these determinants within each country over a period of time.
In these circumstances, exchange rates and PPPs are made redundant by the use of domestic
currency values.
Inevitably, time-series analysis has a number of conceptual and methodological
disadvantages. Many macroeconomic data series are subject to underlying trends. Such time-
series are thus non-stationary and non-stationarity makes linear regression problematic. A
stationary time-series is one that has a constant mean, a variance that is less than infinity, and
a covariance that does not depend on time. In other words, the process by which the data are
being generated is the same over time. Most time-series are found to be integrated of some
order I(d), which means that the series must be differenced d times in order to become
stationary. If a time-series is non-stationary, the conventional hypothesis testing procedures
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based on the critical values of the t and F statistics may be suspect (Harvey, 1989).
Furthermore, one would erroneously observe a good fit between non-stationary variables
because the R2 statistic is biased upwards. This could account for the strong relationship
foundbetween health expenditure and GDP in time-series analyses, which did not account for
potential non-stationarity. In view of the problems with non-stationary variables, appropriate
techniques are therefore essential to avoid mis-specification and estimation biases.
A further methodological issue is that the use of time-series analysis requires datasets that can
incorporate variable lag structures. However data may not be available easily, or in a
consistent form for the desired periods. A particular problem arises with attempts to
incorporate variables relating to determinants of health, such as diet, tobacco and alcohol
consumption, in long-term econometric analysis.
3.3.2.4 Afinal remark on estimation methodology
The discussion around the use of estimation methodology assessed the relative advantages
and disadvantages of cross-section analysis, pooled cross-section analysis and time-series
analysis. Overall, it was deemed preferable to conduct statistical analysis by using time-
series, both on methodological as well as policy-related grounds. In view of the evidence
presented in this part of the chapter, it appears as though individual country time-series
analysis presents a more robust estimation method for the purpose of explaining variations in
health care expenditures in individual countries. It will also allow the derivation of policy
conclusions on a country-by-country basis, which is not possible either with the use of cross-
sectional or pooled cross-sectional analysis. The choice of time-series analysis over cross-
sectional and pooled cross-sectional analysis is further underpinned on theoretical grounds by
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the lack of homogeneity among countries as well as the bias generated through the use of
different conversion factors.
3.3.3 The choice of conversion factor
Some types of empirical analysis (notably cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional) imply
that all economic variables in each country must be translated into a common measure. Two
main approaches have been adopted, namely the use of exchange rates to translate all types of
expenditures into a common currency, and US$ Purchasing Power Parities, whereas a third-
workers' earning power - exists but has not been used at all widely. However, the choice of
method presents important conceptual and practical problems. In addition to the
methodological problems with the type of conversion factors used, significant problems also
exist in terms of identifying prices of health care goods and services in an activity (health
care), that is characterised by the absence of markets, and thus subject to price distortions.
These are reviewed in the following paragraphs.
3.3.3.1 The use of exchange rates
It is evident from the literature that the use of exchange rates to make health expenditures in
different countries comparable raises a number of conceptual and practical problems. First,
the international spread of per capita health care expenditure exaggerates the true differences
in real per capita health care expenditures among different countries. This is because, even
under free trade, the equilibrium set of exchange rates would only reflect the equalisation of
prices of internationally traded goods. There is evidence to suggest that productivity
differentials among countries are larger for tradables than for non-tradables (mainly services,
including health care). The production of non-tradables is relatively more labour-intensive,
and labour is relatively more abundant and relatively less expensive in low-income countries.
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Thus, the relative prices of non-tradables can be expected to increase systematically with real
per capita income. This price effect causes the spread of health care expenditure to be over-
stated by comparisons using exchange rate conversions. Thus, exchange rates do not
adequately reflect relative purchasing power across countries. In addition, their use attaches
little weight to non-marketed[28] commodities[29]. Therefore, international comparisons of
expenditure on non-marketed commodities, which rely on exchange rates are, at best,
approximations and do not reflect true consumer preferences.
Second, different exchange rate regimes have considerable impact on the denominated
variables, which further affects the credibility of the analysis conducted on this basis.
Exchange rates are an economic policy tool used to influence capital movements orland a
country's overall competitiveness. It holds, for example, that under a flexible exchange rate
regime, a consistent balance of payments deficit will force a national government to allow its
exchange rate to depreciate, by a reduction in interest rates, for example, in order that its
competitiveness be improved. Such a depreciation will make domestic goods cheaper in
international markets and imports more expensive at home. In terms of health expenditures,
those in a depreciating country will be understated, whereas those in an appreciating country
will be overstated. Of course, this type of policy, whereby a country allows its exchange rate
to depreciate in order to improve its competitiveness, may result in a series of competitive
devaluations as countries whose trade interests are affected follow suit in order to restore
their previous competitiveness. This is the infamous "beggar thy neighbour" policy, which
may lead to considerable instability in international markets. It follows therefore that flexible
28 Namely commodities for which a "market" in which supply and demand determine price and in that sense
the market clears, does not exist. Commodities, which are often described as public goods (such as education,
defense and health) present such features.
29 ~on-marketed commodities (goods or services) are different from non-tradable commodities (goods or
servIces). Non-marketed commodities are those for which price is not determined through supply and demand
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exchange rates are susceptible to considerable volatility and uncertainty. Fixed exchange
rates, on the other hand, are only a partial solution, as the currencies covered by a particular
regime are limited. This was the case of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System (EMS), whereby most of the European currencies were tied to a
fixed, but adjustable, exchange rate, whereas other major international currencies such as the
Japanese Yen or the US dollar were following a flexible exchange rate regime. In addition,
the reality of frequent realignments (devaluations or revaluations) within the mechanism,
meant that even within the ERM, structural breaks are introduced into the data, which affect
the conclusions of such analysis.
3.3.3.2 The use of Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs)
PPPs are calculated on the basis of a basket of goods that is theoretically common to all
countries and which is used as a benchmark. They are calculated at 5-yearly intervals by the
OECD. Specifically, the OECD GDP-PPP statistics are based on a set of 2,500 individual
consumer goods and services available in each of the 29 most industrialised nations - the
members of the OEeD - with the cost of purchasing that specific market basket of goods and
services measured in the local currency of each of those nations. For example, if the total cost
of that market basket was US$100,OOOin the United States and UK£75,OOOin the United
Kingdom, then the PPP exchange rate would be 0.75 UK pounds per US dollar. Using an
over-simplified example, if UK health expenditure per capita averages £75, the cost of the
equivalent real resources foregone in the UK to purchase health care would be $100 in the
United States.
forces within a given market territory. Non-tradable commodities are those, which are not traded across
countries, partly because of the "non-market" nature.
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As international pnce deflators, PPPs have none of the problems of exchange rates.
International comparisons based upon them have significant conceptual advantages, including
representativeness and good coverage, though their use presents a number of measurement
problems, including the actual method of calculation. Such problems are compounded when
the commodity groups under scrutiny are not marketed goods or services, as in the case of
health care. The composition of the basket, although theoretically common to all countries,
does not account for the different values and preferences that individuals in different
countries attach to different components. Nor does it account for differences in the
composition of the basket, which may be significant for components such as health care.
Thus, for instance, the OECD-defined "basket" for health care goods and services contains
294 items and their prices (health goods and services); pharmaceuticals account for 228 of
those prices (or 77.55% of the sample) (OECD, 1990) although they account for a much
smaller proportion of total health care expenditure. Within the European Union, for the 1995
Health-PPPs, EUROSTAT used the same internationally acknowledged methods to compile
around 875 prices in the health sector. Of these around 800 prices (91.43% of the sample)
were of pharmaceutical products and 45 were other products (medical appliances). Only 30
prices of health care services were collected. This has resulted in a significant over-
representation of pharmaceutical prices in the basket of goods and services. A selection of the
prices of health care services and medical goods are shown in Table 3.1. Within EU countries
services by hospitals and practising medical personnel amount to more than two thirds of
total spending in health care. In principle great attention is made to select representative
samples, however, this process breaks down for several reasons:
(a) There are more than 450 products in case-mix management tools, such as DRGs for
acute care; as it is not possible to include all450 products in a representative index,
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this suggests that a selection of homogeneous medical and surgical procedures might
be desirable (also across countries);
(b) Within the 30 defined health care services, four of these concern general practitioner
visits (see table 3.1). The guidelines concerning the four prices of general practitioner
services are not very precise about what is to be included in the price and what
excluded. To avoid different ways of reporting by member countries, the descriptions
need to be much more precise, although this may then fall foul of real differences in
the nature of the services provided[30].
(c) As shown in table 3.1, the definition of Eurostat PPPs also relies on 5 different types
of dental service. One question that might arise from this is why prices are collected
covering five different dental services, whereas all practising specialists are covered
by only two services (ophthalmology and internist). Why is it, for instance, that no
prices of ambulatory surgery are collected?
(d) Finally, health care is more than discrete procedures, which effectively implies that
elements of chronic care should also be considered for inclusion into a representative
basket of health care goods and services.
Thus, if Health PPPs are to be used, it appears that a much greater clarification of definitions
(except for dentist's services, perhaps) and sampling are required. This would permit the
current huge weighting of pharmaceutical products (91.43%) of the health-related PPP basket
to be revisited in order to strike a more reasonable balance, between health care goods and
services.
Caution should therefore be exercised in the use of Health-PPPs because health care inputs
are assessed by a small sample of prices using weakly comparable volume indices, with a
30 Which further implies that robust comparison would first require standardization across countries.
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bias towards pharmaceuticals, Finally, the use of 5-yearly Health-PPPs produces a blunt tool
to analyse year-to-year variation.
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Table 3-1 Eurostat guidelines concerning the collation of prices of health
care services (PPP statistics in the EU - Prices of health services and health
non- harmaceutical roducts for the 1995 PPP exercise
1. Primary Health Care Services
1.1.General Practitioner: consultation at surgery with appointment (not first consultation)
without special examination but with prescription (during the day). Price for a health
service patient.
1.2.General Practitioner: The same as 1.1.Price for a private patient.
l.3. General Practitioner: Home visit (workday, not urgent or night visit), including the
doctors' travelling expenses for a distance of 5 km. Price for a health service patient.
1.4.General Practitioner: As in 1.3.Price for a private patient.
l.5. Specialist (ophthalmologist): Consultation at surgery with appointment; one consultation
without special examination but with prescription for glasses. Price for a health service
patient.
1.6. Specialist (ophthalmologist): As in 1.5. Price for a private patient.
1.7. Internist: Reading of a standard electrocardiogram (not an ECG made under varying
strain) on request of a general practitioner or another specialist (not being a cardiologist,
internist or paediatrician). Price for reading the ECG and for making a written report. Price
for a health service patient.
1.8. Internist: As in 1.7. Price for a private patient.
1.9.Dentist: extraction of a single-root tooth without complication, including local anaesthetic
by injection, excluding the charge of any radiograph. Price for a health service patient.
1.10. Dentist: As in 19.9. Price for a private patient.
1.11. Dentist: filling of molar tooth (under right 7), silver amalgam central filling (occlusal
surface) without local anaesthetic. Price for a health service patient.
l.12. Dentist: As in 1.11. Price for a private patient.
1.13. Dentist: Insertion of a bonded gold/porcelain crown under right 1,without complication.
The total treatment consists of: preparation of the tooth, making of the impressions, making
of temporary appliance, and mounting of the crown. Price for a health service patient,
including the costs for the technician.
1.14. Dentist: As in 1.13. Price for a private patient.
1.15. Dentist: Examination (check -up), normal scaling and polishing, no other treatment.
Price for a health service patient.
1.16. Dentist: As in 1.15. Price for a private patient.
1.17. Dentist: Insertion of a complete appliance for an adult. Appliance is made using two
plaster-caps. The fee comprises all actions between the first consultation up to the mounting
of the appliance and includes the follow-up care during the first two months after the
mounting. Price for a health service patient, including the costs for the technician.
1.18. Dentist: As in 1.18. Price for a private patient.
1.19. Nurse (home visit): Care of an aged, handicapped patient (routine check-up of state of
health, dispensing of medicines, giving instructions). Travelling distance approx. 5 km.
Price including travelling expenses. Price for a health service patient.
1.20. Nurse (home visit): As in 1.19. Price for a private patient.
1.21. Nurse: Medical treatment at the office of a district nurse (or similar category of medical
staff). Intramuscular injection of vitamin B 12. Price to exclude the cost of the preparation.
Price for a health service patient.
1.22. Nurse: As in 1.21. Price for a private patient.
1.23. Physiotherapy: Massage of shoulder and neck muscles. 10 sessions 15minutes each
no home visits. To be converted to rice er 2.5 hours. Price for a health service atient.
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1.24. Physiotherapy: As in 1.23. Price for a private patient.
1.25. Laboratory: Standard blood and urine check. Blood check: count ofleucocytes and
blood group, sedimentation rate, urea, creatinine blood sugar, total lipids, triglycerides,
cholesterol, uracid, -GT. Urine check: albumine, glycose, sediment. Price for a health
service patient.
1.26. Laboratory: As in 1.25. Price for a private patient.
1.27. X-Ray-Photography: Adult's thorax. Photo: 36x43 cm. Automatic RP (quick
development). Film: Kodak, Agfa, Dupon, 3M, Hilford. Development baths of the same
brand. With evidence. Price for a health service patient.
1.28. X-Ray-Photography: As in 1.27. Price for a private patient.
2. Hospital salaries
2.29. Doctors: Head of department, 15 years seniority.
2.30. Doctors: Doctor-assistant, not head of department, 10 years seniority.
2.31. Doctors: Not head of department, less than 4 years of seniority.
2.32. Nurse: 10 years seniority, head of department.
2.33. Nurse: Operating theatre nurse, 6 years of seniority.
2.34. Nurse: 3 years of seniority.
2.35. Nursing-auxiliary: 3 years of seniority.
2.36. Physiotherapist: 3 years of seniority.
2.37. Laboratory assistant: 3 years of seniority.
2.38. Hospital administrator: 15 years of seniority.
2.39. Secretary (typist): 3 years of seniority.
2.40. Cook: Not head of kitchen, 6 years of seniori_!y.
3. Charges for hospital treatment
3.41. Hospital: Daily rate in a private hospital including the following: normal meals, medical
care provided by a nurse (measurement oftemperature, provision of drugs); including the daily
visit of s doctor. Room for one person (no fridge or TV).
3.42. Hospital: Daily rate in a university hospital including the following: normal meals,
medical care provided by a nurse (measurement of temperature, provision of drugs); including
the daily visit of s doctor. Room for 4 persons (no fridge or TV).
3.43. Hospital: Daily rate in a public (non-university) hospital including the following: normal
meals, medical care provided by a nurse (measurement oftemperature, provision of drugs);
including the daily visit of s doctor. Four-bed room.
3.44. Hospital: Daily rate in a public (non-university) hospital including the following: normal
meals, medical care provided by a nurse (measurement oftemperature, provision of drugs);
including the daily visit of s doctor. Six-bed room.
Source: Eurostat, December 1992.
3.3.3.3 Workers' earning power
Given the problems encountered in the use of both exchange rates and PPPs as conversion
factors, an alternative methodology has been put forward, namely the value of one hour of an
average worker's time, and the volume of goods or services that this hour would purchase in
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different countries (Andersson, 1992). A common example is the annual estimation of how
many days the average citizen has to work to pay their taxes. This measure has a number of
advantages. Firstly, it is easily conceptualised, in that it would enable us to answer the
question: "How long would a person have to work to pay for health services typical for their
respective country? Another advantage is that exchange rate fluctuations or PPP
measurement problems are no longer a problem. Table 3.2 shows some examples of the use
of this methodology from a number ofOECD countries.
Nevertheless, this methodology also has significant disadvantages, which hamper its use as a
tool for international comparison. In particular, it has been criticised on the grounds that
labour markets in different countries are subject to different regulatory regimes. Thus,
assumptions that would reduce differently regulated markets to a common model may be far
too simplistic. Furthermore, definitions, economies and labour forces in different countries
vary quite considerably. These add considerably to the variability of the comparisons.
Although standardised data on employee compensation in 26 industrialised countries are
available and have been published in the past, this methodology would require a considerable
amount of effort for data to become available over time and for all countries involved (US
Dept of Labour, 1991).
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Table 3-2 Annual Pharmaceutical Expenditures compared with
Worker's Earning Power in the late 1980s (values in local currencies)
Per capita Average Work hours
Country currency expenditure earning needed to
in national per hour cover annual
currency nat. cur. per capita
expenditures
USA) US$ 210 14.83 14.2
Canada" CAN$ 217 15.86 13.7
Japan' y 37,330 1,641.00 22.7
UK2 £ 58 6.37 9.1
Gennany DM 628 31.70 19.8
France) FF 1,699 83.09 20.4
Italy) ITL 338,266 19,518.00 17.3
Sweden' SKR 1,006 113.11 8.9
Switzerland3 SF 386 26.33 14.7
Greece2 DRA 11,015 892.00 12.3
Portugal) ESC 5,468 311.22 17.6
Average 15.5
Notes: ) 1990 value.
2 1989 value.
3 1988 value.
4 1987 value.
Sources: OECD (1991); US Department of Labour (1991), quoted by Andersson F., The US
Pharmaceutical Expenditures in an International and National Perspective, Battelle, London,
1992.
3.3.3.4 Afinal remark on conversion/actors
This part of the chapter revealed considerable methodological flaws in the use of exchange
rates, purchasing power parities and average wage earnings and questioned whether the use
of such conversion methods is at all necessary. As shown in the previous sections, the debate
around the appropriateness of conversion measures such as exchange rates and PPPs has been
quite intense [Parkin et al, (1987); Murillo et aI, (1993); Saez et aI, (1994); Gerdtham &
Joensson (199Ia); Gerdtham and Jonsson (199Ib); Murthy, (1992); Gerdtham and Joensson,
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(1992); Kravis, Heston and Summers, (1978); Milne and Molana, (1991), Karatzas, (1992),
and Hitiris and Posnett, (1992)]. It seems that, on methodological grounds, the use of PPPs
has prevailed due to their ability to evaluate better the true volume of health care expenditure
and income (Kramers, Heston and Summers, 1978). Consequently, PPPs are considered to be
the most appropriate method to measure variations in income and expenditure across
countries. However, the choice of denominator has been found to alter the extent to which
health care is a luxury good or a necessity (Parkin et al 1987; Newhouse, 1977; McGuire et
al, 1993;Newhouse, 1993). For instance it has been shown that the use of PPPs as deflators
causes the income elasticity to drop below unity, compared with when exchange rates are
used (Parkin et al, 1987). In all cases the use of PPPs reduces the extent of inter-country
variation. Other results contradict this (Gerdtham and Jonsson, 1992) and suggest that the use
of exchange rates to convert health care expenditure in various countries into a common
currency exaggerates the discrepancies between real health care expenditure in those
countries.
Consequently, this part of the chapter also took the opportunity to investigate the
representativeness, coverage and validity ofPPPs and found that Health-PPPs are particularly
vulnerable to methodological problems, first because they are heavily biased towards
pharmaceuticals and second, because the rest of the sample comprising prices of health
services and non-pharmaceutical goods is not representative of health care overall. The
proposal to undertake a country-by-country time series analysis effectively eliminates these
problems and the methodological concerns associated with the various conversion indices.
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3.3.4 The use of Health Prices and Price Indices
3.3.4.1 Availability of Health Prices
Health price indices are often used to compare price trends in the health sector with price
trends in the economy in general (the latter measured, for instance, through the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), or the GDP deflator). When price indices are used it is important to be
aware of the problems that may arise when they are calculated over a long time period.
Improvements in the quality of products or interventions included in a price index basket
often go unmeasured, while the nominal price increases will often be captured exactly.
Similarly, over a five to ten year time frame, typically used in national revisions and re-
benchmarking of consumer price indices, the introduction of newer products bearing the
same label but embodying improved technology or enhanced uses, may bias upward index-
based price estimates. One such example is pharmaceuticals, which is characterised by cycles
of innovation, each of which usually yields higher price premia to pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Increases in the relative prices of new drug products have been attributed to
both the general rise in inflation over time as well as to the increasing cost of drug
development. Although the calculations are controversiaI[31], estimates of the cost of
developing a new molecular compound were about US$231 million in the 1970-82 period (in
1987 prices) (DiMasi et al, 1991), compared with about US$ 1 million in the late 1950s and
early 19608(Mansfield, 1970) and US$ 54 million (at 1976 prices) for a new molecular entity
developed between 1963 and 1976 (Hansen, 1979).
31 Relating, for instance, to what is R&D, should advertising expenditure be included in the calculations, how
should opportunity costs of sunk capital be handled, among others.
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3.3.4.2 Problems with price indices and selection
Price statistics have continuously been collected in OECD countries in order to construct
different types of PPP. The methods of data collection and of calculation of indices and PPPs,
as well as the breadth and representativeness of the prices collected have been refined
continuously during these years. However, an area that has received less attention is the
nature of price data for public and semi-public services where there is no market price. A
number of problems exist in finding the appropriate prices to collect, as well as how to
compute prices in a common currency (e.g. the US$ or the Euro).
The bias in favour of pharmaceutical prices identified in the previous section, (and the
complete absence of prices of ambulatory surgery), may be explained by the fact that the
health Caresector in most OEeD countries is characterized, to a large extent, by the absence
of markets to determine prices. As a result, pharmaceutical product prices constitute the
majority of observable market prices, despite the fact that personnel costs amount to more
than two-thirds of total spending on health care (Kanavos and Mossialos, 1999). The absence
of markets referred to above applies most strongly to public health, since public health
cannot, by definition, be individualized. But even where markets do exist, they are
incomplete because of important market failures and government intervention. Consequently
many prices have to be artificial (Danish Ministry of Health, 1994), and careful selection of
health price indices is required (Danish Ministry of Health, 1994)[32]. Finally, there is a
conceptual problem because health care technology changes rapidly, creating difficulties in
measuring quality-adjusted prices (Greenspan, 1997). In an area of such rapid technological
change, decisions have to be made regarding the choice of an appropriate unit of output.
32 The selection of an overall health price index and the justification for its use are provided in chapter 5.
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These problems challenge the validity of deflation indices when these are used at discrete
points in time, for instance in cross-sectional analysis.
3.3.4.3 Afinal remark on health prices and price indices
With regard to prices, it was established that their use in a model of the determinants of
health care expenditures is essential, particularly over time, in order to capture dynamic
effects and technological change. Caution should, nevertheless, be exercised in the use of
relevant price indices and their selection should be carefully justified. In particular, a
dilemma exists about the choice of prices of health care goods and services, because of the
extent to which they are representative and also the extent to which they take into account
technological change. Given that considerable background work is still needed, it may be
necessary to focus on specific sub-sets of prices that would provide adequate measurements
of specific aspects of health care markets (e.g. the pharmaceutical health index to account for
a measurement of "perceived" innovation). This would avoid the bias observed in the overall
Health-PPp by accounting for the drug component of the health care sector only.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on four main points:
• first, it has provided a critique of the absence of a theoretical framework used in
existing analyses.
• Second, it has assessed the relative advantages and disadvantages of different
estimation methodologies (cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional, and time-series
analysis) used in estimating the importance of different variables as determinants of
health care expenditures.
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• Third, it has discussed the validity of different conversion factors employed in cross-
country comparison.
• And, finally, it has discussed health prices and the extent to which they have been
used in the literature. A number of conclusions were drawn and these will shape the
analysis that will be used in this thesis from chapter 5 onwards.
In particular, there is no existing theoretical or conceptual framework on which to base the
health expenditure - income relationship; one can seek a relationship between health spending
and any other macroeconomic variable and still come up with statistically significant results.
The analysis that has hitherto taken place is therefore ad hoc and does not per se add to the
existing pool of knowledge. Furthermore, there is very little analysis or theory of what
actually determines health spending; rather, there is an ad hoc use of those factors which can
be measured and are thus readily available for econometric analysis.
Consequently, chapter 5 of this thesis will undertake to establish such a theoretical
framework, which will be tested empirically in subsequent chapters. This chapter will take
into consideration the critique provided in this chapter.
With regard to the estimation methodology it is important in any econometric modelling to
provide a comprehensive understanding of particular sequences. It is, however, doubtful
whether this can be done in cross-sectional studies and it is questionable whether institutional
developments can be reduced to a dummy variable in either cross-sectional or pooled cross-
sectional analysis.
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The evidence reviewed supports the use of individual country time-series analysis to address
the question of the determinants of health care expenditures, on theoretical and conceptual
grounds. Through time-series analysis for individual countries, it will become possible to
explore the long-term relationships in the model to be defined in chapter 5. An individual
country, time-series analysis will also enable policy conclusions specific for particular health
systems to be drawn.
Concerning the different conversion factors, the available evidence from the international
literature identifies problems in comparing health expenditures across countries. Exchange
rates and PPPs (Health- and GDP-PPP) have serious disadvantages. Whereas exchange rates
have been criticised widely in the literature, the use of PPPs has been widely accepted by
default. However, this chapter has shown that Health-PPPs are severely biased towards
pharmaceuticals whilst, at the same time, they cannot capture the extent of innovation. This
leaves the health expenditure-related variables without a credible deflator over time that
would produce comparable health expenditure data in different countries. Finally, the average
worker's time methodology does not really offer a robust alternative, again because of
problems of comparability.
It is concluded that none of the above conversion factors enables a robust comparison across
countries. Given the individual country, time-series approach that has been put forward, the
thesis will not use any of these conversion factors in the econometric analysis that will follow
chapter 5. Rather, all financial variables will be expressed in national currency units (NCUs)
deflated by the 1995 GDP deflator in each country, in order to arrive at constant prices for
individual financial variables in individual countries ..
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A number of important conclusions were also reached with regard to the importance of prices
and the relative price of health care. For instance, omission of a price variable might affect
the value of the income elasticity of demand. Similarly, the relative price of health care in
pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is a key factor as price movements are
important determinants of changes in health care expenditures.
It is concluded that the empirical analysis that will follow chapter 5 will make use of price
indices which capture movements in prices of health goods and services over the period
under investigation, in order to enable dynamic effects as well as technological innovations to
be adequately represented.
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Appendix 3-1 The Engel curve: definition, derivation and link with the
incomeelasticity of demand
The Engel curve shows the relationship between a consumer's income and the quantity of a
good purchased, all other things being equal.
In order to derive the Engel curve, we need to first of all derive the income-consumption
curve, in order to examine the impact of a change in income on the quantity of good X
demanded. This is derived as follows. Attention is confined to two commodities by adopting
the composite good convention: good Y represents all other goods, and good X is the one we
are interested in. The quantity of the other goods is expressed in terms of expenditure on
them.
If all prices are held constant and the consumer's budget or monetary income is increased,
then the budget line (showing all possible combinations of goods X and Y that can be
purchased at that income level) shifts outwards in a parallel manner as shown in figure 3.1.
The vertical intercept is now equal to the amount of the budget. So, in figure 3.1, MJ is the
income corresponding to the lowest budget line, M2 is a higher income corresponding to the
middle budget line, and so on.
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Figure 3-1 An income-consumption curve
Income-conswnption curve
",
x
130
In figure 3.1 and for each budget line, we can locate the point of tangency with an
indifference curve (a curve showing combinations of two commodities that a consumer is
indifferent between) and thus observe the consumer's optimal consumption bundle. By
connecting all these tangency points, we derive an income-consumption curve. From the
points on the income-consumption curve, we can read off the quantities of good X demanded
at the different income levels.
These data can be plotted in a graph showing the quantity of good X demanded for each
income level, M. This graph, shown in figure 3.2, is called the Engel curve after the
statistician Engel (1821-1896), who first studied the relationship between family incomes and
quantities demanded of different goods.
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Figure 3-2 An Engel curve
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The slope of the Engel curve at any point is known as the marginal propensity to consume
good X and measures for a small change (in the limiting case: an infinitesimal change) in
income, the ratio of the resulting change in the consumption of the good to that change in
income. We may also define the average propensity to consume the good as the ratio of the
quantity of it bought at any particular level of income to that level of income, or,
equivalently, given the good's price, as the proportion of income devoted to buying it. The
ratio of the marginal propensity to consume the good to the average propensity to consume is
defined as the income elasticity of demand for that good, and measures the proportional
change in income that causes the variation, other things being equal.
The Engel curve is very often positively sloped, as in figure 3.2, so that the quantity of the
good demanded rises with income. In this case, the good is a normal good and its elasticity
ranges between 0 and 1 (which also means that the marginal propensity to consume is
positive, but lower than the average propensity to consume). In the case of a luxury good, the
income elasticity of demand is greater than one. Such a good has a positive marginal
propensity to consume, which is also greater than the average propensity to consume.
The Engel curve need not always be positively sloping, however. There are cases, where it
can be negatively sloped, so that an increase in income leads to a decrease the quantity
demanded. In this case, the good is an inferior good and its income elasticity of demand is
negative. This implies a good for which the marginal propensity to consume is negative.
Figure 3.3 shows a set of indifference curves for which the consumption of good X falls as
income rises. In this case, the Engel curve is downward sloping.
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Figure 3-3 Income-consumption curve for an inferior good
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
ESTIMATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH CARE
EXPENDITURES: A WAY FORWARD - PART II
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter focused on the theoretical framework used in empirical research of the
determinants of health care expenditures, debated the robustness of different conversion
factors and the selection of price indices, and discussed the rigour of different estimation
methodologies. It concluded that the empirical evidence, as well as being atheoretical, had
significant methodological and estimation flaws, which challenge the results obtained. It
concluded by taking further the discussion on the determinants of health care expenditures,
suggesting methodological steps that would lead to more robust estimates.
The purpose of this chapter is to build on this background and elaborate on four key issues in
particular:
• First, to analyse methodological problems in the measurement of key variables, such
as health expenditures and gross domestic product.
• Second, on the basis of the evidence presented, to explore whether there are
alternative and more robust measures of a country's income (for instance, aggregate
personal consumption instead of gross domestic product).
• Third, to explore certain measures of health that are commonly used in econometric
analyses such as mortality, life expectancy, and ageing from a conceptual perspective
and discuss the extent to which these can be used from a methodological perspective.
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• And, fourth, to identify further potential determinants of health care expenditures that
have not been used in the literature (for instance, technology, and the impact of other
macroeconomic factors).
Thus, this chapter addresses both methodological and conceptual issues: methodological
because it analyses issues of measurement of different variables and the extent to which they
can be used in comparative analysis; conceptual, because it attempts to identify likely
determinants of aggregate health care expenditures.
Section two investigates methodological problems related to the measurement of national
health care expenditures. Section three investigates methodological problems related to the
measurement and use of Gross Domestic Product, as a proxy for society's income. Section
four analyses the likely impact of technology on health care expenditures and reviews how
measurement of technology has been addressed in the international literature. Section five
analyses the likely impact of ageing on health spending and reviews how this has been
addressed in the international literature. Section six discusses other likely determinants of
health care expenditures, such as the macroeconomic environment, the determinants of
health, and patient expectations. Finally, section seven draws the main conclusions from the
preceding sections.
4.2 Measuring Aggregate Health Care Expenditures
4.2.1 Introduction
To conduct credible international comparisons of national health care expenditures, a
standardised definition of health care expenditure is needed. However, measurement of health
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expenditures in different countries varies considerably as several different methodologies are
employed. At the same time, individual country characteristics, cultural issues, past history,
and health care reforms shape the individual components of health care expenditure and their
comparability across countries and over time. The following sections analyse the
methodological problems in achieving comparability of health care expenditures, focusing on
(i) differences in accounting systems and practices between countries, (ii) individual
characteristics of health care reforms, and (iii) the role of the informal health economy.
4.2.2 Differences in measurements, and accounting systems and
practices across countries
Considerable differences exist in the measurement of health care expenditures between
countries due to differences in accounting systems. Within the European Union (EU), for
instance, individual national statistical offices compute health expenditure figures using
concepts that vary from one member country to another (Schneider, 1996). Some use the
concept of final consumption of medical goods and services within the framework of Systems
of National Accounts (SNA). A different approach is used by Eurostat[33] based on the
European Systematic Approach of Social Protection (ESSPROS). Although this approach
includes both benefits in kind and cash benefits, it differs from the System of National
Accounts (SNA) in that it is primarily directed to the compilation of public transfers in the
case of sickness. Finally, a mixed model with elements of both the SNA and ESSPROS is
used by some national statistical services, such as the German Statistical Office. Worse still,
some countries do not publish health accounts and what is available in terms of statistics, are
estimates or proxies of public and private consumption in the national accounts. Examples are
Belgium and Turkey.
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As well as differences in accounting method followed and the resulting differences,
individual countries vary as to what is included and what is not included. Consequently the
reported health expenditure in one country may include components which are excluded from
the same figure in other countries. Taking the USA and Japan as an example, expenditure on a
normal delivery, a luxury hospital bed, and per diem nursing care is not included in Japan's
definitionwhile it is in the American definition; in contrast, expenditure on nursing homes is not
included in the American definition (Tokita, 1995). Further examples are the treatment of
health-related R&D spending, expenditure on social services, prison health services, and
health education services, which in some countries are included in other departmental
budgets, rather than in total health care expenditure which is reported by the Ministry of
Health. Table 4.1 presents examples from OECD countries that reflect these problems.
Thus, studies pursuing cross-country comparisons, such as those reviewed in chapter two of
the thesis, ought to have taken these issues into consideration, because with the current state
of affairs such cross-country comparisons may lead to misleading results depending on which
components of health expenditures are included and which are not in different countries. The
compilation of data adjusted to facilitate comparisons across countries was initiated by the
OECD in 1975. The development of consistent national health accounts has already required
considerable efforts from many international organisations, national health, financing and
statistical bureaux, but is still incomplete (Getzen, 1991).
33 Eurostat is the statistical service of the European Union.
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4.2.3 The implications of health care reforms for data collection
Often, the implementation of health care reform leads to changes in the resource allocation
process, which may also lead to changes in the way(s) data are collected and reported. Such
changes may also arise from changes in institutional governance. A typical example in this
case is Sweden, with its three tiers of governance (central government, county councils and
municipalities). County councils in Sweden are responsible for the allocation of resources for
health care, on the basis of a grant received by the central government and taxes raised
locally. Prior to the reforms in the early 1990s, health care in Sweden was the sole
responsibility of county councils. This also included social care. A significant part of the
Swedish health care reform in the early 1990s was to separate health from social care and to
delegate responsibility for its delivery, along with the relevant budget, to municipalities[34].
The initial perception of this change was that Sweden's health reform policies were
successful in containing costs (indeed, they appeared to reduce costs) because health
spending as share of GDP fell from nearly 9% to 7.3% of GDP. However, this was largely
due to the shift of costs of long-term care and home care from the health budget to the social
security budget and the transfer of power from the county councils to the municipalities.
Therefore, there are two issues here: the first relates to the definition of health care
expenditure, which, in the Swedish case does not include mental health, long-term care, and
nursing homes, since all that is part of the social care budget; the second is associated with
the administration of the different budgets (health and social care) and the role of different
tiers of governance.
34 With regards to mental health, that separation has been in place since 1985.
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4.2.4 Measuring the Informal Health Economy
The informal sector[35] accounts for a significant proportion of overall economic activity in
many countries (lOVE, 2001). In most countries, the scale of informal activities is among the
highest in the services sector (Pavlopoulos, 1987), including health care, although, reflecting
its often clandestine nature, the exact size in any country is not known. Although the size of
the informal economy is thought to vary considerably, it is well known that there are
substantial direct payments for medical services by individuals in many developed countries
including Italy, Spain De Miguel and Guillen, 1989), Portugal, and Greece (Abel-Smith,
1994; Gardiner et aI, 1995), which are not measured in figures relating to either publicly or
privately provided services. Moreover, a considerable part of payments to dentists and
opticians are made through either private insurance schemes or at one's own expense. A
further complication is that such payments may themselves have been generated in the
informal sector[36] and so be excluded from the denominator. As table 4.2 shows, it is much
more likely that informal sector employees seek health care financed by their own means,
since they avoid paying social security contributions. The existence of an informal sector in
health services is likely to be even more widespread in developing and middle Income
countries, for instance in Eastern European economies in transition.
4.2.5 The way forward
On the basis of the methodological problems identified above, any cross-sectional or pooled
cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of health care expenditures is almost certainly
35 Also known as informal economy, or parallel economy, or black economy. The informal sector cannot be
captured by the fiscal authorities and can comprise illegal and criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and
prostitution, or, indeed, legal activities the income from which are not declared to the fiscal authorities, for
instance, a part-time job, or a second job in a given household, or, even, cash-only based employment.
36 This also highlights the need to look at the validity of GDP as a measure of national/individual wealth. This
is done in the next section.
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flawed, in that it implicitly assumes perfect comparability of health care expenditure data
across countries and over time. As the previous section has shown, this is not the case. One
way forward would, of course, be to standardise the measurement and reporting of health care
expenditure data. However, while this might be the ideal approach, in reality, a country-by-
country set of time-series analyses of the determinants of health care expenditures would
partly address the issue of data comparability across countries, if it is recognised that factors
affecting the distribution of the health budget overall, such as those identified above, are
addressed in subsequent analysis.
4.3 Measuring Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
4.3.1 Introduction
The most widely used measure of income used in the literature of health expenditures is a
country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). There are several issues associated with the use of
GDP as a key determinant of health care expenditures. The first relates to whether GOP
represents an adequate and robust measure of a country's income[37]. In order to address this
question, we need to consider three major issues related to the measurement and use of GDP as
a determinant of health care expenditures:
37 If that question can be answered in the affirmative, then a series of other questions arise, for instance: does
GDP explain variations in life expectancy across countries, in particular, the fact that some southern countries in
Europe (which are, in principle, poorer) have a higher life expectancy compared with the richer northern ones
(which are, in principle, richer), or should we look into lifestyle and environmental factors? A side issue relates
to what extent is the comparison of current health status with current income levels valid, rather than relating
past health status (and up to how many lags) to current income levels. Furthermore, does GDP explain why
infant mortality in wealthy countries such as the US is higher than in other GEeD countries with similar or,
most frequently, lower per capita income levels (see Table 4.3), or should one be looking at other factors for an
adequate explanation? Strictly speaking, however, these questions are not part of the remit for this thesis and
will not be pursued further.
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• First, the range of transactions captured in the estimation of GDP often varies between
countries, so that data may not be comparable; while this is widely recognised, the
differences identified may exceed acceptable margins of tolerance;
• Second, the scale of the informal sector (parallel economy) may have a sufficiently
large impact on disposable income and its uses to bias significantly the observed
relationships; and
• Third, certain transactions are not influenced by the current levels of GDP or its
growth rate, but are closely linked to historical levels of wealth not necessarily
associated with personal disposable income.
These factors are discussed further in the following sections.
4.3.2 Disparities in the measurement of GDP
Significant disparities emerge with regard to the definition and measurement of GDP even in
economic groupings of countries, such as the DECD and the European Union, where attempts
at standardisation have been in place for some time. The differences reflect how data are
collected, compiled and analysed. Consequently the basis of data reporting across countries
may be entirely different. Hence the results of any comparative analysis may offer misleading
conclusions. A large body of literature has explored this issue in industrialised countries. The
following examples highlight the problems of comparative research in using aggregate GDP
measures, with particular reference to the European Union.
Analysts often refer to the European Union as a single, homogeneous entity, thereby
implicitly assuming a single method of measuring national income, which would guarantee
comparability of national accounts. Nevertheless, the diversity of methodologies in the
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collection of GDP figures and the comparability problems within the EU necessitated action
by the European Commission. This action led to the Gross National Product (GNP) Directive
(Commission of the European Communities, 1989), which established procedures for
verification of national accounts, and, where necessary, to take action to improve the
comparability, reliability and coverage of estimates ofGNP[38].
The GNP Directive noted, in article 7, that special attention should be given to verifying and
improving the exhaustiveness of GNP estimates, particularly the coverage of the informal
economy, with this issue becoming a top priority (Commission of the European
Communities, 1994). There were three aspects in particular:
• Existing calculations and adjustments already made by EU countries: it became clear
that not all estimates were based on good quality data on all parts of the economy. For
instance, several countries do not have good data on all services, some do not have
good quality business registers, and some fail to maximise the use of the cross-checks
intrinsic to the system of national accounts. Although this is expected to be improved
in the near future, the disparities remain in historical data.
• Incomes in kind and tips or gratuities: the extent to which adjustments are made
differs substantially between Member States. These differences reflect differences in
the tax regime and regulations, in the importance of such income in the Member
States, and in the interpretation of the accounting guidelines. This is an area where
further work is necessary.
• Using information from fiscal audits: the need to use such information depends on the
availability of other measures to combat tax evasion, and this differs for each Member
38 The adoption of the GNP Directive followed the creation of the fourth own resource of the European
Communities - the GNP resource - used in the determination of the EU budget.
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State and for each sector. Furthermore, while some countries can and do use fiscal
audit information, to varying extents, other countries are unable to do so, either for
reasons of data confidentiality, or because the non-random nature of the data makes
its use statistically impossible.
Much effort has also been put into verifying the comparability, reliability and completeness
of Member States' GNP estimates in a two ways: firstly, with respect to a series of issues that
concern all the countries and, secondly, with respect to a large number of country-specific
issues (Commission of the European Communities, 1996).
The common issues identified include:
• The definition of the boundaries of the economic territory, reflecting the transition
from GDP to GNP[39];
• The recording of taxes and subsidies in each country and their comparability across
countries;
• The comparability of estimates for dwelling (housing) provision;
• The comparability of estimates at the borderline between intermediate and final
consumption;
• The completeness and recording of the activity of financial institutions;
• The completeness of the estimates for agriculture;
• The quality of the estimates for the transition from GOP to GNP; and
• The completeness of the estimates of VAT as a component of GNP.
39 GDP is defined as product produced by all production factors within the borders of a given country, whereas
GNP is product produced within a given country, but also product produced abroad by nationals (individual or
Corporate) of that country.
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Of the country-specific issues, which are important for GNP, the most notable improvements
can be summarised as follows:
• Great efforts have been made to redevelop fundamentally the national accounts of
those Member States which were seen as having the weaker basis for GNP estimates.
There have already been large changes to the GNP estimates for Greece, Luxembourg
and Portugal (changes in the order of+20%, +15% and +10% respectively (see table
4.4». Similarly, important developments are under way in Belgium and Ireland,
though the changes in those two countries are unlikely to be of a similar magnitude.
• All EU countries have made considerable progress in response to the Commission's
country-specific reservations on aspects of their GNP compilation methods.
• All EU countries also have their own projects to develop their own national accounts.
These projects are not directly the consequence of programmes emanating from the
Commission, but are, nevertheless very important and complementary to the
Commission's efforts.
More detailed information on the country-specific developments can be seen in table 4.5. The
impact of some of the adjustments made on estimates of GDP can be seen in table 4.4. From
this table, it appears that the revised GNP data provide a completely different picture in some
EU countries, particularly those of Greece and Portugal.
4.3.3 The Informal Sector and GDP
The use of national accounts data regarding the magnitude of GDP excludes important
elements, most notably the scale of the informal economy. The informal economy is by
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definition a non-measurable, albeit quite often sizeable, variable. As already discussed, it
includes both legal (production of goods and services which will subsequently be brought
onto the marketplace) and illegal, and, therefore, punishable transactions (drug dealing or
trafficking). The common feature of both types of activities is that incomes generated and
profits realised are not declared for tax purposes. The net result, however, is that, regardless
of its legal or illegal nature, it produces income which does not necessarily remain within the
informal sector's boundaries but is diffused to the benefit of the whole economy, thereby
producing considerable multiplier effects.
The size of the informal sector varies by country and most efforts to measure it to date have
focused on the evaluation of the "legal" informal sector. Frey & Week Hanneman (1984)
estimated the relative size of the parallel economy in 17 OECD countries using cross-
sectional and time series analysis applying the LISREL sofiware[40]. They suggested that it
is around 10% of GDP in most countries (see table 4.6), although some of the assumptions
used by the authors are quite restrictive and point to much higher shares in some economies.
For instance, Pavlopoulos (1987), estimated that in 1986 the informal sector in Greece
accounted for over 28% of GOP. There are many other estimates of the size of the parallel
economy for a number of countries and sectors (Partes et aI, 1989). In Spain, for instance,
21.9% of total employment was estimated to occur in the informal sector in 1988 (see table
4.2).
40 LISREL is a software product designed to estimate and test Structural Equation Models (SEMs). SEMs are
statistical models of linear relationships among latent (unobserved) variables and manifest (observed) variables.
It can also carry out exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, as well as path analysis. LISREL uses the
correlations or covariances among measured variables such as survey items to estimate or infer the values of
factor loadings, variances, and errors of latent (unobserved) variables. LISREL's flexibility allows it to also
estimate the relationships among latent variables with other latent variables.
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Although it is generally acknowledged that estimating the exact size of the informal sector is
an impossible task, its existence could be inferred from other indicators, for example the ratio
of growth in property construction to GDP growth, or the ratio of bank deposits to GDP
growth and so on. The size of the informal sector may also influence government policies, as
the implicit acceptance of its existence may mean that certain types of expenditures are left to
be taken care of by the private sector.
4.3.4 Wealth or income?
Gross Domestic Product has long been used as a proxy for national income. The question
remains, however, whether GDP can actually capture adequately the notion of personal
income. As well as the measurement problems noted above, even with improvements in the
collection, reporting, comparability, completeness and reliability of data across countries, the
measurement of GDP cannot take into account other aspects of individual income that do not
constitute "product". There are two such aspects; the first is income from housing, namely
imputed income from occupying one's own home, but also property ownership, which
increases net household assets, and shapes expectations about total family income and family
wealth. The second aspect is financial wealth, namely liquid assets including savings, bonds,
government securities and shares. Both are integral parts of private non-human wealth,
which, in most developed countries, considerably exceeds disposable household income, as
shown in table 4.7.
The reason why wealth is argued to be important and, perhaps, a better measure than GDP in
explaining the variation in health spending, is its impact on household consumption decisions
(Kanavos & Karakitsos, 1994; Hamnett & Seavers, 1996). Apart from its monetary aspects,
147
which have consumption and investment implications, improvements in wealth have been
shown to be associated with improvements in individual health status. For instance,
ownership of a tangible asset (a house) contributes to individual well-being[41]. Housing and
financial assets have been shown to be influential factors affecting the amplitude and the
depth of the business cycle, particularly in highly leveraged (overdebted) economies, such as
the UK, Sweden, Japan and the United States (Fisher, 1933; King, 1993; Hall, 1986; Kimball,
1990; Leland, 1968; Carroll, 1992; Tobin, 1980; Baumgartner and Meredith, 1995).
Consequently, private non-human wealth may be a more appropriate means of capturing the
key determinants of health care expenditure. In particular, private sector wealth can capture
some inherent deficiencies of GOP, which include the level of the parallel economy in a
given country, as well as aspects of disposable income, such as the level of imputed income.
Both these aspects increase individual marginal propensity to consume.
4.3.5 Alternative measures and way(s) forward
The use of GOP does not address some fundamental issues related to the supply of and
demand for health services. For instance, GOP does not account for the supply of hospitals
and doctors, and is certainly too crude a measure to incorporate an economy's ability to
produce and consume pharmaceuticals or to encompass advances in technology in its health
care production function. In addition, the use of GOP as the single most important variable in
the determination of health care expenditure denies differences in society's willingness to pay
for health care. Thus, the use of GOP could only serve to facilitate our understanding of the
impact of macroeconomic factors on the growth in health expenditures. The macroeconomic
41 Provided it is either owned outright without mortgage repayment requirements, or that such requirements can
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environment affects decisions in the health care sector just as it does in other sectors of the
economy, particularly in countries having tax financed or social insurance-based systems.
Macroeconomic pressures, stemming from the impact of an oncoming recession, or, even, a
stabilisation plan, will put pressure on health spending. In countries where substantial private
financing of health services exists, the advent of economic recession will trigger an
adjustment process, whereby the total burden on private sector companies (the payers of
private health care plans) will be reduced through layoffs or voluntary redundancies.
Consequently, the use of GDP is problematic for methodological as well as conceptual
reasons. Because of measurement and reporting problems, its use in cross-sectional and
pooled cross-sectional analysis is problematic so its use as a means of capturing the
macroeconomic environment can only be justified in individual country time-series analysis.
This means that more robust alternatives to capture adequately the impact of the macro-
economy are needed. Wealth could be such an alternative, but would be extremely difficult to
measure consistently over time because of the magnitude and volatility of its components
(personal disposable income, imputed income from home-ownership, wealth from home-
ownership, and financial wealth comprising savings, stocks, bonds and other financial
instruments). However, personal wealth could be proxied by total private consumption © on
goods and services[ 42].
be serviced without difficulties.
42 Another significant factor that may also influence a government's position on health care spending is the
amplitude and the severity of the business cycle. This can be measured either through intertemporal variations in
the overall fiscal deficit or through changes in total public spending (G). Of course, once again, country-specific
Structural factors would influence government spending and thus, the size of the deficit and decisions to
consume, so any analysis incorporating public deficit, or total public consumption or, indeed, total private
consumption, would have to be in an individual country context.
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Total private consumption on goods and services as a proxy for wealth captures society's
willingness to pay for goods and services in general at different points in time, including a
recession, and is a predictor of household or economy-wide expectations about the future. It
has been shown, for example, that in the 1989 - 1992 recession in the UK, the consumption
of individuals with mortgages fell by 2%, whereas those without a mortgage rose by 4%[43],
an observation that emphasizes the importance of wealth rather than income. At the other end
of the spectrum, the fiscal deficit is a measure of macroeconomic pressures in any given
economy. A high government deficit implies that restrictions may sooner or later be imposed
on aspects of government spending including health. A period of low deficit, on the other
hand, does not necessitate interventions in spending. This was an important issue for most
Member States of the European Union, as they strived to meet the Maastricht convergence
criteria that would lead to the introduction of the single European currency. As most EU
economies were initially well away from meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria[ 44]
(see table 4.8), additional cost containment measures, or structural reforms to increase
efficiency and keep costs stable were introduced in health care (as well as in other publicly
funded welfare services), regardless of the level of income within countries and regardless of
the growth rates ofGDP. Such measures continue to be required following the introduction of
the single currency in order to ensure price and fiscal stability within the current (2002)
regime pursued in the Euro-zone.
4.4 Measuring the impact of Health Care Technology
43 This is according to the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which each year contains responses from
around 3,000 home-owners with a mortgage and just under 2,000 without a mortgage.
44 These are a 3 per cent government deficit and a 60 per cent overall government debt levels, low
inflation rates and long-run interest rate convergence. A sustainable 3% government deficit implies
strict control over time on the total amount of government expenditure (G).
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4.4.1 The treatment of health technology in the intemationalliterature
Health care technology is perceived to encompass all of the instruments, equipment, drugs
and procedures used in health care delivery, as well as the organisations supporting delivery
of such care[45] (OTA, 1978), (Johansen, 1988). Technological innovation has rendered
profound changes in the delivery of health care services over the last 50 years, and has
contributed substantially to lengthening life expectancy and further reducing avoidable
mortality[46]. However, growth in medical technologies is considered by some to be
responsible for the rapid escalation in health care costs in the developed world (Evans, 1983;
Davis, 1974; Worthington, 1975; Altman and Blendon, 1979; and Moloney and Rogers,
1979; Klarman et al, 1970). Yet, increased prices are not the only factors underlying hospital
cost increases. The complexity of diseases being treated and the intensity of services have
been found to be the main factors underlying such cost increases in the US (Ashby and Craig,
1992). Technologies can be both cost reducing, contributing, for instance, to the reduction in
the length of stay in hospitals or a reduction in specialists' costs, or cost-increasing in that
they expand the scope of patients or conditions that can be treated, or the complexity of the
treatment that is provided.
There are several costs associated with the adoption of new medical technologies, all of
which are subject to different considerations; these types of costs are:
• The cost of acquiring the new technology; this is part of capital investment, and is
considered a sunk cost in tax-based and some social insurance-based systems, but
45 Both, the World Health Organisation and the United States Office of Technology Assessment (now
redundant) used the same definition.
46 Although health technology has been credited with improvements in average life expectancy, it appears that
this is not the case, across all population groups. Evidence from the UK, for instance, suggests that life
expectancy for the lowest social class, has hardly improved.
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often needs to be recovered by the investing body in privately-funded health systems,
through (high) utilisation;
• The cost of technology acquisition may be supplemented by the cost of operating the
technology (Banta, 1990), in terms of the necessary skilled staff needed to use it
appropriately; and
• The cost to the system once a given technology is paid for by insurance; here the issue
is the appropriate utilisation of the technology and the extent to which over-utilisation
occurs;
These cost considerations raise the question of whether technology actually improves
outcome and for what patients, rather than simply whether it is safe or it does what it purports
to do. An effective new technology can so easily replace an older and much less expensive
technology for routine use when, for many conditions, the outcome of using the old
technology may be just as good as with the new (Abel-Smith, 1996).
4.4.2 Impact of technology on health care expenditure
4.4.2.1 Theories of the impact a/technology on health care costs
Although many studies argue that health technology is responsible for the escalation of health
care costs over time, (among them Evans, 1983; Davis, 1974; Worthington, 1975; Altman
and Blendon, 1979; and Moloney and Rogers, 1979), little is actually known about the
precise impact of health technology on health care costs. In particular, the literature has
focused mainly on microeconomic studies investigating the impact of specific health
technologies in tightly controlled environments. Many studies evaluate the cost effectiveness
of particular health technologies, with a view to making decisions about reimbursement on
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the basis of incremental cost effectiveness[ 47]. In addition, several studies explore the impact
of technology on health care costs indirectly, rather than directly.
More often, technology has been treated as a residual (Klarman, Rice and Cooper, 1970),
(Fuchs, 1972) or at the micro level, looking at the impact on growth in hospital costs because
of increases in service intensity (Freeland and Schendler, 1983). A distinction has also been
drawn between "big-ticket" or "small-ticket"[ 48] technology and different approaches have
been used to account for the intensity in its use, among them the excess inflation approach
(Altman and Blendon, 1979; Moloney and Rogers, 1979) and the cost a/treatment approach
(Scitovsky and McCall, 1976; Scitovsky, 1985; Showstack, 1982).
4.4.2.2 The residual approach
According to the residual approach, technology is treated as a residual in a model that
analyses the determinants of health care expenditures. Fuchs (1972) used this approach to
estimate a model of the determinants of health care expenditures over the 1947-1967 period,
with a view to establishing the impact of health care technology. He found that growth in
health care spending was positively related to population growth, rise in prices, growth in real
income, and was negatively associated with declines in demand due to price increases. The
residual of this model (or most of it) was labelled as the impact of technology on health care
costs and in Fuchs' case it was found to be positively related to increases in health care
expenditure. Mushkin and Ladenfeld (1979) repeated Fuchs' exercise by adding another
variable, the relative ageing of the population, which was found to be positively related to
47 Namely to determine whether the additional cost that needs to be paid by health insurance justifies the
additional benefit accruing by the use of the technology.
48 Big-ticket is a term applying to large scale, costly technologies, such as C'I' or MRI scanners, whereas the
term small-ticket applies to small-scale technologies, such as laboratory equipment.
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changes in health care expenditure. The resulting residual from this exercise was negatively
related to health expenditure and that may have been due to the fact that the interaction
between the different variables after the addition of population ageing would possibly include
the effect of technology. The different signs and magnitude of the residual terms, however,
suggest that the residual approach is flawed: as a minimum the initial model must be
correctly specified if the residual term is to be interpreted as the impact of technology.
4.4.2.3 The "big-ticket" v. "small-ticket" approach
The literature is divided on the division of health care technologies into "big-ticket" and
"small-ticket". Some studies found that the impact on expenditure of the latter was greater
than the former (Altman and Blendon, 1979; Moloney and Rogers, 1979). However, others
disagreed, especially those that looked at subsequent periods (Scitowski and McCall, 1976;
Scitowsky, 1985; Showstack, 1982)[49]. Scitowski and McCall (1976) and Scitowski (1985)
analysed at the cost of treating a number of conditions over ten year intervals. Scitowski and
McCall (1976) found that the cost of treating 9 conditions out of 11 in their study increased
from 1951 to 1971, and Scitowski (1985) found that the cost of treating 7 conditions out of a
total 16 also increased from 1971 to 1981, despite reductions in the average length of stay for
each condition. The increase in cost is explained by the large increase in laboratory tests.
Table 4.9 shows the results for 3 conditions and shows the reduction in lengths of stay and
the increase in laboratory tests. Altogether, these studies cover only a fraction of inpatient
care, which is not surprising because of limitations on data as well as the diversity of
conditions treated and technologies employed.
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Additionally, there is evidence that industrialised countries vary significantly in their rates of
adoption of common technologies. In particular, table 4.10 shows how such adoption patterns
differ not only among countries with dissimilar income levels, but also with similar standards
of living (for instance the very different number of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scanners in the UK, France, Germany and the US).
A further difficulty is the diversity of ways of paying for technology. In many countries
technology is funded from revenue, rather than designated capital expenditure, and there are
also alternative modes of financing medical equipment, for instance long-term leasing or,
even, donation, making it undetectable in national statistics (Banta, 1995).
4.4.2.4 Hysteresis in the adoption ofhealth care technology
Much of the existing empirical evidence on the determinants of health care spending assumes
that all countries have the same technology, that is incorporated in their health production
functions. This technology is implicitly assumed to be static if the analysis is conducted on a
cross-sectional basis (Newhouse, 1987). However, as the previous section showed, there are
dramatic differences in the level of technology.
Two issues are relevant here. First, there are, unavoidably, leaders and followers in the
implementation of new technology in health care delivery. The latter adopt new technologies
with a time lag. There is consequently hysteresis in the implementation of new technology.
Second, notwithstanding the hysteresis in the adoption of new technology, the learning curve
49 Of course, there is a broader point relating to whether some "small-ticket" items represent "technology" and
innovation in health care delivery, or, rather, they represent medical supplies, having an auxiliary role in the
delivery of health care.
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of lagging countries is usually fast so that it is absorbed rapidly into routine practice. It is
implicitly assumed, however, that countries in which technological development is lagging
have a predetermined and predefined path to follow, which is exactly the path that the more
advanced countries in the comparisons have already achieved. This recalls the Rostow model
of 'five stages of economic growth', which assumes that a developing (or less developed)
country follows the same path that a currently developed nation followed some decades
before (Rostow, 1965). The process of catching up thus becomes linear. This can be rejected
because it implicitly (but quite clearly) suggests that there is no diffusion of innovation so
that countries starting from a lower level can embody innovation more rapidly into their
aggregate production functions[50).
4.4.3 The way(s) forward
The previous sections revealed the complexity of the issues associated with health care
technology, its inclusion in national health production functions, and the measurement of its
impact on health care costs at a particular point in time or over time and across countries. At
best, the impact of technology has been treated as a residual, rather than measured explicitly,
which is quite surprising, given its purported significance as an important determinant of
health care expenditure. There are also some definitional issues as to what constitutes "health
technology", although the definition that has been adopted (OTA, 1978; Johansen, 1988) is,
in principle, all-inclusive and can be interpreted to comprise "small-ticket" items (e.g.
syringes, wound care, etc).
50 Within the developing world, the issue of new technology and its adoption is even more complex and relates
to the financial ability of nations to purchase such technologies. It also relates to the extent to which the
appropriate manpower exists to operate them adequately.
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Perhaps the most important problem associated with the measurement of the impact of health
care technology on health care costs, is the measurement of the technology variable itself
because expenditure on health technology is very difficult to capture accurately. Since
expenditure on technology i, is the product of price (P) times volume (Q), then total
expenditure on technology is the sum of all products on all technologies, as shown in
equation (1) below.
E= ~P·Q·I.J , " i = 1, .... , n (1)
Data on prices and volumes of different technologies are not readily available. However there
are two exceptions: first, expenditure on pharmaceuticals and its rate of change over time is
available. Pharmaceutical expenditure comprises a significant proportion of expenditure on
technology[51] and an ever increasing proportion of total health care costs. Second, health
price indices over time are available but they are heavily biased towards what is measurable,
namely prices of pharmaceutical products and prices of medical devices, or procedures using
medical devices[52]. These two approximations of medical technology (namely the rate of
growth in pharmaceutical expenditure and the price index for health goods) could be used to
test statistically the impact of technology on health care expenditure.
4.5 Measuring health needs that must be responded to:
Population Ageing and Historical Lifestyle Patterns
51 It is very difficult to quantify with precision total expenditure on health technology. However, the proportion
of pharmaceutical spending on total health care expenditure is known with a small margin of error.
52 In what concerns medical devices, expenditure relates to utilization (price per procedure and number of cases
performed), rather than the cost of their acquisition, which is part of the health system's capital or investment
budget.
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4.5.1 Ageing and health care costs
It has long been argued that people use health services more as they get older. Yet the
contribution of the changing age structure to health care costs is less than clear. Empirical
research into the determinants of health care expenditures has included an ageing variable,
most often the share of the population aged 65 and above. Existing research has found that,
although it may be statistically significant in pooled cross-section analysis (Hitiris and
Posnett, 1992), the relationship breaks down in individual country times-series (Saez and
Murillo, 1994) fora varietyofreasons[53].
However these calculations seem over-simplistic in the light of more recent evidence
suggesting that other factors may need to be considered in relation to the impact of ageing on
a country's health care production function. Thus, microeconomic (household) studies have
shown that approximately a fifth of health care costs are devoted to persons in their last year
of life (Fuchs, 1984), regardless of their chronological age. Additional evidence from the US
suggests that, contrary to common belief, the costs of those who die aged 80 or over are only
about 80 per cent of the costs for those who die aged 65 to 79. Moreover, these costs were
heavily concentrated in nursing home and home care costs (Scitovsky, 1988). It seems
therefore that it is the "younger-old" rather than the "very old" who get expensive high-
technology care. These results are confirmed by another study, which examined data on
deceased members of a major sickness fund in Switzerland and found that (i) health care
expenditure increases with closeness to death, (ii) for retired individuals, health care
expenditure decreases with age, and (iii) low-income individuals incur lower health care
expenditures than high-income individuals in the last months of life (Felder et aI, 2000).
53 For example, there may be differences across countries in population structures, there may be differences in
dealing with diseases affiicting the elderly, or the issue may be related to the way health and social services are
158
Another study from Germany has found that hospital utilisation is not increasing with life
expectancy (Busse and Schwartz, 1997). A key issue, of course, in the above discussion is
what is actually included in national health accounts.
From a financing or cost containment point of view the ageing factor may be more important
where nursing care is included in health accounts and, by extension, in the health budget,
whereas it will probably not feature as an important factor if health and social care budgets
are kept separate. In the latter case, ageing will only feature in the health care budget to the
extent that elderly patients have utilised health care services!
Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on ageing considers its the future impact on
health care costs, by projecting population growth and changing age structure and estimating
the change in resources needed to address the emerging needs at current levels of
consumption. An early estimate of the impact of demographic change on the cost of the
British National Health Service suggested that it would increase costs by 8.1 per cent over the
twenty years from 1951152 to 1971172. Of this, about half would be due to population growth
and the rest to the changing age structure (Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1956). Others have
estimated that demographic change in the UK will require an extra 8.25% growth in real
expenditure between 1994 and 2014, which is slightly less than the growth of 10.3% in the
preceding twenty years from 1974 to 1994, thus concluding that pressures arising from
demography and morbidity are likely to have a modest impact in the future (Harrison et al,
1997). In a more recent exercise, the UK Treasury applied a range of alternative scenarios
with regards to ageing and health in old age in order to calculate future resource needs. These
structured; in the latter case, long-term care may not be part of the health care budget. Whatever the differences,
they receive little, if any, credit in the empirical literature.
159
scenarios ranged from slow increases in life expectancy associated with no changes in health
status, to significant increases in life expectancy in future, coupled with improved health
status and less time spent in ill-health (Wanless, 2002).
Fries (Fries, 1980) and Oslansky et al (Oslansky et al, 1990) have challenged much of this
work, arguing that improvements in health and medical care will delay the onset of illness
and disabling conditions, thus resulting in "the compression of morbidity and the
rectangularisation of mortality" (Fries, 1980). Others (Manton and Tolley, 1991) have
suggested that reduced mortality could increase the number of older living with disabilities or
ill health and the length of time they survive disabled or ill. A further issue is the maximum
attainable life expectancy, with some proposing that the US population might attain a
maximum average life expectancy of 85 years, whereas others anticipate life expectancies of
95 or 100 years. Stoto and Durch (Stoto and Durch, 1993) note that forecasts of the number
of people aged 85 and over in 2040 differ markedly. Some authors attribute such differences
to nutrition patterns, which, in tum are also used to explain longevity in certain societies
(Nagata et aI, 2002; Sho, 2001). As a result, very different models of ageing process produce
different results in terms of future death rates (Himes et al, 1994).
All these models are, however, susceptible to the effect noted by Wilmoth (Wilmoth, 1995),
whereby the direct calculation of mortality rates is subject to excessive random fluctuation
due to the small number of individuals who survive to advanced ages. Another difficulty is
systematic bias due to inaccuracies in the reporting of age in population census and vital
registration data.
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Despite the extensive literature on this topic, it is far from clear how changing risk factors
will affect future morbidity and mortality. The prevention or elimination of a number of risk
factors may have large effects but there are inevitable time lags between changes in
behaviour and in mortality and morbidity. A much better understanding of these lags is
needed. The resulting changes in health will significantly affect consumption patterns and,
thus, per capita expenditure. However, reduction of existing risks at younger ages may lead to
exposure to other risks, which may in turn be less susceptible to intervention (Stoto and
Durch,1993).
Preston (1970) has estimated that the excess mortality for older males in different populations
was closely linked to the per capita consumption of cigarettes. When the younger
heavy-smoking female cohorts reach very old ages mortality and morbidity rates may
increase. A number of exogenous factors, such as housing, may also affect the health status of
the elderly population and consequently their demand for health services. Furthermore,
societal changes including the increasing number of elderly people living alone, may affect
the options for health care delivery, in particular the extent of informal care. These societal
changes will differ among countries, reflecting different cultural contacts and may take quite
different shapes in countries with similar levels of economic development.
4.5.2 Population Ageing: The way(s) forward
The overall impact of ageing on health care expenditure, both now and in the future, is not
entirely clear. Additional evidence is needed both on the current as well as the future impact
of ageing on spending. Of course the delivery of health care to the elderly differs dramatically
among industrialised countries. Typical in this respect in the North - South European
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division, whereby institutional care for the elderly in the north is replaced by family care in
the south. The evidence that health services are utilised more intensively in the last few
months of life also seems to lead to the conclusion that what really is important is proximity
to death, regardless of age. But in that case, chronological age becomes irrelevant as a
determining factor. Consequently, this thesis dismisses any arbitrarily set age levels and
certainly advances the view that adding "the share of the population aged 65 and above" in a
statistical model will not add to our knowledge about the determinants of health care
expenditure[54].
4.5.3 Lifestyle and health
The inclusion of relevant lifestyle variables in a production function is problematic because
lifestyle factors, such as diet, smoking, or alcohol consumption act with variable, but, often,
considerable lags. One would therefore need an extensive time series as well as a much better
understanding of the determinants of disease than currently exists. Thus, empirical work
attempting to correlate levels of health spending with levels of lifestyle factors is open to
question. There is, nevertheless, a link between historical patterns of lifestyle and population
structure (in particular, ageing) and current levels of disease, although aggregate analyses are
complicated greatly by the uneven distribution of risk factors within societies.
4.6 Measuring the impact of other factors
There are several other variables that may contribute to the size of health care expenditure
and its rate of growth over time. In addition to the potential impact of technology, ageing, and
54 A recent UK report (Wanless, 2002) follows the proximity to death approach in its estimation of the
demographic impact. In order to account for the effect of proximity to death on acute health care costs, mortality
rates were used to separate demographic projections into projections of decedents and survivors. These
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income or consumption, which were dealt with in the previous sections, this section brings
together a number of other issues that the empirical literature needs to address in more detail
in the future. In particular, it examines the impact of the macroeconomic environment and its
performance, the impact of health status on health expenditures, and the impact of (patient
and consumer) expectations in shaping public policy responses.
4.6.1 The impact of macroeconomic performance on health care
expenditures
Some authors (Hitiris and Posnett, 1992) and (Hitiris, 1997) have examined the statistical
relationship between health care expenditures and other macroeconomic variables, in
particular, government deficit, government debt and inflation, with a view to establishing
whether convergence in economic performance and standards of living might lead to
convergence of health expenditure standards. Both studies pooled observations across
countries to test the impact of these variables on health care expenditures[55]. The approach
used was, once again, ad hoc and not based on a clear theoretical framework. Neither was the
analysis embedded in the existing literature on the determinants of health care expenditure.
There can be no doubt that, in principle, levels of government spending and levels of deficit
may influence health expenditure. The overall macroeconomic environment and the business
cycle might also influence the type and pace of reform in health services. It would therefore
be important to take into account the impact of the macroeconomic environment, in terms of
overall government spending (G), as well as in terms of the general government deficit.
Decisions to initiate health care reforms often result from movements in the business cycle,
population projections were then multiplied by activity rates for decedents and survivors separately, where this
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aiming to either contain costs orland increase efficiency. These can, in theory, be examined,
using a dummy variable for the year(s) during which reform was being implemented.
4.6.2 The impact of health status on health care expenditures
A corollary of the argument that health care is a luxury good is that reductions in the level of
spending should be possible with little loss in effectiveness, as the additional impact on
health will be marginal. However, the empirical evidence of the relationship between health
expenditure and health status is extremely superficial and often ambiguous both at
macroeconomic and microeconomic level.
At the macroeconomic level, early empirical research has concluded that there is no
relationship between health spending and health status (Andreano, 1984), with health status
measured as age-adjusted mortality. Maxwell (1981) finds a weak association between
spending and health status only in the UK, in that low spending on health results in smaller
diminution in infant mortality rates compared with other developed countries with higher
spending rates, although the use of infant mortality as a measure of health has no obvious
justification except that is easily available. In addition, some empirical studies of the
determinants of health care expenditures, particularly of the pooled cross-section type, have
experimented with the inclusion of a mortality variable as a potential determinant and have
found a negative significant relationship between expenditures and the aggregate mortality
indicator (e.g. Hitiris and Posnett, 1992).
breakdown was available.
55 Both studies were reviewed in chapter 2.
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Other studies at macroeconomic level have concluded that reductions in health care
expenditures may well have some cost in terms of overall health [Wolfe (1986)]. This
conclusion is reached by using health and life-style data from six countries (Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK, the US, France and Sweden). By holding constant those changes in life
style that have an impact upon health, (for instance, smoking, drinking, traffic accidents,
occupational dangers), and adjusting for inflation and population size, health care
expenditures do bear a positive relationship to health status. These conclusions are, in
principle, supported by earlier findings by Cochrane et al (1978), and subsequent findings by
Scheiber et al (1993), whereby, among others, GDP per capita is positively related with
improvements in health status, defined as age-specific mortality rates. The latter two studies
can actually support quite the opposite conclusion, such that greater health care resources
lead to worse overall health. One possible explanation is that scarce resources are being
channelled into health care rather than sectors such as education, where they would have a
greater, albeit less immediately obvious, impact on health (McKee and Figueras, 2001).
Another explanation may be that health care has a direct, and adverse effect on health, a view
advanced by Illich (1976). These views have either been dismissed (Ingelfinger, 1977), or
have been taken more seriously (Lavis and Stoddart, 1994; Evans, 1994), giving rise to
arguments that politicians should shift expenditure from health care to sectors such as
education, housing and employment (Smith, 1994). More recently, this debate has resurfaced
in the work of the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (WHO, 2001).
In sum, a key issue is that there is no theoretical basis for relating overall mortality rates to
expenditure, because of the role that other factors play in this respect; however, there is some
justification for looking at specific causes of death, but, even here, the organisation and
delivery of health care are probably as important as how much is spent on it.
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Few empirical studies at the microeconomic level address the contribution of health care
expenditure to overall health status. A study examining neonatal and post-neonatal mortality
in Germany since reunification finds that since reunification, the two parts of Germany
underwent a complex process that has led finally to convergence of parameters of infant
health that are most likely to have been because of improvements in the quality in perinatal
care. The study concludes, however, that " ... in order to improve infant mortality in
Germany, policy measures should focus on preventive rather than curative measures as the
proportion of very low birthweight babies is increasing in both parts of Germany" (Nolte et
al, 2000). However, another study, examining the contribution of medical care to changing
life expectancy in Germany and Poland, suggests that improvements in medical care after the
political transition were associated with improvements in life expectancy in East Germany
and, to a lesser extent, in Poland, and that differences in the quality of medical care contribute
to a persisting east-west health gap (Nolte et al, in press). A major, recently concluded
analysis of avoidable mortality indicates that, in industrialised countries, improvements the
effectiveness or quality of medical care still offers a greater potential to reduce mortality
differences than has been assumed so far" (Nolte and McKee, in press).
This evidence indicates the limits of the available evidence relating economic studies
involving health outcomes and health expenditures, other than the use of such outcome
indicators not being justified. The thesis will not include infant mortality, life expectancy, or
other indicators in the analysis that follows.
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4.6.3 The impact of patient expectations and patient satisfaction on
health care expenditures
There are different rates of satisfaction in different (European) countries with the levels of
service provided by health systems. A recent EU-wide survey (Mossialos, 1997), although
presenting evidence for a single year, indicates that, in general, the level of satisfaction
increases as per capita spending on health rises among countries. Thus, it seems to hold that
the more citizens spend on health, the happier they seem to be with their health care systems
(see table 4.11). Furthermore, there seems to be a north - south divide with Ireland and the
UK falling in between.
Although this is a rather plausible result, this positive relationship breaks down dramatically in a
number of cases. For instance, relatively low levels of spending can be associated with high
levels of patient satisfaction and vice versa. Typical in this case are the examples of Denmark
and the UK. Both countries spend per capita similar amounts on health; however 90 per cent of
respondents in Denmark are at least fairly satisfied with health care provision in the country, the
respective percentage in the UK was just over 48 per cent.
These findings illustrate the variation in expectations, showing what the population in given
countries actually believes. These expectations will inevitably influence governments. One
possible implication is that rising expectations about what a health system should cover may
force governments to increase expenditure, perhaps by increasing the amount of private
insurance. This has already happened in the Netherlands and Germany[56], whereas some
other European governments are gradually reducing their role in the financing and provision
56 In both countries the highest income classes can opt out of statutory health insurance and can contract with a
private health insurer; this represents approximately 33% and 10% of the insured population in the
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of health care. This has been the case in Belgium, Denmark and Ireland (Natarajan, 1996)
[57]. Such pressures on national governments may open the way for more private insurance.
Rising income inequalities may also provide a stimulus, as the increasingly better off part of
the population will seek private insurance rather than having to join the waiting lists.
Thus, the share of private insurance reflects current and expected pressures in European
economies and very much depends on a number of parameters, including citizens' satisfaction
with existing health services, regulation of private insurance markets, and incentives to
consumers to shift from publicly provided forms of care towards private forms, among others
(Mossialos and Thomson, 2002).
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter has reached a number of important conclusions related to the empirical analysis
of the determinants of health care expenditures. First, it has shown that there are important
methodological problems in the comparability of both health care expenditure and GDP
across countries. Consequently, we do not have robust estimates of the level of health care
expenditure across countries and its share of GDP.
Second, it is not self-evident that GDP adequately reflects societal disposable income.
Instead, total private consumption was proposed as an indicator of income, in the sense that it
incorporates knowledge about one's own wealth and expectations about its future state.
Netherlands and Germany respectively.
57 By the same token, the opposite can also be observed, whereby center-left governments enhance the role of
the public sector and, by extension, have at times, abandoned neo-liberal reforms. This is certainly the case in
the UK after the 1997 general election, where the Labour government abandoned in part the internal market and
sought to increase expenditure on health in real terms, rather than explicitly endorse private coverage. It is also
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Third, this chapter appraised the existing evidence associated with two very important issues,
which have been at the forefront of policy analysis: ageing and technology. Many authors
have tried to analyse the effects of population ageing as a determinant of health spending;
although ageing is an important contributor to social security costs, its true value in pushing
health care costs up has been disputed (Abel-Smith, 1994; Abel-Smith, 1996). With regards
to ageing, the thesis has proposed that it be left out altogether as chronological age was
deemed almost irrelevant as a contributor to health care (as opposed to social care)
expenditures. Medical technology has very rarely appeared explicitly in empirical analysis,
despite arguments that it is one of the most dynamic components of growth in health
spending (OEeD, 1996), perhaps because of the inadequacy of data on technology spending
and utilisation. Despite the complexity of the issues surrounding technology, two potential
proxies were suggested that would provide estimates of its impact on health care expenditure.
The section on technology also highlighted the complete absence of "technology"
considerations from the empirical (econometric) literature of the determinants of health care
expenditures, despite the latter being accused to be a net contributor to increasing health care
costs in industrialised countries.
Finally, the last section of the chapter attempted to identify other potential determinants of
health care expenditures. In doing so, it highlighted the importance of macroeconomic
factors, such as deficit and total public consumption on goods and services, but also the
significance of lifestyle variables, the relevance of consumer expectations about health
the case in France in the mid-1990s, where the Juppe government introduced an earmarked income tax in order
to underwrite the financial sustainability of securite socia/e.
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services and the extent to which expectations shape demand, and the likely importance of
output indicators, such as life expectancy and mortality rates.
The chapter concludes that the body of literature investigating health care expenditures has
done very little to identify its determinants, highlight their dynamic implications and offer
insight for policy-making.
The findings of this and the previous chapter will be used in chapter 5 in two ways: firstly, to
develop a theoretical framework of analysis for the aggregate determinants of health care
expenditures, and, secondly, to develop an empirical model that will subsequently be tested in
chapter 6.
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T bl 4 1 H I h E dia e - ea t xpen lture Accounting used by OEeD Member States
Country Remarks
Australia Excludes minor amouns spent on defence force and
prison medical services, education of health professionals
outside health institutions & spending on school services.
Institutions other than acute care hospitals, psychiatric
hospitals & nursing homes, classified as welfare
institutions are not included; fiscal year: July 1 - June 30
Belgium No health accounts are published; different use of private I
public consumption in the national accounts; no R&D and
education
Canada Most expenditure for the education or training of health
personnel are excluded; due to lack of data, the services
of dentists are omitted as are the expenditures of the
private sector for ambulance services
Denmark Nursing homes not included
Finland definition includes public environmental health and travel
costs, other than ambulance services covered by the
National Sickness Insurance; R&D excluded.
France There is a break in the series between 1969 and 1970; the
older series is based on consumption, not expenditures,
estimates.
Germany Including cash benefits, no private expenditures for
nursing homes; estimates prior to 1970 refer to household
expenditure and statutory health insurance only; there is
no full identity between the aggregates and the
components
Greece No R&D and education; nursing homes not included
Iceland Prior to 1972, the in-patient care outlays included
investment outlays. From 1972, it has been assumed that
all investment was allocated to in-patient care, thereby
slightly increasing in-patient care as a small part related to
ambulatory care.
Ireland No R&D and education; includes estimates for private
capital investment in health from 1975.
Italy No R&D and education; nursing homes not included
Luxembourg No R&D and education; nursing homes not included
Netherlands No R&D and education; no gross capital formation is
included but depreciation and interest are included as an
approximation ofthe use of capital goods
New Zealand grants to rest homes for elderly people are excluded; costs
relating to individuals in private institutions are excluded.
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Norway From 1979 onwards, public expenditure sometimes
exceeds total expenditure because transfers for medical
care include items like transport aid and hotel aid for
patients; these items are not included in private medical
consumption but are allocated to transport services, hotel
services, etc, in private consumption estimates.
Portugal No R&D and education; nursing homes not included;
expenditure estimates relate to mainland Portugal only.
S_pain No R&D and education; nursing homes not included
Sweden From 1985, the National Accounts have modified the
classification of the functions of government, shifting the
responsibility of expenditure of the mentally retarded
from health run by counties, to welfare and social services
run by municipalities.
Switzerland Estimates do not include administrative outlays, but
include non compulsory health insurance.
Turkey No health accounts are published. Total expenditure is an
OEeD estimate; expenditure financed by voluntary
contributions to hospital associations, and from foreign
aid is not included; total size of private sector is not
measured directly and is probably underestimated.
United Kingdom No R&D and education; expenditure on armed forces'
health services, prison health services and nursing homes
are excluded.
Sources: a) Author's compilation from national statistical sources; b) OEeD (1995).
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Table 4-2 Informal Sector Workers as a Percentage of the Work Force
and by Professional Category in Spain
Employment Salaried workers Self-employed Total employment
Sector (%) workers (%) (%)
Informal sector 18.9 30.4 21.9
Formal sector 81.1 69.6 78.1
Total employment 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: 1 Includes workers in five categories distributed as follows: a) employed but not
registered with social security (65.7%); b) employed and registered but not making
payments (15.2%); c) employed for a salary but registered as self-employed (8.8%); d)
self-employed and registered as salaried (5.1%); and e) employed and receiving
unemployment compensation (5.2%).
Source: Ybarra, J-A., (1989).
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Table 4-6 Estimates of the Relative Size of the Parallel Economy in 17
OECD countries as a % of GNP (1978)
Country %ofGNP
Sweden 13.2
Denmark 11.8
Belgium 11.5
Italy 10.5
Netherlands 9.2
Norway 9.2
France 8.7
Canada 8.6
Austria 8.6
W. Germany 8.3
USA 8.2
UK 8.1
Finland 7.6
Ireland 7.0
Spain 6.0
Switzerland 4.5
Japan 3.9
Source: Frey B. & Week-Hanneman, European Economic Review, 1984.
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Table 4-7 Household Net Wealth in Major OECD Countries; 1981-1993
Net wealth expressed as a ratio of household nominal disposable income)
Country 1981 1986 1991 1992 1993
USA 4.87 4.99 5.04 4.99 4.95
Japan 5.28 6.34 7.85 7.15 na
France 5.23 6.00 6.31 na na
Italy 5.01 5.19 5.692 na na
UK 4.13 5.3 5.55 5.28 5.68
Canada 4.09 4.15 4.36 4.47 4.59
Note: 1 1988.
21989.
Source: DECD.
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Table 4-8 Convergence criteria and macroeconomic performance in EU Member
States,1994 - 2000
General Fiscal Deficit Inflation rates Real Long Term
Government as % ofGDP Interest Rates
Country
Debt as % of
GDP
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
Austria 65.2 63 -4.4 -3 3 2.1 -0.2* 0.3
Belgium 136 115 -5.3 -2.4 3 1.8 -0.3* 0.2
Denmark 75.6 57 -3.8 -3 1 2.7 0.3* -0.4
Finland 59.8 59.5 -6.3 0.3 1.3 2.6 na na
France 48.4 55 -6 -2.9 1.8 2.5 na na
Germany 50.2 60 -2.6 -2.5 2.7 2.1 4.8 5
Greece 113 107 -11.4 -4 10.8 5 -3.5* -0.7
Ireland 91.1 65 -2.1 -2 2.7 2.5 0.1* -0.4
Italy 125.4 111 -9 -2.6 4.8 3 na na
Luxembourg 5.9 7 2.2 1.2 2.4 2 na na
Netherlands 78 60 -3.2 -2.3 2.4 2.1 na na
Portugal 69.4 63.5 -5.7 -3 5.5 3.2 -0.3* -0.5
Spain 63 63 -6.6 -3 4.9 3 4.5* 5
Sweden 79.3 73 -10.8 -0.5 3.1 3 na na
United 50.3 52 -6.8 -2.9 2.5 3.2
Kingdom
Note: * 1995.
Source: Datastream.
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Table 4-9
d·
Average length of stay and laboratory tests for appendicitis,
1964 1981myocar lal infarction and breast cancer, -
1964 1971 1981
Condition Length of Length of Laboratory Length of Laboratory
stay stay (days) tests stay (days) tests
(number) (number)
Appendicitis 4.2 3.8 14.3 3.5 19.2
Myocardial 19.7 18.8 81.3 10.6 124.8
infarction
Breast cancer 10.5 9.5 16.6 3.3 32.9
Source: Scitovsky & McCall, 1976; Scitovsky, 1985.
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Table 4-10 Frequency of selected technologies in different countries, 1990
(per million population)
Country Scanners MRI Lithotripters
Australia 13.7 0.6 0.4
Canada 7.0 0.7 0.4
China 0.3 0.02 0.18
France 7.2 1.2 0.7
Germany 12.2 2.3 1.7
India 0.2 0.02 0.02
Japan 55.4 6.5 2.5
Mexico 2.2 0.2 0.17
Netherlands 7.3 0.9 0.8
Sweden 10.5 1.5 1.2
UK 4.3 0.9 0.3
USA 26.8 8.4 1.4
Source: Banta D., An Approach to the Social Control of Hospital Technologies, WHO, SHS
PaperNo. 10, 1995.
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CHAPTER 5 TOWARDS A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL
FRAMEWORK OF THE AGGREGATE DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 explored the theoretical foundation of research on the determinants of health
expenditure internationally and synthesized empirical evidence over the past thirty years. It
concluded that the existing literature is characterized by a lack of a theoretical foundation and
that the commonly cited finding that GDP is the most important determinant of health care
expenditures, with an income elasticity of demand greater than unity, is largely dependent on
the choice of model, the conversion factor, and the period over which the analysis takes
place.
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on methodological arguments related to the determinants of health
care expenditures, shed new light on the comparability of data, and highlighted the flaws
associated with estimation techniques, price indices and conversion factors. In particular,
chapters 3 and 4 critically discussed:
• The methodological limitations of the analytical framework and the lack of policy
relevance of cross-country analysis;
• The problems of the theoretical framework, as it has been applied in the literature and
the assumptions on which it was based;
• The problems of conversion factors, such as exchange rates and purchasing power
parities, used in comparative research;
• The constraints of cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis in
producing robust estimates. The use of cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional
analysis were ruled out on methodological grounds;
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• The problems with price indices and the fact that price effects have largely been
ignored in empirical research;
• The lack of comparability of health care expenditures across countries and over time;
• The methodological problems associated with the measurement of GDP in different
countries and the extent to which it can be used as a proxy for total personal
disposable income;
• The treatment of technology In the empirical literature and alternative ways to
incorporate technology as a potential determinant of health care expenditures;
• The treatment of population ageing in the empirical literature and the problems
associated with the inclusion of ageing in empirical research;
• The potential explanatory power of other variables, in particular those related to the
macroeconomic environment, disease burden, inputs to the health system, and
organizational aspects of individual health systems.
The purpose of this chapter is to take account of the theoretical and methodological points
raised in the previous chapters, create a theoretical framework of the aggregate determinants
of health care expenditure and discuss ways of estimating it empirically. Section 2 develops
the conceptual theoretical framework and empirical model. Section 3 presents the variables
employed in the empirical model. Section 4 discusses the countries chosen for empirical
analysis and the data sources, and briefly describes the estimation techniques that will be
used. Section 5 briefly summarises the theoretical and empirical advances made with the
current framework. Finally, section 6 draws the main conclusions.
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5.2 The theoretical framework
5.2.1 Introductory remarks
As shown in chapters 2 (literature review) and 3 (particularly section 3.2), economists have
tended to analyse the determinants of health care expenditures at two levels. They have
looked either at the macro level, at the impact of aggregate variables on expenditure, or at the
micro level at expenditure patterns of individuals or households relative to their respective
needs, resources and preferences. While noting the lack of a conceptual framework, it is also
apparent that little attention has been paid to the characteristics of health care systems,
particularly the way financial resources are collected, pooled and allocated. Yet, system-wide
dynamics arising from resource mobilization, allocation, and service delivery have an impact
on spending patterns over time. A brief look at table 5.1 and appendix 5.1 highlights the
heterogeneity amongst seemingly similar systems. Consequently, any conceptual framework
seeking to analyse the aggregate determinants of health care expenditure needs to take into
account system-wide factors in each country.
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Table 5-1 Source of health care financing in selected OEeD countries
(percentages. ear in brackets)
Country Main sources of finance Public
Taxation Social Voluntary User Other spending as
insurance health charges a % of total
insurance health
~endirlg
Belgium (1994) 38 36 - 17 9 74
Denmark 80.7 - 1.9 17.4 - 80.7
(1996)
Germany II 64.8 7.1l 7.3 9.8J 75.8
_(1995)
Greece (1992) 33.3 24.1 2.1 40.4 - 57.4
Spain (1995) 59.3 15.3 7 16.3 1.7 74.6
France" (1994) 3.6 71.6 7' 16S 1.3 75.2
Ireland (1993) 68.1 7.3 8.6 13.9 2.1" 75.4
Italy (1995) 64.6~ - 2.6 31.2 2.4~ 64.6
Luxembourg 30 49.8 2 7.9 2.8 79.8
(1992)
Netherlands 10 6810 15 7.1 - 78
11996)
Austria (1992) 24 54 7.S 14 - 78
Portue;al (1995) 55.2 6 1.4 37.4 - 61.2
Finland (1994) 62.211 13 2.2 20.8 1.8'l 75.3
Sweden (1993) 69.713 13.4" Negligible 16.9 - 83.1
UK (1993/4) 78.8 12.3" 5.6'0 3.2" - 91.1
USA (1998) 44.3 - 55.7
Switzerland 70.5 29.5
11997)
Includes premiums for voluntary health insurance, VAT and hypothecatred taxes.
Includes premiums of those who have joined private health insurance funds.
Includes accident insurance, retirement funds expenditure, direct expenditure by
employees.
Research, training, administrative and preventive care costs not included.
Mutuelles.
Includes voluntary health insurance (VHD.
Includes voluntary health insurance expenditure, other non-household expenditure
and private capital expenditure.
Includes receipts under EU regulations, i.e. European Social Fund, European
Regional Fund.
General taxation accounts for 27.9 per cent and payroll and earmarked taxes for 36.7
per cent. "Other", are regional revenues.
Includes the compulsory exceptional medical expenses scheme (AWBZ), which
covers the entire population for long-term care.
National government: 29.2 per cent; municipalities: 33 per cent.
Includes private insurance, direct expenditure by employers and relief funds
expenditure.
Includes 64.2 per cent local taxes and 5.5 per cent general taxes.
Social insurance (payroll earmarked tax).
Earmarked tax (national insurance).
Private health insurance premiums and other private medical payments (grossed up
from Family Expenditure Survey data).
17 Mainly prescription charges.
Sources: Synthesis from Mossialos & Legrand (1999), pp. 6-8; OEeD Health Data Base,
2001.
Notes: I
2
4
6
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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5.2.2 The theoretical framework for aggregate determinants of health
care expenditures
5.2.2.1 The setting
Health care markets involve, chiefly, three agents: purchasers/insurers (which can be a public
sector agencies, publicly-underwritten sickness funds, or private for-profit insurance
companies), providers (doctors, hospitals, other health professionals), and consumers of
health care (individuals and families, e.g. the case of a child with learning disabilities).
All industrialized countries, except the USA, provide almost universal health care coverage,
which is collectively funded, with a relatively small proportion financed through voluntary
health insurance [58]. Collective funding is by two main methods: general taxation and social
insurance. General taxation is derived from multiple sources, such as direct and indirect
taxes, corporate taxes and excise duties, paid by individuals and corporate entities, which are
allocated to different end uses, including health services, through the state budget.
Consequently, citizens do not know how much of their taxes will be allocated to health
services. With social insurance, employees and employers contribute a premium, which is
income-related, to an agency (a sickness fund). Contributions from employees and employers
are pooled, with additional resources from, for example, taxation in respect of non-earners.
There is always some form of public accountability by the various sickness funds, although
its nature varies. However, sickness funds have independent managerial responsibility for the
resources raised through contributions. In some countries they can make their own decisions
about contracting of services. The state also takes an interest in the macroeconomic and
58 This also holds for countries which have a relatively long history of finance through voluntary health
insurance, such as Switzerland, where the ratio of public over total health spending was 70.5% in 1997, the
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equity consequences of health insurance. In these circumstances, the contribution that
individuals make towards health care is, in theory, more transparent, although, of course, this
ignores the often considerable cross subsidy from taxation.
In both circumstances those consuming health services do not decide what they really
consume for two reasons: first, they do not have full knowledge about the conditions they
may be suffering from and, for this purpose, they delegate responsibility to agents (usually
physicians) who advise them on the best course of action. This, of course, may generate a
number of well-recognised problems associated with "agency" in a principal-agent
relationship (Vick and Scott, 1998; Ricketts, 1987).
Second, collective financing of health services implies that the insurer or purchaser will cover
all or most of the costs associated with an individual's treatment. In the case where the
purchaser/insurer covers most of the cost, the remainder is paid for by the individual, either
out of pocket or, through supplementary health insurance [59]. Out-of-pocket co-insurance
payments may be flat payments or a percentage of the value of the service rendered, or either,
but subject to an upper ceiling after which costs are covered (deductibles [60]). Exemptions
from co-insurance payments are common and may be related to individual income, severity
of the condition involved, or age. Often, the scale of exemptions mean that the majority of
services are provided free of charge. For instance in the UK, although only a minority of
Netherlands (70.4% in 1998) and Germany (74% in 1997). In the US, the publicly funded share of health
spending was 44.2% in 1999.
59 One such case is France, where 87% of the population are either members of voluntary, supplementary
insurance funds (mutuelles), or purchase private health insurance, which complements the compulsory health
insurance ,and covers, to varying degrees, the charges of statutory health insurance's non-reimbursed services.
60 A deductible is a fixed sum (usually per annum or per period covered) paid by the consumer/patient, before
health insurance covers any related costs incurred by the same consumer/patient. For example, a $1,000
deductible for in-patient services implies that the patient will incur the first $1,000 of treatment costs and her
insurance will kick in once the $1,000 has been exceeded.
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people is exempt from payment, over 83.5% of all prescriptions were free of co-payments in
1995 (Kanavos, 1999).
Consequently, issues of affordability do not, in principle, affect individual access to health
care in tax-based or social insurance-based systems, although there may be services for which
access to care is restricted or rationed [61] and access may be deterred by other costs of
seeking care, such as those associated with transport or loss of earnings. Affordability is,
however, an issue that determines access, to a much greater extent, in private insurance-based
systems.
5.2.2.2 An analytical framework of public finance: bias towards excessive budgets or
adaptation to changing needs?
Neoclassical economic theory has espoused a market-based model, with government taking
remedial action when markets fail (Pigou, 1928; Musgrave, 1958). One cause of market
failure is the existence of externalities [62]. In this context, health care is largely a public
good [63]. Beyond this, the assumption has been that government, once advised on proper
61 There are, of course, policies resulting in restrictions to access and/or rationing in the use of health services.
Three examples may offer insight into the types of issues arising. For instance, the hotel aspects of long-term
care services (nursing homes, care homes) is subject to means-testing in several health systems. Dental care, is
excluded for large segments of the population from the reimbursable package of health services in many health
systems. And some very expensive medications may either be altogether excluded from cover, or be offered
very selectively to those that are thought to benefit most.
62 Externalities are factors that are not included in Gross Domestic Product, but which have an effect on human
welfare. There can be negative and positive externalities. Pollution is a prime example of a (negative) external
cost imposed on society: national output may only be maintained by allowing a certain degree of pollution,
which detracts from the quality oflife. A firm will include the private costs of materials, labour and capital used
in producing goods and services, but will not count the social costs of pollution involved. On the other hand,
positive externalities such as the social benefits conferred by firms in training workers who become available for
employment elsewhere are again not counted in national output. Similarly, in the case of health care, the
benefits accruing to society from vaccination, are not measured in national output.
63 Public goods are goods and services that are provided by the state for the benefit of all or most of the
population. Unlike private products, there is no direct link between the consumption of a social product and
payment for it. Public goods in their pure form exhibit three technical characteristics: non-rivalness in
consumption; non-excludability; and non-rejectability. Non-rivalness implies that the arrival of an extra person
does not reduce the amount of a service (e.g. health, or police, or defense) available to everyone else. Nor is it
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action, will proceed to carry it out (Musgrave, 1985). Recent literature emerging from the
theory of public choice has addressed the ways in which fiscal decisions are made. Initially,
the fiscal process was viewed in terms of an economic model of democracy (Downs, 1957;
Black, 1958). Interacting in the political market, consumers (who are also voters) and
politicians (entrepreneurs) combine to provide public goods so as to approximate an efficient
outcome. More recently, emphasis has been placed on the defects in that process (Buchanan
and Tullock, 1962; Niskanen, 1971). Defects include (a) institutional inertias, (b) rent-
seeking, and (c) the power of bureaucracy. Institutional inertias (particularly public budget
inertias) arise because, once in place, public programmes are very difficult to kill off because
they have a constituency prepared to fight for them. Some researchers go as far as to suggest
that political choice is all but ruled out (Rose & Davies, 1994). Additionally, pressure groups
seeking to force government to create a new service will have something to gain of a
significant kind. Their members may be prepared to spend many hours and much money
lobbying for a new service or programme (rent-seeking). Finally, public bureaucrats receive
several potential gains from their jobs, including salary, perquisites of the office, public
reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes and ease of
running the bureau. With the exception of the last two, Niskanen (1971) claims that all these
possible personal gains are directly and positively linked to the size of the agency budget.
possible to exclude the new arrival by saying that services will not be delivered until taxes or insurance premia
have been paid by him (non-excludability); nor is the individual able to reject the health service, police service
or defense on the grounds of excellent personal health, feeling of safety or pacifist beliefs respectively (non-
rejectability). In discussing public goods, an important distinction should be noted. For a private good, the
marginal cost associated with an extra unit of output and the marginal cost of an extra user are one and the same
thing, for example, if it costs £ I00 to produce an extra hospital bed, it also costs £ lOO to provide for an extra
patient-that-uses-the-bed. But this identity does not hold for public goods - for instance, the marginal cost of an
extra hour's broadcasting is positive (an probably large), whereas the marginal cost of an extra viewer is zero.
This has important implications. If a public good is provided at all, then non-excludability makes it impossible
to charge for it. This is the free-rider problem and in such cases, the market will generally fail entirely. Non-
rivalness implies that the marginal cost of an extra user (though not of an extra unit of output) is zero, and,
therefore, the efficient price should be based not on costs, but on the value placed by each individual on an extra
unit of consumption. Since this is impractical, the market is likely to produce an inefficient output. Thus, the
market is either inefficient or fails altogether. If the good is to be provided at all, it will generally have to be
publicly produced.
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Given the above context, the traditional concern about market failure has been replaced with
concern about public sector (or government) failure, which is seen as one of the major
sources (if not the major) of budget growth and has led to the emergence of a new theory of
fiscal crisis (Musgrave, 1980). This suggests that the political and administrative process
carries an innate bias towards adoption of programmes which do not reflect the preferences of
the public and which, under a more efficient procedure, would not be adopted. Based on this
diagnosis, the remedy is seen as institutional change which restricts expansion. The vision of
a Leviathan consuming resources insatiably has replaced that of the benevolent welfare state
(Musgrave, 1981). To that end, much of the modeling of budgetary behaviour is based on the
hypothesis that there is an inherent bias towards excess budgets.
However, this argument can only be sustained if the optimal level of expenditure is known. It
is apparent that an "objective" (optimal) standard does not exist (Musgrave, 1969; Musgrave,
1985). Indeed, "... a realistic appraisal does not sustain the hypothesis that distortions in the
fiscal process have been the primary cause of budget growth; nor does it sustain the
proposition that bias must necessarily be towards excess" (Musgrave, 1985, p. 306). Fiscal
reform should therefore not be derived from a premise of excess, which calls only for cost
containment (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; McKenzie, 1984), but instead should be
designed to improve information and to facilitate the translation of society's preferences into
policy action, thereby improving budget composition and scope, whether the result is to raise
or lower the size of the budget.
Thus, empirical evidence suggests that certain countries may actually underspend in
particular services financed directly out of general taxation. The UK National Health Service
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has for a long time faced criticism that it underspends vis-a-vis its EU counterparts and that
the outcomes of care in the UK are below those in other EU countries. In particular, sustained
underinvestment in staff and facilities has led to long waiting lists and rationing of services,
thus violating the equity principle. These shortcomings have led to the UK Treasury's
decision to increase the funding available in the NHS over the next three decades (Wanless,
2002).
To summarise the discussion so far, it can be seen that:
(a) In the majority of DEeD countries health care is considered to be at least a quasi-
public good; even in countries, such as the United States, where great emphasis is
placed on private insurance, a substantial proportion of total health care expenditures
is government financed and supports vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, the
disabled, and the poor [64]
(b) In most industrialized countries, the government, or agents closely associated with the
government, are responsible for making decisions on financing, allocating and
spending limited resources;
(c) Governments administer a welfare state, which is benevolent in principle, often in the
face of criticisms from some quarters about the management of resources;
(d) In determining the aggregate budget, the appropriate budget share may change over
time, due, among other things, to demographic and technological changes, or changes
in relative costs. To that end, budget growth may not result from institutional inertia,
bureaucracy, or rent-seeking, but from factors endogenous to the system the budget
serves.
64 Although, admittedly, at a level which is less than desirable.
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(e) Since the aggregate public sector budget reflects decisions in individual spending
areas such as health, it can be assumed that the same or similar reasons prevail for the
growth over time in expenditure in these spending areas.
5.2.2.3 The resource allocation process in collectively funded health systems
In collectively funded health systems, budget allocation may take one of two forms,
depending on whether funding is via taxation or social insurance: either resources are
allocated to individual spending departments, such as the Ministry of Health (MoH), from the
central budget, or resources are pooled by a central agency and are subsequently allocated to
sickness funds [65]. This is often the final stage ofa process comprising the following stages:
firstly, the involvement of the institutions of government in determining planned total public
expenditure (in tax-based systems), or sickness fund contribution rates (premia) and level of
subsidies for special classes of citizens. This decision will take account of the government's
macroeconomic objectives, financing constraints and ideological perspective.
The next stage may involve a bargaining process between the Treasury/Ministry of Finance
and the spending departments about the apportionment of available resources between
programmes. This stage is, strictly speaking, absent in social insurance systems, although it is
implicit in decisions about contribution levels. The final stage, involves the spending
departments, in this case the Ministry of Health, using the allocated resources (or the
resources that have been raised through taxation) to produce the (health) goods and services
desired by the electorate, and which are intended to contribute to social welfare. The focus of
attention of this thesis will be the third stage. Given this, the first and second stage (where
they exist) are treated as exogenous to the allocation decision.
65 Although this may in itself be a simplification, as there may be a subsequent re-allocation between funds.
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5.2.2.4 The theoretical model
The model described in the following sections presents the interaction between the budget
holders (governments, sickness funds, central collection agency) and individuals. It builds on
and extends the model suggested by Dunne and Smith (1983) and draws upon theoretical
research by Smith (1980), Dunne et al (1984), and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). It
combines the government and households as maximisers of social and individual welfare
respectively. As outlined in the previous section, in publicly funded health care systems, the
government or sickness funds determine the level of public expenditure on health, as well as
the policy on patient contributions (cost-sharing). Furthermore, by defining a package of
services that is reimbursed by statutory health insurance, the government also partly
determines the extent to which households contract private insurance to cover either non-
reimbursed health care goods and services, or elements of cost-sharing, or, indeed, offer an
alternative mode of provision to publicly funded services [66]. Total health care expenditure
therefore is the sum of all agents' spending on health care goods and services, or
HCE= LEi (5.1)
where E is health care expenditure of agent i, with; defined as the public sector, individuals
(paying co-payments and incurring out-of-pocket expenses), and private insurers.
Government acting as maximiser of social welfare and individuals as utility maximisers
66 This particular point may be related to individual perceptions of quality and the extent to which quality is
perceived to be higher in the private sector (that also includes the waiting list for specific types of care). Or it
may involve an element of choice for high earning individuals. In this case, high earners may (or must) contract
health insurance with a private insurer, rather than a sickness fund. This is the case in Germany and the
Netherlands.
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Expenditure on health services is designed to meet certain ultimate needs in society. They are
intermediate goods, inputs to produce desired outputs, Hi, for instance enhance and/or extend
life. The government or the para-state agency that ultimately controls the flow of funds to
health care services allocates resources to health care plans. Three main methods can be
envisaged for paying for health care: (a) retrospective reimbursement for expenditure
incurred, (b) reimbursement for all activity based on a fixed schedule of fees using, for
instance, a system of DRGs, and (c) prospective funding based on expected future
expenditure, using fixed budgets (Rice and Smith, 2002). Many health care systems in
Europe have formally moved away from the first and have increasingly leaned towards the
third type of resource allocation mechanism (Mossialos & Legrand, 1999), although in
practice overspends are often covered retrospectively. It should, however, be noted that this
taxonomy represents of necessity a simplification as it relates mainly to revenue financing.
Capital financing takes many diverse forms, often with little relationship to the means of
paying revenue costs.
In allocating resources, the government has in theory an objective function relating to
maximizing benefit for the population served. This is rarely defined explicitly but it can be
inferred that it includes elements of health gain and responsiveness. This objective function J,
can be written in terms of these outputs, Hi; as follows:
J=J(Hb .•.,H,J (5.2)
Outputs are pursued together, which may imply a degree of interaction between them.
Of course, individuals also have preferences. Let us assume that each individual, out of N
possible individuals in a given country, has an indirect utility function:
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(5.3)
where x, is the total per capita expenditure that is assumed to be equal to personal disposable
income, p refers to prices, and Z h is a vector of individual socio-economic, cultural and
demographic characteristics. These include, for example, age, gender, race, and disability,
income, education, urban status, among other things. The literature on the demand for health
care goods identifies several determinants and has elucidated aspects of their significance in
influencing demand for health care goods (Stuart et aI, 2000; Poisal et al, 2000; Start et al,
2000).
The government's objective function includes needs of individuals as outlined in equation (3)
and should take them into account. Such needs are influenced by a variety of factors such as:
• The burden of disease in the population, itself a function of age, life-course
experiences, etc.
• The opportunities to respond to the burden of disease, itself a function of technology,
skills, etc.
• Collective expectations.
If each of these variables is denoted by D, and each of the expenditure quantities is denoted
by q, then each output H, in equation (1) is generated by production functions of the form:
i=l,...,n (5.4)
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Equation (4) essentially means that producing better health requires resources to be expended
on those in need. In doing so, those paying for health care face two constraints. The first is
the availability of financed resources, which takes the form
fpiqi= E (5.5)
which is the sum of prices Pi for the various categories of health care expenditure times
quantities, qi, demanded of health goods and services. E is health care expenditure. The
budget constraint is also shaped by the macroeconomic situation, the business cycle, political
preferences, and may also be affected by individual expectations about the future state of the
world. The second constraint is the scarcity of the inputs, such as staff, facilities or
technology that the financial resources are intended to purchase.
Policy-makers would in principle wish to maximize the objective function J, that is,
maximize benefit to society. Doing this may ensure that they maintain power, enhance
patronage, or meet their ideological goals. The budget available to them is constrained by
fiscal and monetary policy considerations [67], but also by political preferences and the
macroeconomic environment in which the country operates and which affects decisions about
resource allocation. They may also wish to increase J, by raising the public outputs Hi,
through the use of more inputs qi. These inputs, measured by expenditures on different health
services, are composite bundles of factors, and are supplied at prices Pi, which politicians as
regulators have some power to influence. This power results from the monopolistic or
67 This would be the case in both tax-based and social insurance-based systems. In tax-based systems, fiscal
policy determines overall tax policy, and influences the amount of taxes accruing to the Treasury, both directly
(e.g. income tax, corporation tax, etc), or indirectly (e.g. through VAT, sales taxes, excise duties, etc). The
process is slightly different in social insurance-based systems, in that sickness funds and/or the government
agree on the insurance premia, payable by employees in employment and employers and deducted each month
by means of payroll taxation.
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oligopsonistic structure of health systems, which implies that purchasers of health goods and
services exert some control over their prices [68], although this control may be limited [69],
particularly with regard to the implementation of new technology, due to lack of adequate
information, or, simply political naivety as the case of the Czech Republic in the 1993-5
period demonstrates [70]. The politicians' problem is to maximize J subject to a budget
constraint, input prices, the type of technology and households' needs. Substituting (4) into
(2) the direct welfare function can be written as
J= U(q,D) (5.6)
Where q are vectors of expenditure quantities and D are vectors of variables such as burden
of disease, scope to respond, etc. Constrained maximization of this will produce a level J* of
the objective function, and the corresponding expenditure will be equal to the minimum cost
necessary to reach that level, namely
68 An integrated tax-based health care system, or a social insurance system with a single insurer is
monopsonistic in nature, in that purchasing of health care goods and services is conducted by a central authority
and the means of provision are strictly owned by the system or purchasing authority. In this case, the
monopsony determines prices of health services, subject to individual regulatory schemes applying to specific
parts of health care delivery (e.g. pharmaceuticals), which may allow (some) price flexibility. A contract system
(either tax-based with a purchaser provider split, or a social insurance system with multiple insurance funds), is
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic in nature. Insurance funds can negotiate prices and volumes of health care
goods and services and purchase bulk at a preferred price. As in the previous case, this is subject to regulatory
schemes in operation for particular services (e.g. pharmaceuticals), which apply to these services at national
level (e.g. a positive list for pharmaceuticals, which is common across sickness funds, and which is negotiated
nationally between manufacturers and government and sickness fund representatives. Such negotiation includes
prices, or volumes, or a combination of the two).
69 Such control is depends on what is actually being purchased and whether there is a short- or a long-term
view; for example, in the case of medicines, outright price control is possible in the short- as well as the long-
term by the monopsony in question. With regards to the labour market, however, this relationship would only
hold in the long-term only ifthere were free movement oflabour.
70 This is when the country's leadership decided to implement reforms, such as fee-for-service payments to
physicians and generous reimbursement to pharmaceuticals, which effectively contributed to the entire health
budget being spent within 7 months in 1994.
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E = C(]*, p, D) (5.7)
The price derivatives of the cost function C(J*, p, D) are the amount of each input demanded,
qi= gi(J* ,p, D) =8C/ Gp; (5.8)
and the indirect welfare function,
J=/(E,p, D) (5.9)
can be used to substitute for J to give a simple set of estimable input demand functions,
q; = q;(E, p, D) (5.10)
The assumption of welfare maximization or cost minimization by the government then
implies restrictions on the parameters of the demand function in (10), such as homogeneity
[71], symmetry [72], and negativity [73], and these are testable (Dunne and Smith, 1983).
The implementation of the model requires choosing a functional form for the system of
equations (10). The form used is that associated with the almost ideal demand system
71 A homogeneous production function is such that, when each input factor is multiplied by a constant k, the
constant can be completely factored out. To illustrate, if we have
q = 2x + 3y + 1.5z
If we increase all inputs by some proportion k, then:
Hq = k(2x) + k(3y) + k(1.5z) = k(2x + 3y +1.5z)
Since k can be completely factored out, that is, each term contains the same power of the proportionality factor,
this production function is homogeneous. The reason why this is important, is because the degree of
homogeneity provides the key to the returns to scale question (increasing - constant - or decreasing returns to
scale).
72 Symmetry, as well as negativity, derive from the existence of consistent preferences. The symmetry of a
consumer's substitution matrix is not easily interpreted without reference to the cost function; it is hardly
intuitively obvious why, for instance, a compensated penny per pound increase in the price of apples should
increase the number of bars of soap bought by a number equal to the number of more pounds of apples bought
consequent on a compensated penny per bar increase in the price of soap. Nevertheless, symmetry is a guarantee
of and test of the consumer's consistency of choice; without it, inconsistent choices are made.
73 Negativity comes from the concavity of the cost function, which is entirely due to the fact that costs are
minimized, or equivalently, that utility is maximized.
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(AIDS), (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). The attraction of AIDS is that it aggregates
perfectly over consumers [as in equation (5.3) above], without invoking parallel linear Engel
curves.
5.2.2.5 Closing comments on the theoretical model
The model developed in the previous section has its foundations in the public finance
literature and public choice theory, but differs from the theoretical considerations that
underpin these in that it allows a flexible adjustment mechanism. This derives from the
stream of literature which suggests that the appropriate budget share may change over time.
The model, therefore, allows for flexible adjustment in light of demographic and
technological changes, changes in relative costs, the growth of per capita income, and the
impact of the macroeconomic environment.
5.2.3 The empirical model
The reduced form of the determinants of health care expenditures on the basis of the above
theoretical model is estimated by using a log-linear model. The advantage of log-linear
models rests in how' the values of individual coefficients represent elasticity values, in which
case we are immediately able to test the 'health care being a luxury' assumption. Aggregate
health expenditures are, thus, determined by institutional and aggregated household
characteristics, on the basis of maximization ofan objective function, as follows:
logE = ao + aJ logY + a2logM + a3log!!'T +a4Iog)(;j + zzs log Zs + E (5.11)
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where E is total expenditure on health, Y is income in the economy, M is the impact of the
macroeconomic variables, A T is technological change, X refers to prices of health goods and
services and Z refers to other characteristics of health systems (changes in provision, reforms,
as well as inputs, such as medical personnel, etc.).
5.3 The variables
In order to test the model developed in the previous sections, a number of variables have been
developed. In accordance with the methodology developed in chapters 3 and 4, all monetary
variables are expressed in the national currency of each of the 13 countries identified for
statistical analysis, and are subsequently deflated by the GDP deflator to represent constant
1995 values. Total health care expenditure, public health care expenditure, Gross Domestic
Product, Total Private Consumption, and Total Government Spending are expressed in
natural logarithms, so that the coefficients obtained represent elasticities. The period under
investigation is 1960-1998. The estimation period was selected on the basis of (a) data
availability and (b) uniformity among the countries involved in the analysis.
5.3.1 The dependent variable
The dependent variable used to test the model developed in the previous section is total
health care expenditure. Although differences do exist among countries regarding the
measurement of total health care expenditure, as discussed in chapter 3, these differences are
less likely to affect single country time-series analysis. The definition of total (or national)
health care expenditures is based on the following identity and functional boundaries of
medical care, provided by the OECD [74]:
74 All variable definitions are provided by the GEeD; in its attempt to standardize across its member states, the
organization may have applied definitions which are sub-optimal. In other cases, not all countries are capable of
meeting the definitional criteria for certain variables. Attempts have been made to include countries for which
the definition for each variable applies without compromise.
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Total health care expenditures - Personal health care services +
+ Medical goods dispensed to out-patients +
+ Services of prevention and public health +
+ Health administration and health insurance +
+ Investment into medical facilities
Name of variable and format: LNHEX, which is the log of total health care expenditure in
constant 1995 prices [75].
Data sources: OECD Health Data 2000, OECD, Paris, 2000
5.3.2 The independent variables
5.3.2.1 Introduction
The theory of public choice - flexible adaptation, outlined in the previous section identified
five main areas as potential determinants of health care expenditures:
(a) The macroeconomic environment and fiscal policy decisions
(b) Technology
(c) Prices
(d) Inputs to the health system
(e) Consumer demand and expectations
The variables chosen to test this model are as follows:
5.3.2.2 Macroeconomic variables
Macroeconomic variables are likely to contribute to the determination of total health care
expenditures, since they signal the stance taken on fiscal and monetary policy in response to
75 To achieve this, current total health care expenditures have been deflated by the GDP deflator (1995=100).
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movements in the national business cycle [76]. Although spending on welfare services such
as health care is expected to be rigid downwards [77] regardless of whether there is a boom
or a recession, policy-makers are almost certainly going to resist increases in health care
spending, in real terms, if not also in nominal terms, during a recession. Understandably,
however, there may be increased needs because of the health impact of unemployment [78].
It is therefore understandable that during a recession, governments seek to contain the rate of
growth of spending, exactly because the sources of financing expenditure yield less income
due to a slowdown in economic activity and to support specific groups such as the
unemployed. Consequently, when seeking to cut back on public expenditure, the publicly
funded health sector is a key target. Theoretically, therefore, the examination of the
relationship between health expenditure and GDP should be replaced by that between the
growth in GDP and growth in health expenditure over time. In addition, the total level of
public debt and the current budget deficit are indicators of fiscal stance on future public
policy directions regarding health. Public debt affects (health) spending in the long-term,
whilst the current budget deficit is an indicator of short- to medium-term macroeconomic
policy directions. In view of the above, the following macroeconomic variables have been
retained.
i. Budget Deficit
Rationale: The general government budget deficit is an indicator of fiscal stability or
imbalance at any given point on the business cycle. Fiscal prudence suggests that, at steady-
76 Of course there may be regional variations in the business cycle, for instance, the north-southeast divide in
the UK, but what is of interest at macro level is the national average. Furthermore, there may be differences in
the movements of the business cycle at supra-national level, as is the case with the Euro-zone. Again, this thesis
examines national business cycles and supranational differences will not influence the outcome of the analysis,
so long as the body responsible for the conduct of fiscal policy remains at national rather than supranational
level.
77 Implying that it is almost impossible to reduce, at least in nominal terms, the amount of resources allocated to
health.
78 The combination of increased needs and 'steady state' requirements imply that during a recession the share
of public spending on GDP increases. because GDP contracts, resulting in higher indebtedness.
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state, the budget should be balanced and any fiscal deficit should be zero. Indeed, fiscal
prudence as a macroeconomic policy objective is pursued with vigour and imbalances are
corrected over the mediurn- to long-term. To the extent that health services are publicly
financed or publicly underwritten, the budget deficit acts as an indicator of fiscal policy,
which in the majority of cases is countercyclical, namely loose during a recession and tight in
a boom. It would therefore be expected that a tightening of fiscal policy to reduce the deficit
might have an impact on health care expenditure. In European Union countries, the presence
of an additional constraint might exacerbate the situation: European Union Member States
signing up to the single currency have had to meet tight fiscal requirements in order to qualify
for inclusion in the Euro-zone in the post-1995 era.
Definition: The budget deficit is defined as the excess of net acquisitions of financial assets
by transactors over their net incurrence of liabilities (the difference of total government
revenue minus total government expenditure).
Name of the variable and format: Two different variables will be employed in econometric
analysis: the first is DEFICIT, which is the per capita budget deficit, expressed in 1995
constant prices (divided for this purpose by the GDP deflator). It is not possible to construct
the logarithm of this variable as on certain occasions it becomes negative (surplus). The
second is DEFPCT, which is the deficit as a percentage of GDP.
Data sources: OECD Health Data Base, OECD, Paris, 2000; and International Financial
Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various years.
Expected performance: It is expected that the size of the deficit and health care expenditure
will be inversely related, such that the larger the deficit, the more stringent fiscal (and tax)
policy will be and, therefore, the rate of growth of health care expenditure may be contained.
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ii. Total Private Consumption
Rationale: Total final private consumption is presented as a proxy for private sector non-
human wealth. Consumption rates in a given economy account not only for income from
employment, but also for income generated in the informal (parallel) sector, as well as
imputed income from property and other liquid financial assets. Theoretically, therefore, it is
argued in this thesis that consumption is a more representative measure of private sector
income as well as overall wealth (which incorporates income from employment), than GOP.
This is particularly the case where other financial and non-financial measures of wealth play
an important role in individual and household consumption decisions and also influence the
amplitude and the depth of the business cycle. Changes in wealth, both financial and non-
financial, and, by extension, falls in personal consumption levels, have been responsible for
severe recessions in the UK, the US, the Scandinavian economies (with the exception of
Denmark) and Japan over the past twenty years, but also in the 1930s (Kanavos &
Karakitsos, 1994; King 1994; Tobin, 1969; Tobin & Brainard, 1977) (see Appendix 5.2 for
the relationship between wealth and consumption).
Definition: Total final consumption on goods and services by households in a given year.
Name of the variable and format: LNC95, which is the log of real total private consumption
for goods and services, expressed in 1995 prices. The lag of this variable by one period
(LGLNC or LNC(-l)) has also been used in the analysis to be consistent with the conceptual
model put forward, namely that expenditure at t+1may depend on income generated at time
t.
Data sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 1960-1998.
Expected performance: It is expected that if there is a relationship between aggregate
macroeconomic variables and total health care expenditures, it will be captured by the
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consumption variable. In particular, it is expected that the relationship will be positive, such
that an increase in total final consumption will be due to higher income from all sources, and
positive perceptions about individual financial and non-financial wealth.
iii. Total Government Consumption
Rationale: Decisions about total government spending have an important influence on health
spending to the extent that the latter is publicly (collectively) funded. Thus, there is an
implicit relationship between government spending and health care expenditures (total or
public), such that the former partly helps determine the latter.
Definition: Total outlays of central (federal), local (state, provinces, cantons, municipalities)
governments and social security administrations. The outlays include the purchase of goods
and services, transfer payments to households, subsidies to producers, the servicing of the
public debt, and public investment.
Name of the variable and format: DEL TAG95, which is the percentage change in total
public expenditure in constant 1995 prices. As total government spending (G) and total health
care spending (LNHCE95) or total public health spending (LNPUB95) are correlated, the
DELT AG95 is used instead. Regressing total health spending on total government spending
would be spurious and would result in collinearity.
Data sources: OECD Health Data Base, OECD, Paris, 2000; and International Financial
Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various years.
Expected performance: It is expected that if the change in total government expenditure has
any impact on total health care expenditures this would be in the same direction. However, a
decrease in overall government spending is not expected to result in decrease in health care
expenditures, perhaps only in a reduction in its rate of growth.
iv. Gross Domestic Product
Rationale: Traditionally, the theoretical justification for the inclusion of GDP has been that it
is a reasonably good proxy for total income in the economy and, therefore, is best placed to
test the aggregate relationship between income and health care expenditures. In chapter 4 of
the thesis it was disputed that GDP is a good approximation of society's total income,
because of accounting, measurement, comparability and inclusiveness issues. This view is
maintained here and although the estimation approach adopted in this thesis (time-series
econometric analysis, on a country-by-country basis) takes away some of the accounting and
comparability problems, it still does not eliminate the measurement problems. Governments,
however, observe the GDP rate of growth and set spending targets based on GDP growth
projections. Therefore, the only GDP-related variable included in the analysis is
DELTAGDP, which is the year-on-year real rate of growth in a given economy.
In the analysis that follows (in chapter 6), we have also run the same models for each
country, by including the log of GDP (LNGDP) as a measurement of income for that
country. While this may appear to be contradictory to what has been said in chapter 4 about
GDP as a proxy for income, it is done to serve only one purpose: to determine whether at the
country level the income elasticity of demand for health care exceeds unity, and with a view
to comparing the results from the empirical literature, with the results obtained by this thesis.
The thesis also adopts a measure of GDP which does not include total health care
expenditure, since health expenditure is a component ofGDP.
Definition: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is defined as total domestic expenditure plus
exports less imports of goods and services minus health expenditure.
Data sources: OECD Health Data Base, OECD, Paris, 2000; and International Financial
Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various years.
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Expected performance: The inclusion of the rate of growth of GDP, will add a long-term
dynamic feedback effect to the model, which has been missing from the literature so far.
5.3.2.3 Technology
Rationale: A key component of the proposed model of aggregate determinants of health care
expenditures is health technology and its impact. The model suggests that the impact of
technology is important and positively related to health care expenditures and their growth
over time. As already pointed out, a common feature throughout the industrialised world is
the rising cost of new medical technology. Although health care technology has received
much attention in the literature, most attempts to measure its actual impact have failed and, as
a result, it remains one of the non-estimated factors that appear in the residuals of
econometric investigation, as was noted in chapter 4 of the thesis.
Definition: The consumption of pharmaceutical goods comprises prescription medicines and
self-medication, often referred to as over-the-counter (OTC) products, both in in-patient and
out-patient care. The series includes the pharmacists' remuneration when the latter is separate
from the price of medicines. Pharmaceuticals consumed in hospitals are excluded, as these
could not be captured in a representative manner in several countries. The expenditure time-
series includes VAT and sales taxes where applicable; taxes, where applicable, are
automatically imposed on pharmaceutical products and their effect is difficult to disaggregate
once this has taken place.
Name of the variable and format: PHRMPCT, which is the percentage real growth rate,
year-an-year, of per capita pharmaceutical expenditure in each country. Per capita
pharmaceutical expenditure has been deflated and has been expressed in 1995 prices before
the rate of growth was calculated. The variable is not all-inclusive and would provide a
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partial capture of technology costs. It is, nevertheless, the only variable that can currently
approximate the issue of technology with some credibility. As we are interested in the rate of
growth of pharmaceutical expenditure, any tax effects or long-term volume effects should
disappear.
Data sources: OECD Health Data 2000, OECD, Paris, 2000; National Pharmaceutical
Industry Associations; Eurostat.
Expected performance: The real rate of growth in pharmaceutical expenditure is expected to
be positively related to changes in real per capita health care expenditures over time. Being
the rate of growth, rather than real per capita expenditure in pharmaceuticals, it is not a linear
function of health care expenditure per capita (LNHCE95), and is therefore unrelated to it.
This variable shows the combined effect of changes in prices of medicines over time as well
as the changes in volumes of medicines consumed over time. Policy-makers are interested in
both effects. First, the price effect is critical because, in principle, it shows the rate at which
new medicines are introduced in different countries and the extent to which they actually
represent innovations or are perceived to be innovative in different national regulatory
environments (and therefore achieve high prices in pricing/reimbursement negotiations).
Prices of pharmaceuticals are typically rigid upwards particularly in environments where
price controls exist, or price-volume agreements are in place between purchasers (sickness
funds, health authorities, HMOs, etc). This would comprise all countries under investigation.
Manufacturers, therefore, have an incentive to launch new products or marginal
improvements over older products to achieve higher prices, assuming regulators or
purchasers are convinced about the new products' innovative capacity. The empirical analysis
that follows provides an opportunity to observe this variable across different regulatory
regimes, namely, pricing freedom for new products (Germany, USA), relative pricing
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freedom, subject to profit control (UK), and different types of price control regimes (all other
countries).
Second, the volume effect may show the impact of increased information flows, to the extent
this information is accessible. Of course, different countries have different regulatory regimes
applying to advertising (ranging from placing a ceiling on corporate advertising expenditure
or taxing advertising expenditure (Kanavos, 1999), to banning direct-to-consumer advertising
(Kanavos & Abramson, 2001)). Nevertheless consumers' direct access to information has
increased in recent years through the internet. Changes in volume of medicines consumed
over time also reflect public expectations and the impact of demand-side policies. It is, for
instance, a reflection of differing expectations that consumption of medicines per capita in
France is higher than all other industrialised countries, but it may also relate to the relative
weakness of policies applied on the demand-side (Lancry, 1999). In contrast, the UK's per
capita pharmaceutical consumption is nearly half the French figure, and this may be partly
due to more effective demand-side measures being in place (Fattore, 1999).
5.3.2.4 Health Prices
Rationale: "It seems intuitively obvious that health care expenditures are determined by
health care price levels" (McGuire et al, 1993). However, relatively few studies have
explored the impact of price movements, but where this was done the studies showed some
anomalies. For instance, the OEeD compared real expenditure, using a health-specific
deflator, with real GDP for a sample of 18 countries (OECD 1987). Overall, the average real
expenditure elasticity for these countries was 1.6. When shorter time periods were looked at,
the elasticity fell from 1.6 in 1960-75 to 1.3 in 1975-84. Moreover, the growth of expenditure
relative to GDP slowed markedly in the 1980s, so that the mean elasticity for 1980-84 fell to
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0.5 and real expenditure grew only half as fast as real GDP. The implication was that, after
1980, health care, previously a luxury, became a necessity for these countries.
(Real) price movements may therefore be important determinants of changes in health care
expenditure because they may affect demand for health care services. Of course, the way that
purchasers and citizens in different countries react to (upward) changes in prices differs
dramatically, depending on several factors, for instance:
• The type of insurance funding (publicly funded, or private);
• The type of insurance cover (comprehensive or with high co-payments or deductibles,
exemptions from cover); and
• The type of regulatory regime in place (price negotiation and capping for different
goods and services, price - volume tradeoffs, strict price regulation, profit regulation,
periodic price reductions and efficiency gains, etc)
To that end, this variable adds value to the model since it will be tested in countries whose
systems present at least one of the above characteristics.
Definition. name of the variable and format: PHEX, which is the price index of health care
expenditure in constant 1995 prices (1995=100). It is defined as the implicit price deflator for
total current expenditure and investment, a weighted index for all components.
Data sources: OECD Health Data Base, OECD, Paris, 2000.
Expected performance: In principle, it is expected that prices and health care expenditures are
positively related. The empirical investigation will show whether a statistically significant
relationship actually exists. However the sign of the price coefficient will depend a great deal
on the type of regulatory regime in place and whether there is some pricing freedom in the
goods and services represented by the chosen health price index, or prices are regulated or
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negotiated. In the former case, a positive sign is expected, in the latter, the sign may well be
negative.
5.3.2.5 Demographicfactors
Rationale: As already discussed in chapter 4, much has been written about the implications
for health care and expenditure of an aging population. For instance, it has been shown that
medical expenses in France and Belgium are over three times greater for men aged 65 to 74
than for men aged 15 to 44. And expenses double for men over age 75 compared with the age
group 65 to 74 (Sandier, 1987). On the other hand, the average annual effect of demographic
change in Britain has been calculated as less than 0.3 per cent per annum for the next 35
years (Costain & Wolfson, 1994). In the past also, the effect has been far too small to account
for more than a small part of the rising costs of health care in the developed world.
In view of this evidence, the thesis makes the case for not including an explicit ageing
variable in the statistical analysis, advancing the view that if what matters is proximity to
death after illness, then chronological age is irrelevant [79]. It is, however, expected that if
there is an ageing effect in terms of higher utilisation, this will be picked up by other
variables in the model, notably the technology variable.
5.3.2.6 Inputs to the health system (medical profession)
Rationale: Medical doctors represent an important input to the health care system and are
directly responsible for much of a system's health care expenditure. In particular:
79 In so doing, the thesis also distinguishes between the macroeconomic and the microeconomic perspective(s).
Whereas the burden of disease can be incorporated at micro level (see Wanless, 2002), this is not necessarily the
case at the macro level, due to aggregation of the relevant data.
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(a) Doctors are a costly input, in terms of reimbursement for their services, but to a
variable extent between countries, depending on the organisation and delivery of
health care services, the emphasis or not on primary care, and the methods of paying
doctors.
(b) Doctors are responsible for making decisions on behalf of their patients, thereby
influencing demand for health care.
Contrary to what theory might suggest, however, empirical evidence has been inconclusive
about the extent to which the medical profession is a determinant of health care expenditures
(Parkin et aI, 1987; Gerdtham & Jonsson, 1991; Gerdtham and Jonsson, 1995). For example,
an increase in supply may lower unit costs (i.e. average income). However, the thesis will
explore the hypothesis that the number of doctors per capita are a determinant of health care
expenditures within the remit of the present model.
Definition: The variable employed is "Practising Physicians, Practising General Practitioners,
Practising Specialists". The variable is defined as the number of physicians, general
practitioners and specialists who are actively practicing medicine in public and private
institutions. The data excludes dentists, stomatologists, qualified physicians who are working
abroad, working in administration, research and industry positions. Data include foreign
physicians licensed to practice and actively practicing medicine in each country. Data have
been calculated to represent full-time equivalents.
Name of the variable and format: PHYSICIAN, is the number of "Practising Physicians,
Practising General Practitioners, Practising Specialists" per 1000 population.
Data sources: OECD Health Data 2000, OECD, Paris, 2000
Expected performance: Theoretically, a positive relationship between PHYS and health care
expenditures should be expected, but the empirical evidence suggests that this relationship is
inconclusive.
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5.3.2.7 Systemic variables
Rationale: The effect of including institutional and system-specific variables in econometric
analysis was discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis. Many authors included several dummy
variables in an attempt to explain whether these constitute determinants of health care
expenditures. Among them were, fee-for-service, capitation and salary as methods of paying
doctors, and prospective budget or activity-based (case-mix adjusted or otherwise) formulae
as methods of reimbursing hospitals. The pooling of data across twenty or so countries and
over thirty years, and the resulting degrees of freedom, allowed a proliferation of dummy
variables to be included, which, nevertheless, yielded results which authors themselves could
very frequently not explain.
Rather, this thesis intends to add dummy variables in selected countries only. The
justification for this is twofold:
(a) dummy variables are inserted to account for structural breaks in the data (for instance,
German re-unification, which resulted in merging West and East German data post-
1990), and which has remained unaccounted for in all previous empirical studies
(b) dummy variables are inserted to account for major shifts in policy and health care
reforms, which may also result in structural breaks in the data. In particular, it is
proposed that dummy variables be included for the UK, Germany, Sweden, France,
and Austria and for specific periods only as outlined below for each country. For
these periods, the dummy will take the value of 1 and it will remain equal to 0 for the
remainder of the sample period.
217
5.3.2.8 Country dummies
(a) UK dummy =1 for 1991 - 1997; this dummy will account for the potential effect of
market oriented reforms that were implemented in 1991 until the end of 1997.
(b) Germany dummy = 1 from 1991 onwards until the end of the sample period; this
dummy will account for the effect of German re-unification and the structural jump in
the data because post-October 1990 economic time-series also include East German
data. Because macroeconomic time series are expressed in per capita terms, we do not
expect a significant result.
(c) Sweden dummies. It is proposed to include two dummy variables for Sweden. One
dummy is needed from 1992 onwards to account for the effect of planned market
reforms; a second dummy is needed from 1993 onwards to account for the shift of
social care to municipalities in 1993; although this took place in 1993, we will need to
have the dummy for the entire sample period post 1993 because the policy shift did
not have a one-off effect.
(d) France dummy = 1: a dummy for the 1996-1998 period will account for the Plan
Juppe reforms. On November 15, 1995, Prime Minister Juppe, aware of rising deficits
in the welfare sector announced a programme of reform of the French social security
system, which would also explicitly affect the health sector. On one hand, the Plan
Juppe announced emergency measures aimed at covering previous deficits, on the
other it set out the guidelines for a financial and operational revision of the health care
system in the medium term. Reforms included (i) increasing contributions by
pensioners, the unemployed and private doctors, (ii) reducing coverage rates with an
increase of the hospitalisation co-payment rate, (iii) imposing an exceptional tax on
the pharmaceutical industry in the region of £250 million, (iv) targeting the growth
rate of hospital and general medical expenditure for 1996-97 to equal general
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inflation, and (v) introducing an exceptional income tax of 0.5% of total income for a
period of 13 years, starting in 1996, aimed at discharging the debt of social security.
(e) Austria dummy = 1: a dummy for the post 1996 period, when the Austrian authorities
changed the way health care expenditures were estimated. Until 1995, Austria had
been over-reporting. Following a recalculation in 1995, health care spending as a
proportion of GDP fell from 9.6% to 8.1% (Osterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt,
1997).
5.4 The countries under investigation, functional forms and
estimation procedures
5.4.1 The countries under investigation
The countries under investigation have been chosen to represent different funding methods
and different versions within their funding methods. In particular, the countries, their
respective funding methods for health services and the specific versions they represent are:
Country
1. U.K.
funding method
mainly general taxation
12% through non-earmarked
national insurance
mainly general taxation2. Spain
3. Portugal mainly general taxation
4. Denmark mainly general taxation
5. Sweden mainly general taxation
6. Finland mainly general taxation
7. Belgium mainly social insurance
8. The Netherlands
version
taxation mainly at central level
taxation mainly at central level
taxation mainly at central level
taxation mainly at local level
taxation mainly at local level
taxation mixed (central and local)
multiple funds (5 federations)
mainly social insurance multiple social insurance funds
substitutes for statutory
health insurance (40% of population)
mainly social insurance 1 fund covers 75% of population9. France
10. Germany mainly social insurance
10% of population has
private insurance
multiple social insurance funds
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11.USA mainly private insurance multiple insurers
publicly funded health care
accounts for 42% of total
health spending
mainly social insurance multiple social insurance funds
a third of total health spending
through private health insurance
Mainly social insurance (54%) multiple social insurance funds
but also taxation (24%)
12. Switzerland
13.Austria
The US and Switzerland have been selected to test the model in the case of health systems
that contain strong private health insurance sectors. Appendix 5.1, provides background
information on each of the 13 countries chosen, particularly on issues related to finance,
organization, provision, payment of providers, key problems, and main reforms over the past
decade.
5.4.2 Functional form
The choice of functional form is of considerable importance in testing an empirical model.
The thesis follows other published empirical evidence (among others Parkin et aI, 1987;
Gerdtham and Joensson, 1991; and Hitiris and Posnett, 1992) and makes use of a log-linear
form of the model.
In addition, it uses a transformation to capture trends in the data which would otherwise lead
to autocorrelation, namely by including time as an independent variable in levels, squared
and to the power of three.
5.4.3 Estimation procedures
A two-step process is followed in estimating the model for each of the 13 countries selected.
First, the model is estimated with Ordinary Least Squares estimation procedure and tested for
autocorrelation in the residuals. Where autocorrelation is found, a first order Autoregressive
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Regression [AR(I)] is run to correct for autocorrelation. Second, where autocorrelation
persists even when the AR( 1) method is used, then the model variables for each country are
tested for trends in levels and in first differences. If trends are (or continue to be) present,
then a co-integration approach is followed.
Chapter 6 pursues in detail the issue of estimation procedures and also summarises the
relevant diagnostic tests that would ensure robust, and unbiased estimates from the empirical
models presented therein.
5.5 Value added of the proposed analysis
The approach presented in the previous sections deviates from the existing literature of the
determinants of health care expenditures in a number of ways.
First, it proposes a conceptual framework that links the determinants of health care
expenditures to the theory of public finance, and allows flexible adjustments by decision-
makers to account for changes in technology, population structure, prices, and the
macroeconomic environment. The conceptual framework recognises that budgets for health
care may need to be adjusted over time because of these changes. Their extent will determine
the optimal size of the "health budget".
Second, the time series approach will be adopted to analyse the determinants of health
expenditures on a country-by-country basis. This follows a limited number of similar
previous attempts in the literature (Murillo et al, 1993; Saez et al, 1994; Kanavos &
Yfantopoulos, 1999). A time-series approach enables the examination of dynamic patterns
arising in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, particularly the
impact that change (in population structure, technology, growth in the economy) has on
health spending. It will identify such patterns over a long period of time that would hold for a
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specific country rather than patterns that hold for a specific year across a number of countries,
which may be subject to change because of a different reference year or a monetary
denominator.
Third, the proposed methodology looks at the health production function within each
individual country over a predetermined period without converting economic variables into a
common currency. It therefore avoids the methodological problems that both the use of
exchange rates and Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) present in similar analyses for both
macroeconomic and health indicators without sacrificing the possibility of comparing results
across countries for similar variables. It also avoids some of the methodological problems
arising from the same variables being collected and/or reported in different ways in different
countries.
Fourth, the proposed analysis looks at the impact of the macro economy on health spending
in two different ways. Firstly, it investigates whether the rate of growth in the economy, has
any influence on the demand for health. Secondly, it investigates whether each country's
public finances impact on health spending and to what extent.
Fifth, the proposed framework attempts to incorporate technology in order to analyse its
impact on health care expenditures. This is an advance from published literature, which has
most often considered technology as a residual. In particular, the impact of technological
change is investigated in two separate ways: firstly, as an expenditure effect, thereby
incorporating prices and volumes, and, secondly, as a price effect, looking at the impact of
prices of health care goods and services only over time, and implicitly assuming volumes
move in line with population growth over time.
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Sixth, it recognises that the lag structure of the model is not sufficient to test for the impact of
health determinants on health spending. Unfortunately there are no adequate data or variables
to test this relationship. This is clearly a gap that future research and policy must address.
Finally, The analysis is conducted at the macroeconomic level and recognises that omitted
variables such as the distribution of income in each country, health determinants, and the
level of the parallel economy may determine some of the variation in health expenditures.
Due to difficulties in accounting for these variables, their impact is deduced from the error
term structure of each model.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has developed a conceptual model for the analysis of aggregate health care
expenditures. The model is a spin-off from the theory of public finance and allows flexible
adjustment of the health care budget in the face of need, this being due to changes in
technology, changes in the prices of health goods and services, changes in the income of
households, and allowing for adjustment in case of macroeconomic fluctuations. The model
stresses the particular importance of technological change and that of prices of health goods
and services. A number of variables have been selected to test the model empirically over the
1960-1998 period in 13 developed (OEeD) countries. The analysis will test the significance
of these variables as determinants of aggregate total health care expenditures and as
determinants of aggregate public health care expenditures. The medium of analysis is time
series regression analysis, with a first order autoregression process and, where needed80,
cointegration analysis, and the functional form is log-linear. Following the analysis set out in
the current chapter, chapter 6 will present the results of the econometric analysis, a number of
diagnostic tests for the models presented, and will comment on the results obtained.
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Appendix 5-1
Under Study
Main features of the Health Care Systems
i Austria
r,l' _> ,u
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory health • Financed mainly by social
insurance system insurance with mixed public and
private providers.
• Premia range from 5.6% of gross
income for fanners, 6% for salary
earners, 8.5% for liberalQrofessions
Coverage by statutory health 99% of the population
insurance system
Role of Voluntary Health • Supplementary to statutory health
Insurance insurance: premiums are calculated
by actuarial methods and are tax-
deductible up to a certain annual
premium amount.
• Up to 38% of population in 1990
had private health cover.
Main problems of health care • Increase in inpatient care in
system hospitals
• Trend towards the use of expensive
technology and other high-cost
services
• Monopoly position for scientifically
trained physicians.
Main Health Care Reforms • 1988: introduction of index-linked
daily charges for hospital stays
• End 1980s: an integrated health
care system was established to shift
the emphasis from hospital to
outpatient care and to control
hospital costs without loss of
quality
• 1993: recalculation of the health
care basket, reducing ReE as a %
ofGDP from 9.4 to 8%.
80 In the case of trends in the data series, as will be explored in chapter 6.
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Belgium ,.. ,
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory • Financed mainly by social insurance with mixed
health insurance public and private providers.
system • There are also state subsidies from general taxation.
• Contributions from old-age pensioners and taxes on
car insurance account for the remainder
Coverage by statutory
health insurance 99% of the population
s_ystem
Role of Voluntary Supplementary to statutory health insurance: small but
Health Insurance steadily growing, offered by "mutualites" and for-profit
compames.
Main problems of • Financial incentives which encourage the growth of
health care system expenditure
• Rising volume of services induced by fee-for-service
incentives
• Very high numbers of physicians per 1000 population
and above average physicians contact per capita
Main Health Care • 1980: introduction of a new reimbursement systemReforms for pharmaceuticals
• 1982: government announced reform in the hospital
sector (reduction of the number of beds &
prospective budgets to replace per diem payments)
• 1983: increase in the rate of contributions to the
health care system
• 1988, 1989: new financing methods for laboratory
testing
• 1990: new policies for psychiatric services
• Between 1992 and 1995, co-payments increased for
inpatient care and ambulatory consultations in some
cases by over 60%
225
Denmark " "'
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory health • Financed mainly by taxation with
insurance system mainly public providers
• Third-party payers include the state,
counties, municipalities, and a
private non-profit insurer
• State subsidies were transformed in
the 1970s into general block grants
calculated on the basis of
population & age distribution
Coverage by statutory health 100% of the populationinsurance system
Role of Voluntary Health Minimal
Insurance
Main problems of health care • Waiting lists increased for hospital
system services when cost-containment
policies were implemented in the
1980s
• Very high drug prices despite
attempts to curb them
Main Health Care Reforms • 1970: responsibility for health care
was placed mainly with the
counties, who became responsible
for reimbursement in 1973. In 1977,
they assumed responsibility for
psychiatric hospitals
• 1980s: cost-containment measures
for improving efficiency and
effectiveness at all levels
• 1993: introduction of a scheme for
cost-sharing drug prices
• Since 1993: contracts have been
gradually introduced between
counties and individual hospitals.
• 1998: health insurance expenditure
on pharmaceuticals was limited to a
0.8% increase over that of the
previous year.
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Finland " "
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory health • Mostly financed through general
insurance system and local taxation
• National government: approx. 30%
• Municipalities: 33%
• Sickness insurance: 13%
• Households: 21%
• Other private (relief funds,
employers, private insurance) 4%
Coverage by statutory health Universal: 100% of the population
insurance system
Role of Voluntary Health Limited; up to 4% of total health care costs
Insurance
Main problems of health care • Multiple funding sources may lead
system to inefficiency in the use of
ambulatory services
• Large number of hospital beds since
1970s
Main Health Care Reforms • Emphasis on primary and out-
patient care since mid-1960s
• Reduce numner of beds from mid-
1990s onwards
• 1990-95: Higher co-payments
introduced
• Flexibility for municipalities to
charge for (some of) the services
they provide
• Introduce manpower control
(doctors)
• Change method of paying doctors
as a means of providing
performance-related incentives
(from salary to capitation)
• Continuous efforts to curb drug
expenditure growth
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France "p
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory Financed mainly by social insurance with mixed public and
health insurance private providers through payroll contribution by employees
system and employers to the sickness funds.
Coverage by statutory
health insurance 99.5% of the population
system
Role of Voluntary • Supplementary to statutory insurance
Health Insurance • Covers 85% of the population
• Income-related premiums to non-profit insurers
(Mutuelles)
• Risk-related _£femiums to__grivateinsurers.
Main problems of • Lack of control over expenditure in the ambulatory and
health care system private hospital sectors (but great choice)
• Second highest drug consumption per capita in the
world (but highest volume globally)
• Above average consultations with doctors, medicines
prescribed outside hospitals, and acute hospital
admissions
• Large number of doctors per 1000_£_~ulation
Main Health Care • Early 1980s and early 1990s: minor, piecemeal reforms
Reforms to curb the rise of costs
• 1984 &1985: introduction of prospective global
budgeting for public hospitals to replace a system of
controlled rates on increase of per diem rates. Increased
cost-sharing
• 1992 and 1995: hospital co-payments nearly doubled,
and patients' contributions to hospital care expenses
increased
• Since 1996: regional hospital agencies are responsible
for allocating funds to individual hospitals on the basis
of the overall regional budget
• Target budget was voted by parliament for 1997 (1.7%
increase on the 1996 budget)
• Additional tax to fund health care introduced as part of
the Juppe plan
• Gate-keeping with budgets introduced in late 1990s
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Germany
;
,
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory • Financed mainly by social insurance with mixed
health insurance public and private providers
system • Payroll contributions to Sickness funds
• Taxes to the Lander
Coverage by statutory
92.2% of the population (the remainder covered throughhealth insurance
system
private health insurance)
Role of Voluntary • Substitute for statutory health insurance: those
Health Insurance exceeding a certain income ceiling are entitled to pay
risk-related premiums for private insurance
• Covers just under 10% of population
Main problems of • General lack of self-consciousness because of the
health care system existence of third-part-payment
• Excessive number of hospital beds, above average
length-of-stay
Main Health Care • 1989: reference drug prices are introduced to specify
Reforms the level at which sickness funds reimburse
prescription medicines
• 1990: unification of East and West Germany,
signifies major investment in health care in the East
• 1992: per diem rates for hospitals are replaced by
prospective payments made on a cost-per-case basis
• Since 1993: the number of doctors treating sickness
funds patients has been regulated, and contracts have
been gradually introduced between counties and
hospitals
• 1997: fixed hospital budgets were replaced by
individually negotiated target budgets
• 1997: fixed budgets for doctors were replaced by
volume targets
• 1990s: co-payments were extended to cover hospital
in-patient days and other services, and were extended
further in 1997
• Planned introduction ofDRGs in the late 1990s
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The Netherlands
,; ..
;, ....• ";
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory • Financed by a mixture of social and privatehealth insurance system insurance with mainly private providers
• Flat payment plus a proportion of earnings to
general fund mainly for employees earning
below a certain salary
• Compulsory tax to Exceptional Medical
Expenses Fund.
Coverage by statutory 72.2% of the population (the remainder covered by
health insurance system private health insurance)
Role of Voluntary Health Substitute to statutory health insurance: those
Insurance exceeding a certain income ceiling are obliged to
leave the social scheme and entitled to pay risk-
related premiums for private insurance
Main problems of health • Large and expensive hospital sectorcare system • Long lengths of stay
• Uncoordinated financing structure
• Complex, rigid and costly government
regulation
• Several attempts at reform in 1980s and early
1990s, but little implementation
Main Health Care Reforms • 1983: establishment of prospective global
budgets for hospitals in place of cost-based
reimbursement
• 1992: pharmaceuticals are being paid for
under the Exceptional Medical Expense Fund
instead of the Health Insurance Act Fund, as
part of the Dekker reform
• 1996: cost-sharing measures extended
• A target budget was decided by government
for 1994-1998 (1.3% annual increase). Rate
of increase was raised to 2.4% for 1998
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Portugal
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory • Financed mainly by taxation with mainly public
health insurance system providers
• Central government raises the funds and the
Ministry allocates a budget to each hospital.
Coverage by statutory 100% of the population
health insurance system
Role of Voluntary • Government incentives to be insured privately
Health Insurance • Covers 8% of the population, Most are covered
indirectly through employment schemes or the
purchase of financial service products
• Provides cash benefits for hospital care and total
coverage for all other treatments.
Main problems of health • Majority of hospital beds and health professionals
care system remain concentrated in urban areas
• Multiple jobs of health professionals (NHS and
private practice)
• Difficulty in regulating the quality and quantity of
care in the private sector
• Difficulties in regulating the system. As a result,
patients use more than one health system
Main Health Care • 1971 and 1978: Social Security was extended to
Reforms cover more categories of workers
• 1974: "misericordias" (religious charity hospitals)
were taken over by the government
• 1975: local hospitals were taken over by the
government
• 1977: over 2000 social welfare medical units
were taken over by the government
• 1979: NHS was established, which extended care
to all citizens
• 1981: introduction of flat rate charges for home
and office visits and diagnostic tests
• 1982: charges were introduced for drugs and all
hospital care, abolished in 1982, and reintroduced
in 1992
• 1996: prospective budgets for individual hospitals
were introduced taking into account hospital
activities and planning priorities
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Sp_ain
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory
health insurance
system
Coverage by statutory
health insurance
!!_Ystem
Role of Voluntary
Health Insurance
Main problems of
health care system
Main Health Care
Reforms
• Financed mainly by taxation with mainly public
providers
• Taxes and social security contributions collected by
the central government, who in tum distributes
budgets to regional health systems and INSALUD
99.8% of the population
• Public sector employees can choose the NHS
coverage or a private insurance company
• A significant proportion has opted for private
insurance
• Provides cash benefits and reimbursement for out-of-
pocket and co-payments.
• Large consumption of medicines
• Long waiting times for public ambulatory care
• Short consultations with physicians
• Crowded emergency departments
• Weak accounting permits a considerable amount of
fraud to take place in the public sector
• 1984: self-employed were brought into compulsory
insurance, primary health care teams were created
with full-time salaried doctors and nurses serving
defined geographical areas, a national health system
was created
• 1984: INSALUD was decentralized to all the
autonomous regions with a view of creating 17
regional health services, and right to free practice and
freedom of enterprise for private clinics and hospitals
were introduced
• 1986 and 1987: health insurance under social security
was extended to include uninsured dependents, and
public hospital doctors were given financial
incentives to work full-time
• 1989: shift towards general taxation. Contributions
were fixed and general taxation was left to take up
the residual to make the system progressive
• Late 1990s: transfer of budgetary responsibility to the
17 autonomous regions for the delivery of care
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Sweden ~'
Variable Comments
Financing of • Financed mainly by taxation with mainly public
statutory health providers
insurance system • Local payroll tax to county councils and municipalities,
general taxation to central government, and national
payroll tax to National Social Insurance Board
• Central government distributes equalization payments
• Local government and municipalities responsible for
delivery of care
Coverage by
statutory health 100% of the population
insurance system
Role of Voluntary • Supplementary to statutory health insurance
Health Insurance • Covers less than 0.5% of the population
• Mainly covers care in private hospitals
• Reimburses patients for co-payments, and pays private
physicians and private hospitals through contracts
Main problems of • Lack of integration among health services
health care system • Difficulties in recruiting GPs in certain areas
• Limitation on patient choice
Main Health Care • 1970s: the responsibility for health delivery wasReforms transferred from the central to the regional and local level
• 1980s: resources increased in hospitals and in primary
care.
• 1985: care for the mentally handicapped shifted from the
health care budget to the education and social services
budget
• 1990s: Dagmar reform began in 1990 to target long
waiting lists and aiming to increase capacity and access
• 1992: shifting of responsibility for care of the elderly in
nursing homes to municipalities
• 1990s: fees for visiting hospital physicians were raised
• 1990s: internal market reforms introduced in a number of
regions
• 1994: Minimum treatment time guarantee introduced for
a number of procedures, but was later withdrawn
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Switzerland
Variable
Health system financing
Coverage by health
insurance system
Role of Voluntary
Health Insurance
Main problems of health
care system
Comments
• Financed mainly by voluntary insurance with
mainly private providers
• Federal government and Cantons and
Communes collect tax revenues and make
direct contributions at the federal, cantonal, and
municipal levels to insurance agencies
• Public health is heavily funded by the cantons
99% of population
• Risk-related premiums paid to private insurers
• Premiums related to age at entry and region to
Insurance Funds
• Employer and government subsidies
• Premium subsidies from government bodies to
Insurance Funds.
• Increased services caused by fee-for-service
payments
• Inefficiencies created by per diem payments for
hospital stays
• Lack of equity: health care premiums are risk-
rated
• Major differences in premiums due to uneven
spread of risk across insurers
• Since the late 1980s, premiums have been
increasing because government has not been
able to meet its commitment in terms of
subsidizing them
Main Health Care
Reforms
Some emergency measures to curb rising costs and to
reinforce equity were adopted, such as limits on
increases in premiums, limits on price increases in the
hospital sector, and introduction of patient
contributions towards treatment costs per hospital day.
-1991: proposal for a fundamental long-term
reorganization of the system, implemented in 1997
(compulsory social insurance)
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United Kingdom
Variable Comments
Financing of statutory health • Financed mainly by taxation with mainly
insurance system public providers
• Mainly through general taxation,
supplemented by national insurance
contributions
Coverage by statutory health 100% of the population
insurance system
Role of Voluntary Health • Supplementary to statutory insurance: risk-
Insurance related premiums paid to private insurers
who reimburse patients through cash
benefits
• Private insurance grew steadily until 1990
In 1995, 10.6% of population was covered
• Slight decline in total subscribers since
1990
Main problems of health • Long waiting times for elective and non-
care system emergency surgery
• Poor accountability
• Limited choice
• Post-code prescribing
Main Health Care Reforms • 1982: government abolished that area health
authorities and district authorities were
introduced
• 1991: creation of an "internal market" by
the separation of purchasers from providers.
Most providers became their own
independent trusts with their own budgets
and decision-making power. District health
authorities became the main purchasers and
hence appear as third-party payers.
Hospitals funded by Health Authorities on
the basis of annual block contracts and by
GP fundholders usually on cost-per-case
contracts
• 1997: Labour reform establishes Primary
Care Trusts, health targets, NICE, and CHI
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USA .t.
Variable Comments
Health system financing • A significant private sector (VHI), coupled
with federal and state assistance
programmes
• Private sector: financed mainly by voluntary
insurance with mainly private providers
• Federal & state assistance programmes:
financed by general taxation; payroll taxes
to federal government; and taxes to state
government
Coverage by health Adequate cover to approximately 75% of the
insurance system population (both in terms of statutory health cover
and private health insurance cover)
Role of Voluntary Health • Mostly risk-related premiums paid toInsurance traditional and managed care organisations
• Employer provision of voluntary health
insurance, encouraged by tax breaks
Main problems of health • Rapid growth of health costscare system • Lack of universal access to insurance
coverage - inequity
• Geographic mal-distribution of providers
• Underutilization of primary care and
preventive services, in favour of 'curative'
services
• Unequal access to services
Main Health Care Reforms • Development of coordinated care networks
(HMOs and PPOs) and recent convergence
centred around managed competition
• Increases in employee cost-sharing
• Expansion in state Medicaid assistance
programmes
• Debate about introducing Rx drug coverage
for Medicare
Sources: Author's Compilation from the following sources: Mossialos and Le Grand
(1999), Hoffmeyer and McCarthy (1994), 1999 OECD Health database, OECD
Health Policy Study No.2 (1992), OECD Health Policy Study No.5 (1994), and
Kanavos and Mossialos (1999).
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Appendix 5-2
consumption
On the interrelationship between income, wealth and
The relevance of wealth m economic policy-making has acquired a new momentum,
especially since the last recession in many countries in the industrialised world was largely a
wealth driven downturn. For instance, the UK economy suffered a prolonged recession, after
a rather long period of boom, and output, consumption and employment took an unusually
long time to recover. This was due to a negative wealth effect following the stock market
crash in October 1987 and the subsequent collapse in property prices from the end of 1988
onwards. The increasing financial liberalisation of the 1980s led to high growth in access to
and use of credit, which was considerably beyond the growth in earnings. At the same time,
with increased credit and low mortgage rates, property prices were bid up and when finally
expectations of future increases faded and the bubble burst, the result was high levels of debt
and debt interest payments outstanding. In this light, consumption fell dramatically and
savings increased, as households struggled to balance their budgets.
Wealth was therefore important in the UK case, as it was (and is) in many other economies, in
particular, the US, Japan, and Sweden, among others. In addition, there is a striking similarity
between what happened in Sweden (Jonung and Stymne, 1994), Japan (Kaku, 1994) and the
UK, as all three countries experienced almost the same type of shock, with their equity and
property markets initially booming and subsequently contracting. In both Sweden and Japan the
shock impacted on the economy more adversely than in the UK. The case of Sweden reflects
the difficulties faced by the freshly deregulated banking sector; in Japan, the property boom
was of a larger proportion than in the UK, following equity inflation.
From the accounting point of view, private non-human wealth amounts to several times the
Gross Domestic Product in all industrialised countries. The literature, so far, has recognised,
partially only, the importance of wealth in the conduct of economic policy, and wealth has
been included, as a flow, in the aggregate demand function. This has a long-standing and
sound foundation in economic theory. As early as 1948, Friedman & Savage in their
discussion on the allocation of risk deliberately included wealth in the demand function of
individuals that maximize an inter-temporal utility function. In fact, the importance of liquid
and illiquid assets as parts of wealth in the UK is quite substantial and averages 35% over a
period of 25 years, from 1966 to 1989. Therefore, given the momentum of net wealth as
compared with GDP figures, it follows that liquid and illiquid assets playa substantial role in
determining consumption and can, indirectly, but, definitely, influence output itself or output
decisions.
In this light, there is general acceptance of the following functional form for non-human, real
net financial wealth:
Real Net Wealth = 1:(money, equities, government debt, foreign assets)
The empirical literature that uses versions of the above functional form for wealth is
substantial, but by no means extensive. In particular, Barrell et al (NIESR, Oct. 1991), use the
National Institute/LBS global econometric model (GEM), to analyse adjustment processes
within a European Monetary Union. In this model wealth is incorporated and is defined as
above. In addition, the European Commission's econometric model, Quest, uses, more or
less, the same definition of wealth in its description of the economies of 12 Member States
and their interaction in the presence of economic policy shocks.
Although theorists, practitioners and policy-makers have realised the importance of
components of wealth for the conduct of economic policy, and, thus, have incorporated parts
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of it in econometric models, there is still a component of wealth, the property market, that
remains unaccounted for. Yet, dwellings account for approximately half of total non-human
wealth in the UK, with similar being the situation in other DEeD countries. There has also
been a tendency for wealth from dwellings to increase over the last two decades, at the
expense of savings, shares and government debt. This was largely due to financial
deregulation and liberalisation that started in the late 1970s and was completed in the 1980s,
following the US example of liberalising markets in 1975. Financial deregulation made cheap
credit available to individuals, thus benefiting from low interest rates, whereas financial
liberalisation further implied freedom in the movement of capital across Europe.
As in the U.K. the property market is important in most other Member States of the European
Union. A very large percentage of the European population occupies its own home; the
percentage for the UK alone was 67% in 1993. The low percentages for Germany,
Netherlands and Denmark, do not necessarily imply that house ownership in these countries
is low. It could be that people are very mobile and because their income is high they choose
to live in other properties, leasing their own. Home ownership, as well as the ability to lease
has implications for the disposable income of individuals, which becomes even more
accentuated if no mortgage or other types of debt exist. Therefore, the property market ought
to be incorporated in the wealth function as an active component. Such an inclusion would
have a number of implications for the conduct of economic policy:
first of all, ownership of a dwelling implies that individual disposable income increases by
the amount of rent or mortgage that individuals would otherwise pay. Where ownership is
subject to mortgage payments, the additions to disposable income are still considerable if the
following facts are taken into account: first, a mortgage has a finite life, therefore an
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individual will enjoy the benefits of full ownership after the expiry of their mortgage, which
is usually before the end of an individual's productive life in employment; secondly, a
mortgage does not hinder individuals from leasing property at a rate lower than their
mortgage, thereby making a net profit; thirdly, a mortgage is usually preferable to renting
property on cost grounds. To the extent that individuals end up with higher disposable
incomes, we then have to consider the implications that the additional income has on
individual consumption, saving and investment. Finally, we must consider the amount of tax
relief obtained by a household (or an individual) opting for a mortgage.
Secondly, ownership implies a net addition to individual assets and renders individuals less
susceptible to economic policy changes. This implies that changes in economic policy affect
owners less than non-owners (mortgage payers). Recent Family Expenditure Survey data
showed that, amidst the recent recession in the UK, the consumption of households with a
mortgage fell, whereas that of households without a mortgage increased. The difference
between the two groups was six percentage points. In addition, ownership may change
individuals' attitude towards risk when investing; in a nutshell, the larger the wealth pool, the
more risk-neutral (sometimes risk-loving, too) individuals become. The theoretical
justification for it has its roots in Friedman and Savage's pioneering work in 1948.
Thirdly, at the international economic policy level, in particular, within the EU, the way the
impacts of wealth were highlighted in the previous subsection do not sufficiently explain why
some Member States continue to afford to run balance of payments deficits, despite the
hypothetical equilibrating effects of asset decumulation described above. In countries like
Greece, Spain, Italy, or, even, France the effect of the property market on the demand
function could provide such an explanation, whereas in the case of countries like the UK, the
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US and Japan, the joint effects of a strong property market with a very powerful equity
market may indeed account for the overall wealth effect.
It follows therefore, that the property market is too important to be left out of economic
policy considerations. In addition, the implications that property ownership may have for
disposable income and thereby, affecting consumption, investment and saving, should be
thoroughly analysed. Given the importance of the wealth effect and its components as
outlined above, the wealth function is as follows:
Net Wealth = ~ (property, equity, bonds, money)
Finally, empirical evidence exists on the interaction between wealth and consumption, the
former (through its various components) affecting the latter.
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CHAPTER6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF
THE TIME-SERIES MODEL
6.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the methodological problems associated with the analysis of health
care expenditures identified in chapters 3 and 4 and the analytical - conceptual framework
proposed in chapter 5. This chapter tests empirically the model that was outlined in chapter 5
for 13 OEeD countries and for the 1960 - 1997 period. In doing so, it acknowledges the
points raised in earlier chapters regarding: (a) the methodological problems with the use of
GDP as an adequate measurement of national income; (b) the methodological problems with
the use of different denominators of monetary values, such as exchange rates and Purchasing
Power Parities; (c) the problems that may arise with the use of different estimation
methodologies, such as cross-sectional analysis and pooled cross-sectional analysis; (d) the
extent to which prior empirical investigations relied on an analytical framework, or on
empirical causal relationships that appeared sensible at first glance. In acknowledging the
above points, the analysis pursued here relies on time series, does not use any denominator
for monetary values, and, for methodological consistency, examines the determinants of
health care expenditures on a country-by-country basis and for each of the 13 countries
individually. The empirical evidence is presented in two stages: the first presents
conventional time-series analysis, in particular, the first order autoregressive correction,
whereas the second builds on the theory of and empirical evidence on trends in time series
and co-integration analysis.
By estimating the determinants of health care expenditures in light of the theoretical
arguments presented in chapter 5 and the methodological arguments made in chapters 3 and
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4, the methodological approach presented herein also aims to address empirically the
question of whether health care is a luxury good, in other words, whether the income
elasticity of demand, measured by GOP, is greater than unity. The sole purpose of doing so is
to ascertain whether the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter leads to
empirical results that are significantly different from the ones already published in the
international literature over the 1960-2000 period.
In light of this, two streams of empirical investigations are therefore followed in this chapter:
the first includes GOP for purposes of comparison with the published empirical literature so
far, whereas the second pursues the inclusion of total consumption, as a measure of national
wealth, in the empirical investigation and is therefore consistent with the analytical
framework presented in the previous chapter.
Section 2 explains the rationale for using the two step process for conducting the empirical
investigation. Section 3 describes the rationale behind the use of the first order autoregressive
error correction and identifies the suitable testes) for it. Section 4 presents and comments on
the results of the model using the first order autoregressive error correction method. Section 5
explains the significance of unit roots and identifies methods of testing for them. Section 6
presents and discusses the results of the unit root tests for each of the 13 countries in our
sample. Section 7 presents the theoretical framework underlying the use of co-integration
analysis and discusses the prevailing tests for co-integration, thus focusing on the Johansen
procedure. Section 8 presents and comments on the Johansen co-integration tests for each of
the 13 countries in the sample. Section 9 presents and comments on the overall results of co-
integration analysis for the full model and, finally, section 10 draws together the conclusions
of this chapter.
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6.2 Empirical results in two parts: First Order Autoregression
and Co-integration
This section briefly explains what model(s) is (are) tested and what econometric procedures
are used. In particular, The remainder of this chapter presents the empirical evidence in two
parts: the first, consisting of sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, discusses the rationale behind
the use of the first order autoregressive correction procedure (AR(l» and presents the
empirical results of the model of the determinants of health care expenditures. In addition, the
statistical relationship between health care expenditure and GDP is tested in a simple
regression equation. The models tested in this part comprise the following functional forms in
each country:
Modell: LNHCE95 = f(LNGDP95, AR(I»
Model 2: LNHCE95 f(LNGDP95, DEFPCT, PHYS, LGLNGDP, PHEX, PHRMPCT,
AR(l»
Model3: LNHCE95 = f(LNC95, DEFPCT, PHYS, LGLNGDP, PHEX, PHRMPCT, AR(I»
Where LNHCE95 is the logarithm of health expenditure in national currency and in constant
1995prices; LNGDP95 is the logarithm of gross domestic product in national currency and in
constant 1995 prices; LNC95 is the logarithm of total national consumption in national
currency and in constant 1995 prices; DEFPCT is the annual change in government deficit,
measured in national currencies; PHYS, is the total number of physicians; LGLNGDP is the
lagged logarithm of total national health care expenditures, measured in national currency
and expressed in constant 1995 prices; PHEX, is the health price index; and PHRMPCT is the
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technology variables, measured as change in total national pharmaceutical expenditure
(prescription medicines), measured in national currency and expressed in constant 1995
prices.
The second part of the empirical evidence, comprises sections 5 - 9. The addition of this part
has become essential due to the AR(I) method being insufficient to produce robust results for
12 of the 13 countries in the analysis, the only exception being Portugal. Sections 5, 6, 7 and
8 prepare the ground for the conduct of co-integration analysis in section 9. Section 5
highlights the significance of unit root tests, starting with the rationale behind the use of unit
root tests, proceeding with an analysis of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, as the key test
for the presence of unit roots in variables, and concludes by offering unit root tests for all
variables and for the 13 countries in the sample (including Portugal, in order to check the
validity and robustness of the estimates obtained in the previous analyses on that country) by
testing levels of integration. Section 7 discusses the theoretical rationale for co-integration
and outlines the rationale for the Johansen procedure, which tests for co-integration among
different variables. Section 8 presents the Johansen results for all 13 countries in the sample
and also presents the co-integrating regressions for each of the countries in the sample. Two
such co-integrating regressions are presented per country, one that is formed with GDP as a
regressor and one with total consumption as a regressor. Finally, section 9 presents the results
of the co-integration analysis.
6.3 The First-Order Autoregressive Error Correction
6.3.1 Theoretical rationale and testing
The previous section outlined the models that would be tested empirically for each of the
countries in the sample. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was initially chosen as the estimation
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method but having run preliminary models with OLS, it was found that, with the exception of
Portugal, all country models suffered from autocorrelation or serial correlation in the
residuals.
Autocorrelation almost exclusively arises in cases where the data have a time dimension
(time series) (Verbeek, 2000). It implies that the covariance matrix is non-diagonal such that
two or more consecutive error terms are correlated. The reason could be persistence in the
unexplained part of the model. Persistence of the effects of excluded variables is therefore a
frequent cause of positive autocorrelation. The consequences of autocorrelation are that OLS
estimates remains unbiased, nevertheless OLS yields inefficient estimates and its standard
errors are estimated in the wrong way. Results from autocorrelated relationships cannot
therefore be taken into account and models using OLS as an estimation method must be
corrected for autocorrelation. This is done by using the first order autoregressive correction
procedure or AR( I) correction.
The first order autoregressive correction procedure, [AR(l)], is a technique that deals with
serial correlation as a statistical problem. It is brought into play after having explored
improved specifications that eliminate serial correlation of the residuals by taking into
account all slowly moving influences. When the disturbances of a linear regression model are
serially correlated, the coefficient estimates of ordinary least squares are inefficient, although
still unbiased. The AR(l) specification provides a method to obtain efficient estimates when
the disturbances display first order serial correlation (Rao and Griliches, 1969).
The disturbance process implicit in the AR(l) procedure says that the correlation of this
disturbance with its own lagged value is a parameter rho. Rho is the first-order serial
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correlation coefficient. In effect, the AR(I) procedure incorporates the residual from the past
observation into the regression model for the current observation.
When changing to AR( 1) correction m a model, the interpretation of the coefficients,
standard errors, and t-statistics is unchanged. However almost everything else has changed
substantially and, to understand it, it should be noted that there are two different kinds of
residuals associated with AR(I) estimation. One kind is the unconditional residual, computed
just as in ordinary least squares: the dependent variable minus each original independent
variable multiplied by its regression coefficient. If a prediction is made without knowing the
lagged residual, the unconditional residual is the error that is made. If the unconditional
residuals are computed after the AR(I) has been run, it will be found that they are serially
correlated.
The other kind of residual is the one-period-ahead forecast error, which, as its name suggests,
is the error made if a forecast is computed by applying the coefficients to the independent
variables and then adding the prediction of the residual from its own past value. Because of
serial correlation, these residuals will tend to be smaller; the forecast is improved by taking
advantage of the predictive power of the lagged residual. The improvement will always be
available in the standard error when the AR( 1) is used and reflects the extra predictive power
of the lagged residual. This improvement only applies when a forecast can be made, already
knowing the forecast error from the immediately preceding period.
A statistic unique to AR( 1) is r, the serial correlation coefficient of the unconditional
residuals. It is the coefficient of the AR( 1) term in the equation. The value of r lies between -
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1 (extreme negative serial correlation) and +1 (extreme positive serial correlation). If r is
roughly zero, serial correlation is absent, and the AR(1} technique is not needed. The value of
r feeds into the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, which is the test traditionally used to detect
serial correlation in the residuals81. The r reported by AR(I) will be related to the Durbin-
Watson statistic from the corresponding least squares regression in roughly the following
way: ifr is doubled and then subtracted from 2, the Durbin-Watson statistic is obtained.
Having identified the rationale behind the use of the AR(l} method, and the significance
attached to the Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistic, we proceed to estimate the models
identified previously with that method, as the use of OLS has indeed yielded results with
autocorrelation in the residuals. The AR(I) results are explained in the following section.
6.4 The determinants of health care expenditures
6.4.1 The statistical relationship between Health Expenditures and
GDP in a simple regression model
We wanted to investigate the hypothesis that the simple relationship between health care
expenditures and GDP results in an income elasticity of demand greater than unity, indicating
that health care is a luxury good. This has been one of the major conclusions of the literature
since the early 1960s. We therefore tested that relationship for each of the 13 countries in our
sample. In addition to the AR(1} method and in order to balance out the likely impact of
trends in the data, we pursued two transformations, one quadratic and one that added a time-
trend every three years in the sample. All financial data are expressed in local currency units,
in constant 1990 prices. By using local currencies we avoided the problems of denomination
81 The DW statistic is based on the one-period ahead forecast errors.
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into a common currency through exchange rates or purchasing power parities that were
discussed in chapter 4. The results are summarised in table 6.1.
For France, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland, the relationship between
health care expenditures and GDP is positive, but, very importantly, not statistically
significant. This means that GDP cannot be shown to explain any of the variation in health
care expenditures over time.
For the Netherlands, the relationship between health care expenditures and GDP is
statistically significant (at the 1% level), but it is negative, indicating a cyclical effect.
However, the persistence of autocorrelation in the residuals, despite the use of AR(l), places
a query on the validity of this relationship.
For Germany and Finland, the relationship between health care expenditure and GDP is
positive and statistically significant, but the value of the coefficient/elasticity is very
substantially lower than unity in Germany ({3 = 0.358), and lower than unity in Finland ({3 =
0.829). This indicates that in both cases health care is a normal rather than a luxury good.
For Austria, Belgium, Spain, and the USA, the income elasticity of demand is greater than
(Austria, Belgium, Spain) or equal to unity, indicating that for these countries health care is a
luxury good.
The results suggest that in the majority of countries, GDP either does not explain any of the
variation in health care expenditures or when it is statistically significant, its coefficient
(value of the elasticity) indicates that health care is a normal rather than a luxury good. This
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result challenges the vast majority of empirical evidence on the subject. The variety of the
results obtained for different countries on a time series basis and by using national currency
units implies that, if anything, the use of cross-sectional or panel data in similar investigations
produces results that are of little practical use to policy analysis. In addition, it confirms how
the use of exchange rates or PPPs may lead to different results.
6.4.2 Testing the determinants of health care expenditures in a multi-
variate model
After testing the relationship between health expenditures and GDP in a simple regression
model for each of the 13 countries of the sample, we proceed to estimate the full model by
using the AR( I) method. This is done in two separate steps. In the first, we estimate the full
model, which includes GDP as a measure of national income; the results for each of the 13
sample countries appear in table 6.2 and a summary of the performance of GDP is shown in
table 6.3. in the second step, we estimate the full model again, but this time, we include total
consumption as a proxy for total national wealth. The results of these estimations for each of
the 13 sample countries are shown in table 6.4.
6.4.2.1Determinants of health care expenditures and the importance o/GDP as an
independent regressor
The results of the linear regression analysis are presented in table 6.2 for each country. For
each country a set of equations is shown where the dependent variable is the total expenditure
on health. The period covered by the statistical analysis ranges from 1960 to 1997 for each
country. The tables show the values of coefficients and the t-statistics in brackets. Linear
regression analysis is applied, the method of estimation being a first order autoregressive
process [AR(l)]. Variables involving monetary values are expressed in local currencies and
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are in 1995 constant prices; the logarithms of these values are subsequently taken. Since
population in the 13 countries has been relatively stationary over the past 38 years, the
analysis has avoided expressing values of both the dependent and independent variables in
per capita terms; this avoids multi-collinearity in the models. Various specification and
diagnostic tests have been applied to all reported equations, including those for higher order
(2nd and 4th respectively) autocorrelation, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(ARCH),White heteroskedasticity, and normality.
The relationship between income and health expenditure
The equations presented in table 6.2 test the extent to which income, expressed in terms of
GDP in national currencies in constant 1995 prices, is, among other variables, a determinant
of health spending in each of the 13 sample countries. They also attempt to show how income
interacts with other potential determinants of health expenditure. The linear relationship has
been tested against the total spending on health. The evidence suggests that the relationship
between national income and health spending is far more complicated than it was originally
thOUghto be and it certainly contrasts with the results of the empirical literature to date.
The inclusion of national income, expressed as the logarithm of GDP at constant 1995 prices
involved two steps: first, the inclusion of GOP at current levels and, second, the inclusion of
GDP in lag format (I-year lag). The empirical results are presented in table 6.2, and table 6.3
summarises the following two relationships:
(i) health care expenditures and GDP and
(ii) health care expenditures and lagged GDP
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As all variables are expressed in logarithms, the coefficient of GOP or lagged GDP is the
value of the income elasticity of demand, which will allow us to infer whether health care is a
normal or a "luxury" good.
The key messages emerging from the statistical analysis are as follows:
• First, in seven countries, income was shown to be not at all significant in explaining
any of the variation in health expenditure (Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, and USA). This result was robust and suggests that other variables
play an important role in explaining the variation in health care expenditure.
• Second, in three other countries (Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain), the results
were ambiguous for two reasons: first, model specification may render GOP non-
significant, implying that GDP is not the main determinant of health care expenditure;
second, persistent autocorrelation in some of the models may influence the robustness
of the estimates.
• Third, in the cases of Belgium and Portugal, model specification determines whether
GDP is statistically significant or not. The results are therefore ambiguous at best. In
the case of Belgium, the GDP coefficient has a negative sign in all models, thereby
implying the negative association between GDP and health care expenditures, which
is contrary to what is normally expected from such an association. The value of the
coefficient is greater than unity in some cases and very significantly below unity in
others, leaving no ground for concrete conclusions to be drawn. In the case of
Portugal, the sign of the GOP coefficient is positive, which is in accordance with
expectations; the value of the coefficient, on the other hand, ranges from greater than
unity to significantly lower than unity.
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• Fourth, the only country where GOP was found to be statistically significant in all
models was Austria. The level of significance ranged from 5% to 10%. The sign of
the coefficient was positive in all models, which is consistent with expectations, and
the value of the coefficient was below unity in all models, although close to unity.
Following the weak performance of income at current levels, the relationship between current
levels of health spending with previous levels of income (LGLNGOP) was tested, based on
the hypothesis that current income could determine future expenditure on health, or that
present expenditure on health is determined by past income levels, particularly in tax-based
systems, where decisions about the funding of health services are made on the basis of budget
allocations and involve cabinet decisions (especially in the UK, Denmark, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden). The results from testing this hypothesis are also summarised in table 6.3.
• First, as can be seen from table 6.2 and table 6.3, the analysis rejected the above
hypothesis in the majority of cases (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Portugal,
Sweden, USA), which found no significant association between past levels of income
and health expenditure.
• Second, in all remaining countries of the sample (Austria, Finland, the Netherlands,
Spain, Switzerland and the UK) the results are ambiguous in terms of statistical
significance of the lagged income variable, and largely depend on model
specification. Model specification also affects the value of the lagged income
coefficients. In the case of Finland, the Netherlands, and Spain, the persistence of
residual autocorrelation (despite the use of the AR(I) method) makes the credibility of
the results problematic.
• Third, the simultaneous inclusion of GDP in levels and one-year lags, does not
improve the explanatory power of GOP as a predictor of health care expenditure.
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In conclusion, the individual country analysis has shown that the aggregate relationship
between income and health spending has been exaggerated in the literature and that other
variables must be responsible for any escalation of health spending.
The impact of the medical profession
Doctors as gatekeepers and prescribers are key to the determination of health care costs. In
addition, the method of paying doctors may lead directly to an escalation in total health care
expenditure. We tested for the role of the medical profession contributing to the explanation
in the variance of health care expenditures by including the number of physicians in multi-
variate analysis. In the majority of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), the number of medical doctors is not associated
significantly with health care expenditures and fails to explain any of its variation. Whereas
previous studies modelling the relationship between the medical profession and health care
expenditures found positive (or even negative) statistical relationships, this is not the case for
9 of the 13 countries in the sample. Three countries displayed a significant statistical
relationship (Finland, Portugal, and Spain), although in the case of Portugal the sign of the
physician variable was negative. Finally, for the US the results are indeterminate, as the
reported models still suffer from the presence of autocorrelation. These results contrast with
some of the results in the existing literature, such as Gerdtham et al and Saez et al., which
appear to be conclusive on the positive impact of the medical profession.
The results obtained highlight the inadequacy of the physician variable to explain any of the
variance of health care expenditures in the majority of the sample countries. This is not
surprising, as this variable can only account for the number of physicians practising in a
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given country, but cannot account for what or how much they authorise/prescribe, or, even,
the extent to which they are employed by health insurance organisations, or they are self-
employed (or both). The data are also subject to definitional problems, often failing to
differentiate those working in mainstream clinical practice from others, or different patterns
of working. Finally, in any particular country the year-to-year variation in numbers is
relatively small.
The impact of budget deficit
The impact of the year-on-year change in the budget deficit on health care expenditures was
also examined, both in level and lagged terms. The lagged variable did not yield significant
results. In the case of the variable in level terms, the evidence is mixed at best. In Belgium,
Finland, Germany, Portugal, and Spain, the budgetary situation is not associated with health
care expenditure.
In Austria, France, Switzerland, and the UK, there is a statistically significant association,
which is negative, whereas in Sweden this association is positive. This means that
movements in the economic and budgetary situation affect health care spending cyclically
(i.e. both variables move in the same direction, as in the case of Sweden) or counter-
cyclically (Le. the two variables move in opposite directions, as in the case of the other four
countries). In the latter case, an increase in the budget deficit affects health care expenditure
negatively, or, equally, a decrease in the budget deficit contributes to increases in health care
spending. This type of movement may be more plausible than the former in which there is co-
movement between deficit and health expenditure.
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In Denmark, and the Netherlands there is some evidence of a negative (and statistically
significant relationship at 10% level) between fiscal deficit and health care expenditures, but
this is weak and is affected by the inclusion of the GDP variable. Finally, in the case of the
USA, the impact of the budget deficit is indeterminate, as all reported models are still
affectedby the presence of autocorrelation.
The impact of technology
Technology has been proxied by the rate of growth in pharmaceutical expenditure. Evidence
is available on and is presented for 11 of the 13 countries (i.e. excluding the UK and the
USA). The model would break down in the case of the UK and would still have
autocorrelation in the USA. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, and Germany there is a
positive and statistically significant association between growth in pharmaceutical
expenditure and health care expenditure, whereas in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland there is no significant association. This result is to a certain
extent expected, as the two groups differentiate the relatively lax price-control countries in
the first case and the command-and-control countries in the latter. The inclusion of France in
the former group does appear to be a paradox, since the country is, strictly speaking, a "price
control" country, but it can be explained by the way that France has moved gradually towards
a system of price negotiation that places a premium on innovation.
The impact of prices
Health prices were proxied by implicit price deflator for total current expenditure and
investment, a weighted index for all components, which was available for constant 1995
prices. Our original hypothesis suggested that prices and health care expenditures would, in
principle, be positively related. The sign of the price coefficient would depend a great deal on
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the type of regulatory regime in place and whether there is some pricing freedom in the goods
and services represented by the chosen health price index, or prices are regulated or
negotiated. In the former case, a positive sign is expected, in the latter, the sign may well be
negative.
The evidence from table 6.2 suggests that in 5 of the 11 countries for which results are
available (Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), there is a positive
and statistically significant relationship, whereas in the rest of the countries no significant
relationship was found. The existence of autocorrelation in the US data does not allow any
conclusions to be drawn. For Spain the model breaks down.
6.4.2.2Determinants ofhealth care expenditures and the importance of Total Consumption
as an independent regressor
The inclusion of total consumption in our models, as a proxy for total national income and as
a likely determinant of health care expenditure was debated in chapters 3 and 5. The results
of analyses of this proposed association are shown in table 6.4. In 4 of the 13 countries of our
sample (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA), autocorrelation still remains a
problem, therefore, the results are of questionable robustness and will not be commented
upon further.
The impact of total consumption
Total consumption was defined as the logarithm of real total private consumption for goods
and services, expressed in 1995 constant prices. The lag of this variable by one period has
also been used in the analysis to be consistent with the conceptual model put forward, namely
that expenditure at a point in the future may depend on income generated at present. It was
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hypothesised that, if there was a relationship between aggregate macroeconomic variables
and total health care expenditures, it would be captured by the consumption variable. The
expectation was for that relationship to be positive, such that an increase in total final
consumption would be due to higher income from employment, other income which may be
generated in the informal sector, and positive perceptions about individual financial and non-
financial wealth. In 6 of the 9 countries for which there is comparable evidence (Austria,
Denmark, France, Portugal, Spain, and the UK), there is a positive and statistical relationship
between total consumption and total health care expenditure. This statistically significant
association confirms our original hypothesis, that consumption might provide a better
measure of total implicit income in the economy, if income was at all to be related to health
care expenditure.
Of the three remaining countries, Belgium and Switzerland displayed no statistically
significant association between total consumption and health care expenditure, whereas in
Sweden that association was significant but negative. The last case could only be explained if
a decline in consumption led to an increase in health care spending, from the point of view
that reduced consumption implies a depressed economy, which, in tum, may imply higher
unemployment and incidence of illness. Finally, lagged consumption was not significantly
associated with health care expenditure, with the exception of the UK and Spain.
The impact of the medical profession
Of the 9 countries with robust results, 5 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Sweden),
displayed no statistical association between the number of physicians and health care
expenditure, whereas in 3, (Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland), the association was (weakly)
statistically significant and negative in sign. Only in the UK was the association positive and
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statistically significant. These results broadly compare with the evidence presented in the
previous section (where GDP was an independent regressor) and highlight the questionable
nature of empirical results from the published literature showing a positive and statistically
significant association.
The impact of GDP growth
The rate of growth of income was also included in the empirical analysis pursued in this
section, to test the hypothesis that GDP growth rates may determine the extent of spending on
health rather than current levels of GDP. It emerged that GDP growth is not statistically
associated with health spending in 7 of the 10 countries for which robust results have been
obtained (Austria, Denmark, France, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland); of the
remaining 3 countries, in Finland and the UK the association is weakly significant, but
changes sign depending on model specification, which implies that no reliable results may be
obtained. Only in the case of Belgium was there a statistically significant association, but it
was shown to be negative and rather counter-intuitive (an acceleration in GDP growth leads
to deceleration in health care spending.
The impact of budget deficit
Two types of budget deficit variables were included in statistical analysis: the first being
national deficit in levels, the second being year-on-year changes in budget deficit levels. With
regard to the impact of the budget deficit in level terms, of the eight countries that yielded
robust results, in three (Austria, Denmark and France) budget deficit was negatively
associated (statistically significant) with health care expenditures. In the remaining five
(Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), no evidence was found of a statistically
significant association. With regard to year-on-year changes in the budget deficit, only in
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three countries was the association between health care expenditures and changes in budget
deficit statistically significant: in Austria and the UK the relationship was found to be
negative (as expected); by contrast, in Sweden it was found to be positive. Both types of
relationships highlight anti-cyclical (in the first two cases) and cyclical (in the latter case)
behaviour in fiscal stance in the countries in question. By contrast, in Belgium, Denmark,
France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the relationship between health care expenditures and
changes in budget deficit was not statistically significant.
The impact of tech n otogy
The impact of technology was mixed. Of the nine countries that yielded robust results, five
had a statistically significant association whereas in four the association did not yield
statistically significant results. In Austria, Denmark, France and the UK, the relationship
between health care expenditures and changes in technology was positive, which leads us to
conclude that technology is a net contributor to health care costs. The negative sign of the
technOlogy variable in Portugal could be associated with that country's attempts to expand
coverage and health care provision in general, as well as its long-term stance in favour of
regulating drug costs via a command and control regulatory system. In Belgium, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland the relationship between the technology variable and health care
expenditures was not statistically significant.
The impact of prices
Of the 9 countries that yielded robust results, the association between prices and health care
expenditures was positive and statistically significant in Belgium. This means that prices
contributed significantly to health care costs. In Denmark, France and Spain, the relationship
260
was negative and statistically significant, which implies that price changes did not contribute
to the escalation of health care expenditures. This may be due to price freezes, price cuts, or
other intervention on prices, for instance, price increase awards below the rate of inflation, or
up to the annual rate of growth of output, or, even, modest tiered increments for a certain
period, exceeding one year, but less than five years. In Austria, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, and UK, no statistically significant relationship between price levels and health
care expenditures was found.
Country dummies
We included dummy variables in Austria, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK, in order to
capture the effect of one-off major changes in macroeconomic and/or health care policy. The
econometric analysis returned the following results on these variables: in France, Germany
and Sweden. The dummies were not significantly associated with the dependent variable. In
Austria, there was limited evidence of the dummy being statistically significant and
negatively associated with health care spending, whereas in the UK there was limited
evidence of a positive significant association.
6.4.3 Conclusions of the AR(1) analysis
For a number of countries the hypothesis that national income, proxied by GDP (at least
partly), explains variations in health expenditures is rejected. The relevant evidence is
presented in table 6.1 where, in a simple regression over time, and with both aggregate and
per capita figures expressed in national currencies and in constant terms, GDP fails to explain
any significant variation in health expenditures in seven of the fourteen EU Member States.
Furthermore, as the value of the income elasticity of demand for health care is significantly
below unity, it is shown that health is not a luxury good, but a necessity. In summary, GDP,
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lagged GDP, GDP growth, lagged total consumption, number of medical doctors were shown
to be non-important determinants of health care expenditures in most countries. By contrast,
consumption, deficit levels, changes in deficit (reflecting, partly, changes in fiscal stance),
technology, prices, and, to some extent, health system-related dummies, were significant
predictors of health care expenditures in the majority of countries examined.
In addition to the above, a key finding is that models hold for some countries but break down
in others. This is due to model specification, as well as model-related data problems, such as
autocorrelation. This, in tum, shows that results can be country-specific and that placing all
countries in one sample for the simple purpose of boosting the number of sample
observations (and, by extension, the number of degrees of freedom), is problematic and may
lead to spurious overall results.
Some of the results reported in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.4 still suffer from the presence of
autocorrelation, despite the application of the AR(I) method. Some of the models frequently
break down due to the persistence of autocorrelation in the residuals in Finland, Germany,
USA, the Netherlands, and Spain. This explains why an alternative methodology may be
essential in understanding the determinants of health care expenditures and, for that purpose,
why the conduct of co-integration analysis may be an important tool in accounting for the
short-term dynamics in our models. This will be pursued in the sections that follow.
6.5 The significance of Unit Root tests
6.5.1 The rationale behind testing for unit roots
Time series are often not stationary over time, exhibiting trends that are often due to factors
that are unknown. For example the causal factors for economic growth are only partially
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understood. If the primary interest in the analysis of the time series data is the long-term
trend, then it is important to build a model for the trend that contains the important covariates
for the trend-generating mechanism. A series is said to be (weakly- or covariance-) stationary
if the mean and auto-co variances of the series do not depend on time. The benchmark
example ofa non-stationary series is the so-called "random walk", described as follows:
yl = YI-l +81 (6.1)
where Et is a stationary random disturbance term. The series y has a constant forecast value,
conditional on t, and the variance is increasing over time. The random walk is a difference
stationary series since the first difference of y is stationary:
yl - yl - 1 = (1- L)yl = 81 (6.2)
A stationary time series is said to contain at least one unit root. Stationarity in a non-
stationary time series can be achieved by differencing it as many times as it takes for it to
become stationary. A difference stationary series is said to be integrated of order d, and is
denoted as I(d), where d is the order of integration. The order of integration is the number of
unit roots contained in the series, or the number of differencing operations it takes to make
the series stationary. For the random walk above, there is one unit root, therefore the series is
integrated of order one, or 1(1). Similarly, a stationary series in levels is integrated of order
zero, or 1(0).
The significance of testing for stationarity lies in the fact that standard inference procedures
do not apply to models and regressions containing an integrated dependent variable or
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integrated regressors. Therefore, it is important to check whether a series is stationary or not
before using it in a regression. The formal method to test the stationarity of a series is the unit
root test. Non-stationary variables need first to be differenced in order to achieve stationarity
before a model can be run. This principle underlies the cointegration procedure, outlined in
section 6.7 below.
6.5.2 Testing for Unit Roots: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Unit root tests are important in examining the stationarity of a time series (Fuller, 1976;
Dickey, 1976; Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Engle and Granger, 1987). Stationarity is a matter of
concern because in co-integration analysis an important question is whether the disturbance
term in the co-integrating vector has a unit root[82]. Testing for the null hypothesis of no co-
integration (or a unit root in the residuals) can be done by the Augmented Dickey Fuller
(ADF) test, or by one of the other methods described in Engle and Granger (1987).
The ADF test consists of running a regression of the first difference of the series against the
series lagged once, lagged difference terms, and optionally, a constant and a time trend. With
two lagged difference terms, the regression is
L\yt = ~Iyt-l + ~2L\yt-1+ ~3L\yt-2 + (34+ (35t (6.3)
82 Other than this, stationarity is a matter of concern in two additional and important areas. First, a crucial
question in the ARIMA modelling of a single time series is the number of times the series needs to be first
differenced before an ARMA model is fit. Each unit root requires a first differencing operation. Second,
stationarity of regressors is assumed in the derivation of standard inference procedures for regression models.
Nonstationaryregressors invalidate many standard results and require special treatment.
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There are three choices in running the ADF test regression: first, whether to include a
constant term in the regression; second, whether to include a linear time trend; and, third,
how many lagged differences are to be included in the regression. The combination of these
choices affects the critical values of the reported test statistic (McKinnon critical values),
which in turn leads to acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis (Ho) of a unit root. In
each case the test for a unit root is a test on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
(Yt.l) in the regression. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero the hypothesis
that y contains a unit root is rejected and the hypothesis is accepted that y is stationary rather
than integrated. The output of the ADF test consists of the t-statistic on the coefficient of the
lagged test variable and critical values for the test of a zero coefficient. A large negative t-
statistic rejects the hypothesis of a unit root and suggests that the series is stationary. Under
the null hypothesis of a unit root, the reported t-statisitic does not have the standard t
distribution. The critical values (McKinnon critical values) for testing the level of
significance are presented in the test output. The reported critical values are chosen on the
basis of the number of observations and the estimation option.
If the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic is smaller (in absolute value) than the reported critical values,
the hypothesis of non-stationarity and the existence of a unit root cannot be rejected. In this
case it will be concluded that the series may not be stationary in levels, or 1(0). The next step
up is to test whether the series is I( I) (integrated of order one) or integrated of a higher order,
namely 1(2), etc. A series is 1(1) if its first difference does not contain a unit root. The ADF
test can be repeated on the first difference of the series to test the hypothesis of integration of
order 1 against higher orders.
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6.6 Unit root tests: country-by country results
Bearing in mind the significance of unit root tests, all time series variables that were
identified in the previous chapter, particularly those containing financial values, were tested
for the presence of unit roots for each of the 13 identified countries. The results are shown in
table 6.5 and table 6.6. Table 6.5 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
tests for all variables in levels, whereas table 6.6 presents ADF results for all variables in first
differences.
With the exception of Portugal, the ADF test statistic for most other variables in the other 12
countries, is smaller than the reported McKinnon critical value at the 5% significance level
(see table 6.S - Notes for the McKinnon critical values). Consequently, the hypothesis of
non-stationarity and the existence of a unit root cannot be rejected. Most series are therefore
not stationary in levels [1(0)]. Having ascertained that most series are not 1(0), we also tested
whether the series were integrated in first differences, or 1(1). As table 6.6 suggests, all
variables[83] are integrated in first differences, since the ADF test statistic, was found to
exceed the benchmark McKinnon critical values at 5% level (see table 6.6 - Notes for the
McKinnon critical values).
The implications of the above are as follows: given that most of the variables in 12 of the 13
countries under examination are non-stationary in levels, conventional time series analysis
(e.g. by using Ordinary Least Squares regression, or first order autoregressive procedure),
would not capture the effect of trends and would therefore yield results of questionable
robustness. The fact that the said time series were found to be 1(1), implies that the analysis
can be run in first differences. Relevant to this discussion is the use of co-integration analysis,
83 With the occasional exception of the price index for some countries.
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namely the analysis incorporating variables, which are integrated of the same order. Section 7
below discusses the theoretical rationale underlying the use of co-integration analysis.
6.7 Co-integration
6.7.1 Rationale and application
The finding that many macro time series may contain a unit root has spurred development of
the theory of non-stationary time series analysis. Two data time series, yt and xt , are said to
be co-integrated of order, d, b, denoted as Cl (d,b), if (i) they are both l(d); and (ii) there is a
linear combination of them which is I (d - b) where b>O. The definition extends to several
series (Engle and Granger, 1987). Essentially, this means that a group of non-stationary time
series is co-integrated if there is a linear combination of them that is stationary; that is, the
combination does not have a stochastic trend. The linear combination is called the co-
integrating equation. Its normal interpretation is as a long-run equilibrium relationship
between the variables in the model.
Suppose that xt is stationary in first differences. In other words it is integrated of order one,
that is xt is I(1) and it can be expressed as
Ax, = gx +n, (6.4)
where 77t is a stationary process with a mean of zero. If xt is in logarithms, as is usually the
case, then gx is the average growth rate. Suppose also that yt is 1(1), but with a mean of gy.
Models of the form shown in equation (6.4) are not unreasonable for many macroeconomic
time series as they are capable of reproducing the kind of evolutionary behaviour often
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observed in practice. Now suppose that there is a relationship between xt and yt, so that
although they are both non-stationary, they tend to stay together in the long run. More
specifically, they obey an equation of the form
y, = Vo +vx, +U, (6.5)
where Po and P are parameters and ut is a zero mean stationary disturbance term. Again, if Yt
and Xt are in logarithms, P can be interpreted as the long-run elasticity of y with respect to x.
A steady-state relationship between two 1(1) variables was shown in equation (6.5) above.
Thus the series yt and xt are Cl (d, b) and it can be seen from (6.5) that setting the constant Cl
equal to v yields a stationary linear combination zt , that is
Zt = Yt -VXt = Vo +Ut (6.6)
The above results suggest a two stage modeling strategy, which may be formalised as
follows. Stage one: estimate the long-run parameters by running a static regression in levels;
this is called the co-integrating regression. From this regression we can test the null
hypothesis of no-eo-integration by a Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root in the residuals, or by
one of the other methods described in Engle and Granger (1987, p. 268); hence, we find a set
of explanatory variables which form a co-integrating relationship with the dependent
variable. Stage Two: we use the error correction term, zt, namely the residuals from the static
regression, as an explanatory variable and estimate the short run dynamics; we test down to
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find a parsimonious dynamic structure. Applications of this strategy can be found in Engle
and Granger (1987) and Hall (1986), among others.
The idea behind co-integration of two variables of any order, say d and b, can most easily be
explained by considering the case of d = b = 1. Both series are non-stationary, and it is
generally true that an arbitrary linear combination, Yt - ax!, where exis a constant, will also be
non-stationary. However, because the series are co-integrated, there must be values of exsuch
that Yt - axt is 1(0) rather than I(1). In other words, the long-run movements cancel out. Thus,
there is some kind of steady state relationship between the variables. In the case of o=t, the
steady-state relationship is such that Yl and x, cannot drift too far apart.
Undoubtedly, co-integration analysis is very useful in terms of addressing the problem of data
trends, but is not without drawbacks. The key criticism of co-integration analysis is bias in
the initial estimation that carries over to the second step of the process. The OLS estimators,
in what is termed the co-integrating regression, converge very rapidly to their limiting
distributions, but these distributions are not normal and they depend strongly on the other
parameters in the full model. There is, consequently, bias in the estimation. Available
empirical evidence (Stock (1987); Banerjee et al. (1986», suggests that the bias in the
estimators could be substantial, particularly in very small samples. Thus inferences may be
very misleading, and erroneous decisions could be made regarding variables to be included or
restrictions to be imposed. At the second stage the bias carries over to the error correction
term and may adversely affect the small-sample properties of the short run parameters. Given
the size of our sample, we do not expect any significant bias in the initial estimation.
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6.7.2 Co-integration (Johansen) tests and Vector Error Correction
models (ECM)
Hypotheses about co-integration between two or more variables can be tested within a
framework established by Johansen (1991). Given a group of non-stationary series, the
Johansen procedure allows us to determine whether the series are co-integrated, and if they
are, to identify the co-integrating (long-run equilibrium) relationships.
If there are N endogenous variables, each of which is first-order integrated (that is, each has a
unit root or stochastic trend or random-walk element), there can be from zero to N-l linearly
independent co-integrating vectors. If there are none, the standard time series analysis such as
vector autoregression CVAR) applies to the first differences of the data. Because there are N
separate integrated elements driving the series, levels of the series do not appear in the VAR.
If there is one co-integrating equation, the VAR will need an error correction term involving
levels of the series, and this term will appear on the right-hand side of each of the VAR
equations, which otherwise will be in first differences. Each additional co-integrating
equation contributes another error correction term involving levels of the series on the right-
hand side of each VAR equation. The Johansen tests can determine the number of co-
integrating equations. This number is called the co-integrating rank.
If there are N co-integrating equations, it means that none of the series is actually integrated,
and the VAR can be specified in terms of the levels of all of the series. If augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests show that some of the series are integrated, but the Johansen tests show that the
co-integrating rank is N, there is a contradiction. Some specification error might be
responsible for this contradiction.
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There is a sequence of nested models in this general framework. The most restricted model,
with the smallest number of parameters, has no co-integrating equations. It is a VAR strictly
in first differences. Each co-integrating equation adds the parameters associated with the term
involving levels of the series which needs to be added to each equation. The Johansen test
procedure computes the likelihood ratio statistic for each added co-integrating equation.
The time series undergoing testing may have means and deterministic trends as well as
stochastic trends. Similarly, the co-integrating equations may have intercepts and
deterministic trends. Johansen's framework considers five combinations of these ingredients:
• Series have means, but the co-integrating equations do not have intercepts;
• Series have means and the co-integrating equations have intercepts;
• Series have means and linear trends but the co-integrating equations have only
intercepts;
• Series have means and linear trends and the co-integrating equations have intercepts
and linear trends; or
• Series have means, linear, and quadratic trends but the co-integrating equations have
only intercepts and linear trends.
These five cases are nested from the most restrictive to the least restrictive, given any
particular co-integrating rank. There are two dimensions in which tests can be carried out
within this framework. One can assume one of the five cases listed above, and carry out tests
for the co-integrating rank. Alternatively, one can fix the rank and test which of the five cases
describes the data (these tests are standard ){2 tests}. Or, if one selects the option to
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summarize all five cases, then all possible combinations of rank and intercept-trend can be
looked at.
6.8 Johansen tests and co-integrating equations for each country
The Johansen tests for each country are shown in tables 6.7 and 6.8. Table 6.7 provides the
results of the Johansen procedure for each of the 13 countries under investigation, and for the
same linear combination of regressors. This combination includes GDP, as a measure of
national income, as well as prices, deficit, physician numbers and technology. By contrast,
table 6.8 provides the results of the Johansen procedure for each of the 13 countries under
investigation, and for the same linear combination of regressors, which includes
Consumption, as a measure of national wealth, prices, deficit, physician numbers and
technology. The key test statistic, which determines the existence or not of co-integrating
relationships among the variables in question, is the likelihood ratio test (column 2, tables 6.7
and 6.8). If the value of the likelihood ratio test is above the 5% critical (test) value, which is
reported in column 3 of tables 6.7 and 6.8, then this indicates the existence ofa co-integrating
relationship. The number of co-integrating relationships is also reported at the bottom of each
country box and is highlighted in bold.
Examination of the results of the Johansen procedure indicate the existence of at least one co-
integrating relationship among the variables in question. In all countries, but Portugal, the
number of co-integrating relationships/vectors is greater than zero and smaller than or equal
to N-I, where N is the number of endogenous variables. For Portugal, there are as many co-
integrating vectors as there are endogenous variables, meaning that none of the series is
actually integrated, and the relationship between the variables in question (the vector
autoregression) can be specified in terms of the levels of all of the series. The results of the
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Johansen procedure for Portugal, confirms what was already shown in tables 6.6 and 6.7
(namely there are no trends in the data series for this country). The implications of this are
that the results of the AR(l) procedure, shown in tables 6.2 and 6.4, hold for Portugal.
The results of the Johansen procedure, and, before that, the ADF tests, have confirmed two
very important issues that are critical to the analysis of the determinants of health care
expenditures from a time-series perspective:
• First, that variables have trends in them, which means they are not integrated m
levels, but in first differences; the existence of trends in model variables, makes the
use of traditional time-series regression analysis (OLS or AR(!» obsolete;
• Second, that there are co-integrating relationships between the variables in question,
which effectively means that a co-integration analysis should be run.
As outlined in the previous section, co-integration analysis implies a two-stage modelling
strategy: the first stage involves the estimation of long-run parameters by running a static
regression in levels. We do this by finding a set of explanatory variables which form a co-
integrating relationship with the dependent variable; this is called the co-integrating equation.
For this purpose, the results of the Johansen procedure are quite instrumental in terms of
identifying one such co-integrating relationship. The second stage, involves the use of the
residuals from the previous stage (this is called the "error correction term" - ECT), as an
explanatory variable in the estimation of the short-run dynamics of our model.
For the first stage of the analysis we have identified two such co-integrating relationships per
country which, as the above section suggested, we ran in levels. The equations that were run
were as follows:
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LNHCE95 = alLNGDP95 + a2PRICE + aJDEFICIT95 + a4PHYSICIAN +
aSTECHNOLOGY (6.7)
And
LNHCE95 = alLNC95 + a2PRICE + aJDEFICIT95 + a4PHYSICIAN +
aSTECHNOLOGY (6.8)
Each of the two equations (one incorporating GDP and one incorporating Consumption) was
run for 12 of the 13 countries under investigation, as Portugal was excluded from the co-
integration analysis because its results were found to be robust under the AR(I) method.
From these regressions we tested the null hypothesis of no-eo-integration for a unit root in the
residuals, by using the Dickey-Fuller test. The test was passed for all countries. The results of
the co-integrating equations have been compiled and are shown in tables 6.9 and 6.10. Table
6.9 shows the co-integrating equation that includes GDP and a dependent variable and table
6.10, shows the results when Consumption is included as an independent variable in the
analysis. All equations are severely affected by autocorrelation in the residuals, a desirable
feature for the analysis that will ensue. From each of the above equations (24 in total) and for
each country, we isolated the residuals (Error Correction Term). which we subsequently used
explanatory variables in the co-integration analysis that follows in section 9 below.
6.9 Co-integrating equations for the determinants of health care
expenditures for each country
This section presents and discusses the results of co-integration analysis that is pursued
following the analysis performed in the previous four sections. Sections 5 and 6 highlighted
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the significance of unit root tests and, by using the ADF test for the existence of a unit root,
showed that the majority of variables were integrated of order 1 [1(1)]. This necessitated the
performance of co-integration analysis, the framework for which was laid out in section 7,
whereas section 8 explained the importance of the Johansen procedure in co-integration and
presented the relevant Johansen tests for our analysis. Section 8 also performed the first stage
of co-integration analysis, namely, the identification of a co-integrating relationship between
the dependent and the explanatory variables and the isolation of the error correction term, to
be used as an explanatory variable in subsequent analysis.
The model that is run in this section has both short-term and long-term dynamics. The short-
term dynamics are captured by the Error Correction Term, together with all other variables
run in first differences. The results are presented in tables 6.11 and 6.12. Table 6.11, includes
GDP as a regressor, whereas table 6.12, includes Consumption as an independent variable.
6.9.1. Comments on the empirical results{84]
The model tested for each of the 12 countries in the sample[85] is as follows:
D(logHEX) = f {D(logGDP), D(logGDP(-I», D(PHRMPCT), D(PHRMPCT(-I»,
D(PHEX), D(PHEX(-I», D(PHYSICIAN), D(DEFICIT), ECT[86]}
(6.9)
D(logHEX) = f {D(logC), D(1ogC(-l», D(PHRMPCT), D(PHRMPCT(-l», D(PHEX),
D(PHEX(-l», D(PHYSICIAN), D(DEFICIT), ECT} (6.10)
84 Variables and results are always expressed in first differences, as is standard practice in co-integration
analysis.
85 With the exception of Portugal, for which, as was shown in previous sections, standard regression analysis
yields robust results.
86 ECT is the error correction term, which in co-integration analysis, displays the short-term dynamics of the
~odel. The error correction term is the residual term from the co-integrating regression and is included as an
mdependent variable in the final co-integration model.
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The model outlined in equation 6.9 contains GDP as a regressor, whereas the model outlined
in equation 6.10 contains consumption as a regressor. The main trends as they emerge from
tables 6.11 and 6.12 are summarised n the following paragraphs.
With regards to GDP (table 6.11), with the exception of Denmark, it proves to be a
statistically significant variable and, therefore, an important determinant of aggregate health
care expenditure. In the case of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, and the USA, the
value of the GDP coefficient is greater than or closely equal to unity, whereas in the case of
France, Sweden, Germany, UK, the Netherlands, and Spain, the value of the GDP coefficient
is significantly below unity. Whilst these results can be interpreted as confirming, at least in
part, the original literature results of health care being a luxury, there are important factors at
play that reduce their significance. First, the addition of GDP lagged once to the model,
frequently boosts the overall performance of the variable. The absence of lagged GDP from
the model often renders GDP non-significant. Second, on several occasions (Austria, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, USA), the inclusion of the DEFICIT variable (both in first
difference and in lagged first difference form) in the model boosts significantly the
performance of GDP (wither in first difference or in lagged first difference form) and elevates
the value of its coefficient to levels above unity, and the value of the lagged GDP variable to
levels very close to unity. When the DEFICIT variable is absent (or it is expressed as a
percentage change over the previous period[DEFPCT]), however, GDP is weak, significantly
below unity and at times non-significant. This is less prominent in Germany, Belgium,
although in both these cases the addition of the DEFICIT variable (whether the first
difference of deficit levels or the percentage change over time) boost upwards the value of
the GDP coefficient, without affecting its statistical significance. Third, autocorrelation in
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some of the models, still poses problems about the credibility of the results in some cases (the
Netherlands, USA).
Consumption (either in first differences or in lagged first differences) is positively related to
health care expenditures and statistically significant in all 12 countries of the sample. The
value of its coefficient ranges from significantly below unity (Austria, Finland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland), to consistently above unity (Germany, the Netherlands, UK), and on
several occasions the value of the coefficient may change from below to above unity or vice
versa, depending on the model available (Belgium, Denmark, France, USA). Of course, a
value over unity does not imply that health care is a luxury. The consumption variable is not
affected by inclusion or not of other macroeconomic variables such as the DEFICIT or the
DEFPCT variables, at least not to the same extent as GDP is. Overall, it appears that
consumption, as a proxy of individual overall wealth provides a more stable, powerful and
robust explanatory variable of the variation in aggregate health care expenditure over time
and across countries.
With the exception of Spain and Switzerland, all countries display robust and statistically
significant results for the technology variable PHRMPCT. It is shown that the technology
variable is an important predictor of the variation in health care expenditures in ten of the
twelve countries in the sample (table 6.12). Frequently, PHRMPCT is significant not only in
first differences but also in lagged first differences. In seven out of ten countries, the sign of
the relationship between health expenditure and technology is positive (Austria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, UK), whereas in three countries the relationship
is negative (Belgium, Sweden, USA). The negative sign appears to be puzzling and counter-
intuitive at first glance, since one would expect that technology should have a positive impact
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on health care spending for that relationship to be plausible. However, it should not be
forgotten that the co-integration results shown in the table 6.12[87] show the relationship
between the dependent variable and the independent variables in first differences and lagged
first differences. A positive sign suggests co-movement of the health expenditure dependent
variable and the technology variable. A negative sign, as in the cases of Belgium, Sweden,
and the USA, suggests that as health expenditure in first differences declines over time, the
impact of technology in first differences increases over time; in other words, the contribution
of technology in the variation in health care expenditures over time is very strong in these
three countries, compared with the remainder of the sample, where there is co-movement
between technology and health spending. As a result, a negative sign is an indication of a
strong effect of technology on health spending.
The price variable (PHEX) shows similar results to those of the technology variable, but in a
smaller number of countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK). In the case of the Netherlands and Switzerland the relationship between
health spending and prices is positive, indicating and co-movement, whereas in the remainder
of the above cases, the relationship is negative. The positive sign indicates that prices in first
differences[88] move faster than health expenditure over time; this indicates a strong price
effect on health care expenditures. The negative sign, by contrast, indicates that prices in first
differences (or lagged first differences) move slower than health expenditure over time; this
indicates a weak price effect, which by implication means that volume (of goods orland
87 We mostly use table 6.12 to report and comment on results, as table 6.11 explores co-integration results with
GDP as an independent variable. We have commented extensively about the use of GDP as an independent
variable in this thesis and the use of GDP in statistical analysis is done for expositional purposes only, therefore,
in principle, table 6.11 serves to highlight and compare its performance with the empirical literature.
Nevertheless, even in the case of the models presented in table 6.11, the results with regards to variables other
than GDP are similar to those shown in table 6.12.
88 Or, indeed, also in lagged first differences (see table 6.12).
278
services) may be a stronger factor. In any case, there is a price effect which contributes
significantly to the variation in health care expenditures.
The impact of the medical profession has produced mixed results, which, overall, cast doubt
over the robustness of the empirical results that other studies have produced to date. In six of
the twelve countries in the sample, the PHYSICIAN variable has no effect whatsoever on
health expenditure over time (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain, USA). In the
remaining of the cases, the relationship is negative (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland), and, therefore, has the opposite sign than expected. In Sweden and the UK, the
relationship between health spending and physicians is positive, as expected. In sum, the
results are rather inconclusive for a single picture to emerge with regards to the impact of the
medical profession on health care expenditure.
Finally, the DEFICIT variable is statistically significant with a negative sign in six of the
twelve countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Sweden, UK, and USA) and has a positive sign
in Spain (table 6.12). The above results are robust and highlight the relative importance of
macroeconomic variables in explaining part of the variation in health care expenditures over
time.
6.10 Overall conclusions
This chapter attempted an empirical investigation of the determinants of health care
expenditures, by pursuing two alternative methodologies, firstly, the use of the first order
autoregressive procedure, in lieu of ordinary least squares, with a view to doing away with
autocorrelation found in the residuals of some of the models, and, secondly, co-integration
analysis, in view of persistence of autocorrelation in some countries and with a view to
determining the short-run dynamics of each model.
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The findings can be summarised as follows:
First, the importance of GDP as the (or one of the) most important factor in explaining the
variation in health care expenditures, either in levels, or in lagged terms, across countries has
been grossly exaggerated. Its statistical significance in dozens of published studies may be
due to model selection bias or conversion factor bias. The evidence presented in this chapter
shows quite clearly, and by using alternative methodologies, that GDP is often an irrelevant
factor. The same holds for the value of its coefficient and the extent to which it leads to the
conclusion that health care is a luxury good. It has been shown that results vary by country
with the value of the GDP coefficient significantly lower than unity being the rule rather then
exception.
Second, the autocorrelation correction method, and, more importantly, co-integration analysis
has confirmed our hypothesis that total consumption (as a proxy for total income) is an
important predictor of the variation in health care expenditures across countries and over
time, whether in level terms, or in first differences, or in lagged terms. The value of the
consumption coefficient exceeds unity at times, but this cannot lend support to the argument
that health care is a luxury good for the simple reason that micro-foundations of economic
theory cannot be used to explain findings at the macroeconomic level, as was discussed in
chapter 4.
Third, the evidence supports the hypothesis that there exists a link between the health
economy and the macroeconomy. Macroeconomic variables, such as the fiscal deficit have
been an important predictor of health care expenditures in many countries and across health
care systems, leading to the conclusion that there is a feedback mechanism from the former to
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the latter. Some caution should nevertheless be used when interpreting these results because
of the relatively high correlation between aggregate variables. In any case, the empirical
evidence has produced robust results across a number of countries.
Fourth, our technology and price variables have produced solid results across all countries
and health care systems, indicating the direct strong link between health care expenditure on
the one side and health care technology and prices of health care goods on the other. This
indicates that the latter are strong drivers of the former, and, as co-integration analysis has
shown, in a number of countries the technology and/or price effect is very powerful indeed
and contributes significantly to the outcome of policy interventions. Indeed, this implies that
cost containment may be ineffective, unless targeted at factors that influence the consumption
of technology or factors that contain growth in prices.
Fifth, the evidence presented in this chapter has failed to show any significant direct impact
of the medical profession on health care expenditures. This comes against evidence published
to date suggesting that the number of physicians in itself is a predictor of health care
expenditures. By contrast, our hypothesis has been and continues to be that the number of
physicians in determining health care costs is largely irrelevant and that what actually matters
is what physicians authorise on behalf of their patients. The latter we were able to show
through the technology and price variables.
Finally, and above everything, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that
despite the similarities in the some of the results, common patterns across countries may be
difficult to obtain. For instance, we have shown that the impact of the same variable may
differ by country. In some sample countries, the same variable has a significant effect, in
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others not. In some countries the same variable has a significant impact in levels or in first
differences, in others only in lagged terms. This highlights differences in health systems,
regulatory and other practices, focus of attention by decision-makers, as well as the
uniqueness in endogenous system dynamics. The differences across countries also confirm
our initial critique of the empirical literature to date that placing countries together and
treating them as identical is a dangerous oversimplification of reality, which, in addition, does
not offer any policy insights.
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Table 6-2 Determinants of Health Care Expenditures - Results of
AR(l) method with GDP as predictor of health spending
,
Austria
MODELS
VARIABL EQI EQ3 EQ4ES EQ2 EQ5 EQ6
Constant -4.424 -3.373 -11.012 -5.023 -0.407 -10.093
(-0.755) (0.575) (1.504) (-0.813) (-0.068) (-1.258)
LNGDP95 0.940 0.808 0.991 0.936
(1.780) ( 1.528) (1.786) (1.676)
DEFPCT -0.0323 -0.0296 -0.0353 -0.0250 -0.0215 -0.0266
(-4.161) (-3.981) (-4.511) (-3.166) (-2.752) (-3.303)
SHARE 0.173 0.173 0.145 0.147 0.163 0.124
(4.046) (3.858) (3.159) (3.005) (3.185) (2.287)
PHYSICIA -0.0836 0.0338 0.0162 -0.0538 0.0344 0.0174
N (-0.383) (0.148) (0.071) (-0.252) (0.151 ) (0.077)
PHRMPCT 0.00196 0.00239 0.00247
(1.447) (1.715) (1.791)
LGLNGDP 0.836 0.720 0.573 0.509
(1.599) (1.395) (1.070) (0.983)
PHEX 0.694 0.478 0.716
(1.104) (0.757) (1.136)
PERIOD -0.0155 -0.00465 -0.0326 -0.0221 0.00272 -0.0352
(-0.590) (-0.197) (-1.161) (-0.724) (0.104) (-1.062)
PERIODSQ 0.000686 0.000243 0.000473 0.000574 0.000110 0.000405
(0.808) (0.276) (0.566) (0.623) (0.0l3) (0.434)
PERIODCU
-0.000002 0.000001 0.000002 -0.000002 0.0000002 0.0000008
(-0.118) (0.082) (0.176) (-0.161) (0.0l3) (0.055)
R2 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.993 0.994
Adj R2 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.991 0.992
F 610.76 577.50 556.49 555.30 505.60 485.19
DW 1.839 1.837 1.835 1.746 1.753 1.727
Mean 9.473 9.473 9.473 9.473 9.473 9.473
S.D 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480
RSS 0.044 0.046 0.042 0.049 0.053 0.048
Log-L 69.510 68.507 70.628 67.806 66.129 68.174
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MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 19.212 6.944 20.573 13.000 3A02 8.238
(3.684) (1.311) (2.793) (2.289) (0.717) (1.059)
LNGDP95 -1.076 -1.076 -OA08 -0.361
(-2A63) (-2A05) (-0.886) (-0.773)
DEFPCT 0.00343 -0.00363 0,00302 -0.00302 -0.00435 -0.00194
(0.652) (-0.679) (0.550) (-OA79) (-0,763) (-0.299)
SHARE 0.198 0.133 0.204 0.112 0.0702 0,0924
(4.240) 2.411 (3.560) (1.574) (1.028) (1.232)
PHYSICIAN -0.0392 -0.00797 -0.0428 0.0251 0.0471 0.0352
(-0.394) (-0.071) (-0.422) (0.260) (0.486) (0.358)
PHRMPCT 0.00109 0.00121 0.00121
(0.800) (0.756) (0.851)
LGLNGDP -0.0414 -0.114 0.382 0.346
(-0,092) (-0.285) (0.987) (0.888)
PHEX 0.0652 0.164 0.0890
(0.168) (0.437) (0.227)
PERIOD 0.290 0.230 0.296 0.0715 0.0392 0,0553
(6.848) (4.877) (5.909) (2.245) (1.302) (l.508)
PERIODSQ -0.00786 -0.00677 -0.00799 0.000568 0.000893 0,000783
(-4.674) (-3A12) (-4.352) (0.364) (0.575) (0.496)
PERIODCU 0.00007 0,00006 0,00007 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00004
(2.803) (2.222) (2.685) (-1.275) (-1.234) (-1.292)
R2
0.995 0.993 0,995 0.992 0.933 0.993
Adj R2 0.993 0.990 0,992 0.990 0.991 0.991
F 439.33 325.97 383.51 430.52 480.27 422.31
DW 1.713 1.670 1.677 1.506 1.574 1.554
Mean 10.701 10.701 10.701 10A28 10.428 10.428
S.D 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.565 0.565 0.565
RSS 0.015 0.020 0.014 0.087 0.078 0.076
Log-L 63.008 59,003 63.532 57.377 59.330 59.811
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Denmark
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 3.053 -2.820 -9.866 4.273 4.546 3.438
(0.222) (-0.266) (-0.507) (2.433) (1.578) (1.168)
LNGDP95 0.232 0.509 0.194 0.180
(0.204) (0.433) 0.141) (1.036)
DEFPCT -0.00900 -0.0113 -0.0151 0.00323 0.00314 0.00262
(-0.884) (-1.339) (-1.279) (2.704) (1.470) (1.254)
SHARE 0.235 0.128 0.117 -0.0488 -0.0714 -0.0584
(0.763) (0.395) (0.356) (-2.276) (-2.091) (-1.688)
PHYSICIAN 0.00351 0.0143 0.00830 0.00959 0.0133 0.0107
(0.018) (0.074) (0.042) (0.386) (0.510) (0.431 )
PHRMPCT 0.00446 0.00427 0.00389
( 1.532) (1.503) (1.301)
LGLNGDP 0.845 0.961 0.165 0.0957
(0.859) (0.927) (0.594) (0.353)
PHEX 2.189 2.130 2.170
(12.527) (11.231) (11.947)
PERIOD 0.0446 0.0386 0.0208 0.165 0.208 0.166
(0.664) (0.659) (0.298) (3.158) (6.082) (3.196)
PERIODSQ -0.00308 -0.00189 -0.00144 -0.00603 -0.00724 -0.00596
(-0.729) (-0.434) (-0.326) (-3.352) (-5.410) (-3.316)
PERIODCU
0.00006 0.00003 0.00002 0.0007 0.00008 0.00007
(0.621) (0.289) (0.205) (3.466) (4.559) (3.190)
R2 0.957 0.959 0.960 0.986 0.986 0.987
Adj R2 0.941 0.945 0.943 0.974 0.973 0.972
F 60.92 65.05 56.02 79.87 79.07 67.39
DW 1.816 1.862 1.851 2.920 2.881 2.918
Mean 9.337 9.337 9.337 9.592 9.592 9.592
S.D 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.057 0.057 0.057
RSS 0.131 0.123 0.122 0.001 0.001 0.001
Log-L 40.703 41.678 41.899 64.869 64.781 65.453
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,
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 4.746 5.867 4.459 4.278 4.895 3.738
(1.833) (2.783) (1.583) (1.364) (2.124) (l.140)
LNGDP95 0.256 0.216 0.247 0.175
(1.051) (0.767) (0.807) (0.505)
DEFPCT -0.00653 -0.00439 -0.00647 -0.00605 -0.00427 -0.00592
(-1.783) (-1.744) (-1.736) (-1.424) (-1.534) (-1.368)
SHARE 0.0329 0.0354 0.0310 0.0212 0.0225 0.0183
(2.449) (2.500) (2.008) (1.381 ) (1.642) (1.131)
PHYSICIAN -0.0473 -0.0571 -0.0400 0.0263 0.0205 0.0331
(-0.655) (-0.758) (-0.509) (0.401) (0.327) (0.485)
PHRMPCT 0.000938 0.000970 0.000911
(1.719) (1.750) (1.617)
LGLNGDP 0.153 0.0682 0.187 0.126
(0.759) (0.296) (0.851) (0.498)
PHEX 0.499 0.528 0.477
(1.634) (1.853) (1.550)
PERIOD 0.0568 0.0618 0.0560 0.0580 0.0601 0.056224
(4.667) (6.305) (4.434) (4.309) (5.215) (4.028)
PERIODSQ -0.000265 -0.000343 -0.000300 -0.000175 -0.000161 -0.000223
(-0.483) (-0.606) (-0.521) (-0.242) (-0.227) (-0.306)
PERIODCU
-0.000008 -0.000008 -0.000007 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.000009
(-0.897) (-0.780) (-0.737) (-0.807) (-0.898) (-0.686)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Adj R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
F 4162.10 4044.74 3555.18 4628.42 4652.83 4020.03
DW 2.128 2.138 2.139 2.030 2.060 2.050
Mean 8.943 8.943 8.943 8.889 8.889 8.889
S.D 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.466 0.466 0.466
RSS 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
Log-L 104.221 103.735 104.238 106.946 107.040 107.208
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MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 6.228 1.951 2.934 4.679 1.228 0.794
(1.733) (0.693) (0.793) (1.736) (0.600) (0.283)
LNGDP95 0.157 -0.154 0.220 0.0518
(0.495) (-0.467) (0.937) (0.235)
DEFPCT 0.000859 -0.00206 -0.00103 0.00190 -0.000278 -0.000702
(0.191) (-0.576) (-0.238) (0.523) (-0.098) (-0.206)
SHARE -0.0704 -0.0700 -0.0791 -0.0789 -0.0978 -0.0957
(-0.615) (-0.710) (-0.762) (-1.071) (-1.539) (1.459)
PHYSICIAN 0.0217 0.0977 0.118 0.108 0.186 0.182
(0.148) (0,721) (0.805) (0.979) (1.854) (1.761)
PHRMPCT 0.00466 0.00326 0.00293
(2.853) (2.077) (1.679)
LGLNGDP 0.567 0.636 0.555 0.541
(2.195) (2.153) (3.002) (2.765)
PHEX 0.872 0.855 0.867
(3.303) (3.758) (3.646)
PERIOD 0.0998 0.0631 0.0661 0.126 0.118 0.116
(1.086) (0.785) (0.796) (5.375) (6.075) (5.474)
PERIODSQ -0.00114 -0.000508 -0.000507 -0.00250 -0.00286 -0.00284
(-0.355) (-0.184) (-0.181) (-2.877) (-3.785) (-3.664)
PERIODCU
-0.000004 -0.000008 -0.000009 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002
(-0.089) (-0.219) (-0.230) (0.674) (1.395) (1.355)
R2 0.981 0.989 0.991 0.994 0.996 0.996
Adj R2 0.973 0.984 0.986 0.993 0.995 0.995
F 118.94 199.81 207.24 583.10 820.98 727.04
DW 1.058 1.487 1.570 1.392 1.825 1.784
Mean 8.784 8.784 8.784 8.560 8.560 8.560
S.D 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.473 0.473 0.473
RSS 0.036 0.989 0.018 0.045 0.032 0.996
Log-L 51.027 57.928 60.754 69.249 75.378 75.988
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MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 3.638 6.589 4.479 -0.00973 7.489 1.255
(2.194) (4.204) (2.139) (-0.004) (3.113) (0.385)
LNGDP95 0.255 0.275 0.627 0.612
(1.441) (1.518) (2.695) (2.583)
DEFPCT -0.00253 -0.000724 -0.00259 -0.00537 -0.00256 -0.00535
(-1.110) (-0.352) (-1.130) (-1.790) (-0.820) (-1.768)
SHARE -0.0257 -0.0280 -0.0250 0.0696 0.0881 0.0692
(-1.146) (-1.210) (-1.079) (1.828) (2.110) (1.781)
PHYSICIAN 0.0632 0.172 0.720 -0.184 -0.0197 -0.172
(0.530) (1.576) (0.594) (-1.315) (-0.137) (-1.199)
PHRMPCT 0.00228 0.00259 0.00206
(3.065) (3.300) (2.501)
LGLNGDP -0.0608 -0.105 -0.173 -0.111
(-0.382) (-0.673) (-0.746) (-0.527)
PHEX 0.165 0.194 0.140
(0.475) (0.497) (0.394)
PERIOD 0.240 0.264 0.240 0.0301 0.0538 0.0352
(6.039) (6.948) (5.906) (1.299) (2.012) (1.388)
PERIODSQ -0.00931 -0.0103 -0.00925 0.000586 -0.00001 0.000508
(-4.838) (-5.517) (-4.693) (0.513) (-0.012) (0.433)
PERIODCU 0.000122 0.000134 0.000120 -0.00001 -0.0002 -0.00002
(4.569) (5.030) (4.380) (-0.882) (-0.693) (-0.875)
R2 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.992 0.994
Adj R2 0.992 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.990 0.992
F 426.3 403.3 362.9 605.2 440.9 519.93
DW 1.731 1.866 1.730 1.506 1.544 1.450
Mean 8.144 8.144 8.144 7.914 7.914 7.914
S.D 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.452 0.452 0.452
RSS 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.093 0.054 0.039
Log-L 74.395 73.651 74.585 71.472 65.808 71.537
290
; '" ,!: ,,' ,.'"", '., . ,. "_" .... "'-_ . ,e , (~, -.;~.~1j' "r~ :". -'1Table 6.~.J~oDtinued)_.':
" :::.:.
Netherlands
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 3,126 -2.090 -4.169 -0.568 0.932 -4.562
(0.961) (-0,778) (-1.152) (-0.213) (0.331) (-1.401)
LNGDP95 0.293 0.263 0.773 0.702
(0.860) (0.883) (2.839) (2.618)
DEFPCT -0.00552 -0.00514 -0.00683 -0.00522 -0.000341 -0.00491
(-0.989) (-1.150) (-1.397) (-1.145) (-0.077) (-1.106)
SHARE 0.0788 -0.0679 -0.0858 -0.0967 -0.116 -0.143
(0.736) (-0,606) (-0.750) (-1.065) (-1.175) (1.583)
PHYSICIAN 0,0675 0.0335 0.00368 -0.134 -0.105 -0.151
(0.610) (0.354) (0.036) (-1.401) (-1.050) (-1.624)
PHRMPCT 0.000174 -0.00102 -0.00112
(0.146) (-0.888) (-0.968)
LGLNGDP 0.979 0.947 0.651 0.536
(2.973) (2.842) (2.123) (1.871)
PHEX 0.971 0.767 0.807
(5.111) (3.495) (4.097)
PERIOD 0.0768 0.0319 0.0218 0.0704 0.0796 0.0494
(1.435) (0.763) (0.495) (3.857) (4.194) (2.409)
PERIODSQ -0.00321 -0.000485 0.00006 -0.00185 -0.00189 -0.000679
(-1.378) (-0.238) (0.030) (-1.993) (-1.747) (-0.630)
PERIODCU
0.00005 0,000004 -0.000005 0.00002 0.00002 0.000005
(1.374) (0.132) (-0.150) (1.483) (1.198) (0.260)
R2 0.987 0.993 0.993 0.998 0.998 0.998
Adj R2 0.981 0.990 0.989 0.997 0.997 0.997
F 157.31 284.96 237.88 1449.24 1604.63 1543.91
DW 1.651 1.793 1.657 1.556 1.648 1.560
Mean 7.945 7.945 7.945 7.674 7.674 7,674
SD 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.469 0.469 0.469
RSS 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.016 0.014
Log-I, 61.629 68.984 69.006 85.820 87.649 89.750
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Portugal
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 1.673 11.715 7.002 -3,454 5.508 -6.180
(0.155) (0.950) (0.617) (-0.781) (1.730) (-1.217)
LNGDP95 0.706 1.549 0.888 0.918
(1.296) (2.210) (2.651) (2.746)
DEFPCT 0.00253 0.00424 0.000775 0.000687 0.00387 0.000766
(0.554) (0.965) (0.146) (0.137) (0.838) (0.153)
SHARE -0.233 -0.298 -0,446 -0.0176 0.0918 0.0431
(-0.985) (-1.043) (-1.758) (-0.153) (0.555) (0.338)
PHYSICIAN -0.0825 0.106 -0.188 -0.683 -0.680 -0.653
(-0.179) 0.230 (-0.371) (-3.142) (-2.663) (-2.994)
PHRMPCT 0.000106 -0.000184 0.000139
(0.074) -0.124 (0.086)
LGLNGDP 0.166 -1.085 0.0938 0.104
(0.269) (-1.535) (0.870) (1.055)
PHEX -0.145 -0.0181 -0.154
(-1.253) (-0.151) (-1.331)
PERIOD 0.0946 -0.187 0.0351 0.284 0,416 0.340
(0.225) (-0,423) (0.082) (3.657) (3.592) (3.637)
PERIODSQ 0.00165 0.0129 0.00765 -0.00578 -0.0115 -0.00908
(0.098) (0.689) (0,443) (-1.151) (-1.573) (-1.544)
PERIODCU
-0.00004 -0.000171 -0.000122 0.00005 0.000122 0.00009
(-0.181) (-0.742) (-0.583) 0.688 (1.181) (1.333)
R2 0.981 0.978 0.984 0.990 0.987 0.991
Adj R2 0.967 0.962 0.969 0.986 0.982 0.987
F 71.61 60,49 67.06 247.33 183.91 221.29
DW 1.780 1.670 1.998 1.959 1.822 1.998
Mean 11.350 11.350 11.350 11.107 11.107 11.107
S.D 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.498 0,498 0.498
RSS 0.333 0.040 0.029 0.064 0.085 0.060
Log-L 35.644 33.991 37.094 45.486 41.384 46.327
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MODELS
VARIABLES EQl EQ2 EQ3
Constant -4.567 -2.646 11.599
(-0.519) (-0.170) (1.362)
LNGDP95 1.872 3.917
(3.706) (4.309)
DEFPCT -0.00834 0.00293 -0.0152
(-1.218) (0.409) (-2.556)
SHARE -0.398 -0.322 -0.610
(-1.910) (-1.091) (-3.444)
PHYSICIAN 0.407 0.0322 1.083
(2.092) (0.096) (3.426)
PHRMPCT 0.000638 0.000798 0.00146
(0.494) (0.455) (1.206)
LGLNGDP 1.397 -2.375
(1.928) (-2.541)
PHEX
PERIOD -0.827 -0.367 -1.957
(-2.755) (-0.591) (-3.964)
PERIODSQ 0.0293 0.0160 0.0661
(3.041) 0.767 (4.228)
PERIODCU
-0.000307 -0.000179 -0.000695
(-2.732) (-0.763) (-4.144)
R2 0.966 0.993 0.998
Adj R2 0.993 0.986 0.995
F 273.36 148.00 350.35
DW 1.820 1.600 2.553
Mean 11.531 11.531 11.531
S.D 0.242 0.242 0.242
RSS 0.003 0.006 0.002
Log-L 48.233 43.044 52.466
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Sweden
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 14.971 7.027 12.918 12.597 9.125 12.809
(3.304) (1.896) (2.381 ) (3.878) (3.055) (3.051)
LNGDP95 -0.566 -0.582 -0.359 -0.358
(-1.415) (-1.431) (-1.240) (-1.202)
DEFPCT 0.00477 0.00198 0.00426 0.00354 0.00224 0.00359
(2.059) (1.039) (1.729) (1.880) (1.294) (1.743)
SHARE -0.0176 -0.0365 -0.0174 -0.00247 -0.0162 -0.00244
(-0.381) (-0.747) (-0.360) (-0.058) (-0.380) (-0.056)
PHYSICIAN -0.000485 0.0235 -0.00666 -0.0321 -0.0229 -0.0316
(-0.005) (0.252) (-0.070) (-0.437) (-0.307) (-0.419)
PHRMPCT -0.000212 -0.00005 -0.000154
(-0.290) (-0.065) (-0.211)
LGLNGDP 0.141 0.194 -0.0433 -0.0196
(0.448) (0.618) (-0.169) (-0.076)
PHEX -0.0122 -0.00933 -0.0123
(-0.216) (-0.161) (-0.212)
PERIOD 0.151 0.130 0.147 0.121 0.110 0.122
(4.525) (3.519) (4.125) (8.866) (7.805) (7.311)
PERIODSQ -0.00393 -0.00348 -0.00391 -0.00291 -0.00252 -0.00293
(-2.525) (-1.978) (-2.353) (-2.959) (-2.557) (-2.884)
PERIODCU
0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002
(1.296) (0.994) (1.246) (1.097) (0.798) (1.083)
R2 0.984 0.981 0.984 0.996 0.996 0.996
Adj R2 0.977 0.972 0.975 0.995 0.994 0.995
F 136.88 114.32 115.06 782.26 760.96 712.10
DW 1.751 1.606 1.797 1.769 1.708 1.769
Mean 9.574 9.574 9.574 9.419 9.419 9.419
S.D 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.332 0.332 0.332
RSS 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.Ql5 0.016 0.Ql5
Log-L 68.323 65.934 68.340 85.480 84.999 86.579
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Switzerland
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 8.902 7.492 8.051 6.686 3.393 3.624
(3.139) (2.545) (2.286) (1.740) (1.011) (0.835)
LNGDP95 -0.0319 -0.0804 0.156, -0.0298
(-0.128) (-0.289) (0.462) (-0.082)
DEFPCT -0.00751 -0.00701 -0.00659 -0.00555 -0.00195 -0.00182
(-1.608) (-1.417) (-1.259) (-0.924) (-0.305) (-0.273)
SHARE -0.176 -0.162 -0.l62 -0.175 -0.146 -0.146
(-2.877) (-2.326) (-2.269) (-3.429) (-2.712) (-2.668)
PHYSICIAN -0.174 -0.150 -0.168 -0.267 -0.200 -0.208
(-1.312) (-1.223) (-1.229) (-1.401) (-1.228) (-1.111)
PHRMPCT -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00008
(-0.125) (-0.134) (-0.138)
LGLNGDP 0.0871 0.118 0.435 0.445
(0.355) (0.427) (1.506) (1.391)
PHEX 0.963 1.052 1.034
( 1.915) (2.309) (2.024)
PERIOD 0.163 0.158 0.156 0.0986 0.0871 0.0881
(3.070) (2.978) (2.781) (5.494) (5.506) (4.540)
PERIODSQ -0.00295 -0.00305 -0.00292 -0.000732 -0.00103 -0.00103
(-1.548) (-1.713) (-1.490) (-0.962) (-1.319) (-1.296)
PERIODCU
0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 -0.000009 0.0000006 0.0000006
(0.728) (0.920) (0.757) (-0.584) (0.039) (0.034)
R2 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.997 0.997 0.997
Adj R2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.996 0.996 0.996
F 454.48 455.62 384.80 1026.47 1084.73 929.92
DW 1.754 1.751 1.751 1.938 1.904 1.905
Mean 8.194 8.194 8.194 7.976 7.976 7.976
S.D 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.456 0.456 0.456
RSS 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.024 0.023 0.023
Log-L 70.567 70.601 70.682 80.643 81.634 81.661
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1. . ", Table 6.2 (continued).' r';<"'ii '_;_ ___'C • " ".
United Kingdom
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3
Constant 3.986 1.718 2.013
(2.438) (1.369) (1.380)
LNGDP95 0.142 -0.0785
(0.782) (-0.413)
DEFPCT -0.00791 -0.0105 -0.0104
(-3.392) (-5.327) (-5.076)
SHARE 0.0212 -0.00426 -0.00652
(0.707) (-0.171) (-0.252)
PHYSICIAN -0.0193 0.0l36 0.0111
(-0.224) (0.178) (0.143)
PHRMPCT
LGLNGDP 0.436 0.484
(2.902) (0.192)
PHEX -0.00709 -0.0203 -0.0191
(-0.193) (-0.616) (-0.567)
PERIOD 0.0420 0.0368 0.0382
(4.724) (5.865) (5.296)
PERIODSQ -0.000625 -0.000464 -0.000477
(-2.066) (-1.973) (-1.978)
PERIODCU
0.000009 0.000005 0.000005
(1.519) (1.154) (1.139)
R2 0.998 0.998 0.998
Adj R2 0.997 0.998 0.998
F 1507.00 1899.99 1636.99
DW 1.881 1.966 1.973
Mean 6.181 6.181 6.181
S.D 0.376 0.376 0.376
RSS 0.011 0.009 0.009
Log-L 94.487 98.650 98.767
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Table 6.2 (c()otinued) [,~>,:..
~'! . ~, '~}' ~~::1"..~\,~;~
.; '; - .j I>';~ '" .~ ~i?>··':i'lN,il".,\>,-. United States . '
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant 6.126 7.547 6.264 5.995 6.479 6.121
(4.219) (6.432) (3.476) (4.401) (5.528) (3.599)
LNGDP95 0.145 0.147 0.0445 0.0462
(0.948) (0.939) (0.290) (0.294)
DEFPCT -0.00235 -0.000833 -0.00230 0.000754 0.00134 0.000791
(-1.023) (-0.466) (-0.969) (0.294) (0.741) (0.301)
SHARE -0.0778 -0.0756 -0.0781 -0.0261 -0.0234 -0.0265
(-3.224) (-3.110) (-3.159) (-0.852) (-0.809) (-0.845)
PHYSICIAN -0.0756 -0.0737 -0.0746 -0.0380 -0.0356 -0.0372
(-1.780) (-1.677) (-1.699) (-0.928) (-0.868) (-0.885)
PHRMPCT 0.00158 0.0166 0.00157
(1.389) 1.439 (1.352)
LGLNGDP -0.00645 -0.0161 -0.0116 -0.0144
(-0.054) (-0.135) (-0.106) (-0.129)
PHEX 0.852 0.887 0.849
(2.295) (2.543) (2.241 )
PERIOD 0.0704 0.0757 0.0710 0.0652 0.0669 0.0657
(8.615) (9.523) (7.558) (8.552) (8.505) (7.396)
PERIODSQ -0.000181 -0.000949 -0.000195 -0.000739 -0.000823 -0.000751
(-0.456) (-0.918) (-0.466) (-1.539) (-1.941) (-1.509)
PERIODCU
-0.000006 -0.000004 -0.000006 0.000001 0.000003 0.000001
(-0.849) (-0.520) (-0.801) (0.155) (0.337) (0.166)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Adj R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
F 3906.94 4033.01 3453.50 3700.76 3850.33 3306.01
DW 1.235 1.282 1.237 1.261 1.277 1.261
Mean 7.563 7.563 7.563 7.563 7.563 7.563
S.D 0.480 0.408 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480
RSS 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Log-L 102.827 103.399 103.405 101.852 102.564 102.620
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Table 6-3 Gross Domestic Product (in current values [LNGDP] and
lagged [LGLNGDP]) as a predictor of the demand for health care, 1960
-1997
LNGDP LGLNGDP
Coefficient Statistical Coefficient Statistical
value and sign Sienificance value and sien Slgnltlcaace
Ambiguous:
All Positive,
some not
Austria <1, but close to Significant at 5%
All positive; statistically
unity and 10% level
Significantly <1 significant; some
significant at
10% level
Ambiguous:
All Negative; some not Positive and
Belgium Some >1 & statistically
negative; Not statistically
some very significant; some Very significant
significantly <1 significant at 1% significantly <1
level
All positive; Not statistically All positive; Not statistically
Denmark very significant Significantly <1 significantsignificantly <1
Statistically
significant at 5%
Mostly positive,
or 1% level;
some
Finland some negative;
Not statistically All positive; autocorrelation
All very significant Significantly <1 in AR(1) models
significantly <1 limits
explanatory
power
All positive; Not statistically
All positive; Not statistically
France very significant
very significant
significantly <1 significantly <1
Statistically
significant at 1% Not statistically
or 10% level; significant; some
All positive; some All negative; autocorrelation
Germany very autocorrelation very in models limits
significantly <1 in the models significantly <1 explanatory
limits
explanatory
power
power
Ambiguous;
some statistically Statistically
significant at 1% significant at 1%
All positive; level; others not
All positive; All or 5% level;
significantly or stat. Significant;
<1, but some some
Netherlands some close to unity, autocorrelationvery
autocorrelation others very in AR(1) modelssignificantly <1 in AR(1) models significantly <1 limits model
limits model explanatory
explanatory power
power
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Positive or
negative; all
All positive; Ambiguous: one very
one close to is not significant; significantly <1
Portugal unity; another all others are with the Not statistically
significantly significant at 1% exception of significant
<1; another> 1 or 5% level one result,which is at
unity, but
negative
Statistically Statistically
significant at 1%; significant at 1%
persistence of or5%;
Spain All positive; all autocorrelation Positive and
persistence of
>1 in AR(l) models negative; All >1 autocorrelation
limits their in AR(l) models
explanatory limits theirexplanatorypower power
All negative; Positive or
Sweden All very Not statistically negative; all Not statistically
significantly <1 significant very significantsignificantly <1
Ambiguous:
Positive or All positive; All some not
Switzerland negative; All Not statistically very statisticallyvery significant significantly <1 significant; some
significantly <1 significant at
10% level
Ambiguous;
Positive or ranging from notUnited negative; very Not statistically Positive; very statisticallyKingdom significant significantly <1 significant tosignificantly <1 significant at 1%
level
Not statistically Not statistically
significant; significant;
persistence of Negative; small persistence of
United States Positive; very autocorrelation coefficients autocorrelationsignificantly <1 in AR(l) models close to zero in AR(1) models
limits limits
explanatory explanatory
power power
Source: Table 2.
Table 6-4
MODELS
DEF95
DEFPCT -0.023
(-3.22)
-0.025
(-3.44 )
-0.028
(-3.67)
-0.019
(-2.49)
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
LGLNGDP
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
AUS8397
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
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Constant
DEF95
DEFPCT -0.006 -0.006
(-1.11) (-1.13)
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
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Denmark
EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6VARIABLES EQl EQ2
Constant
DEF95
DEFPCT
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
MODELS
302
Table
Finland
MODELS
VARIABLES EQl
Constant
DEF95
DEFPCT
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
0.04 0.Q3 0.03 0.Q3 0.03 0.04
0.994 0.996 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.995
0.993 0.995 0.997 0.995 0.996 0.993
842.52 1226.43 1722.16 933.79 1300.07 662.68
69.41 76.13 82.22 77.69 80.57 71.54
1.54 1.65 1.52 1.59 1.80 1.52
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France
MODELS
EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5VARIABLES
Constant
DEF95
DELTAGDP
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
FR9597
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
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MODELS
-0.004
(-1.26)
EQ6EQl EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5
Constant
VARIABLES
DEF95
DEFPCT
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
GR9197
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
-0.003
(-1.18)
-0.003
(-1.28)
-0.002
(-0.76)
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Table 6.4
Netherlands
DEFPCT 0.003
(0.54)
VARIABLES
Constant
DEF95
MODELS
EQl EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
LGLNGDP
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
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LGLNGDP
PHEX
PHRMPCT
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
MODELS
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant
DEF95
DEFPCT 0.003 0.002
(0.75) (0.37)
DELTAGDP
LNC95
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Table
VARIABL MODELS
ES EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6 EQ7
Constant
DEF95
DEFPCT 0.26E-03 -0.11E-03 0.001
(0.04) (-0.016) (0.24)
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNGDP
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
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Sweden
Constant
0.003
(2.04)
MODELS
EQI EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5VARIABLES
DEF95
DEFPCT
LNC95
LGLNGDP
PH EX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
SWD9297
SWD9397
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
309
Switzerland
VARIABLES EQI EQ2 EQ4
5
MODELS
Constant
EQ3 EQ5 EQ6
DEF95
DEFPCT -0.007
(-1.05)
-0.007
(-1.08)
-0.003
(-0.49)
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
310
VARIABLES EQl EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
Constant
DEF9S
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
UK9197 -0.027 0.022 -0.042 0.053 -0.027
(-0.76) (0.86) (-1.04) (1.98) (-0.82)
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
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Table 6.4
VARIABLES
Constant
DEF95
United States
MODELS
-0.001
(-0.80)
EQl EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5
DEFPCT -OAOE-03
(-0.19)
DELTAGDP
LNC95
LGLNGDP
LGLNC
PHEX
PHRMPCT
PHYS
SHARE
PERIOD
PERIODSQ
PERIODCU
PERIOD4
RHO
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Table 6-7 Johansen tests with GDP as an independent variable
Austria
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.713947 124.0225 94.15 103.18 None **
0.623377 80.21729 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.471066 46.03943 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.361362 23.74823 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.201390 8.053622 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.005207 0.182729 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Belgium ,I'." ,
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.781252 132.6404 94.15 103.18 None **
0.622652 79.44622 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.465624 45.33567 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.336143 23.40275 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.164502 9.063656 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.076177 2.773219 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Denmark • '"-: , t'. s- "Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Ll!8s interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.681462 103.2697 94.15 103.18 None **
0.524876 63.22925 68.52 76.07 At most I
0.460105 37.18295 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.274489 15.60962 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.111075 4.378846 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.007340 0.257847 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 1 co integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
"
" Finland
_\"_ ',~\, ,
";,_ -; "i s,
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.659496 118.5269 94.15 103.18 None **
0.651520 80.82045 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.446111 43.92433 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.344327 23.24663 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.174788 8.473389 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.048754 1.749374 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
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France
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
L'!8s interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.764880 136.4654 94.15 103.18 None **
0.630078 85.79734 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.465824 50.99115 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.355802 29.04508 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.237349 13.65385 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.112330 4.170413 3.76 6.65 At most 5 *
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Germany .
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.799412 153.3615 94.15 103.18 None **
0.707864 97.13398 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.466448 54.06521 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.397564 32.07825 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.310012 14.34114 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.037927 1.353291 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
318
Netherlands -: ,,!~ .~,. . ..., t.i •
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.751899 135.8556 94.15 103.18 None **
0.655035 87.06842 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.472180 49.81752 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.346089 27.45251 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.250770 12.58506 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.068411 2.480209 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating ~uation(s) at 5% significance level
, . Portu_gal 'J '.'
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 25
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.871502 156.7198 94.15 103.18 None **
0.748923 105.4237 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.704691 70.87386 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.559890 40.38057 29.68 35.65 At most 3 **
0.345111 19.86232 15.41 20.04 At most 4 *
0.310096 9.280077 3.76 6.65 At most 5 **
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 6 coint~atin_g_ eguation(s) at 5% significance level
319
·" Spain
,. I. ,.
,.
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 34
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.833460 165.6972 94.15 103.18 None **
0.759288 104.7516 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.573362 56.33041 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.384653 27.36854 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.222717 10.85920 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.065214 2.292869 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
,
Sweden
,
•
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.804888 158.0125 94.15 103.18 None **
0.674735 100.8161 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.591903 61.50704 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.406468 30.13827 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.210103 11.88003 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.098393 3.625170 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
320
Switzerland
.
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.661694 121.4553 94.15 103.18 None **
0.611691 83.52210 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.494886 50.4l370 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.410729 26.50972 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.195774 7.999328 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.010620 0.373699 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 co integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
United Kin2dom
,
,
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.728920 125.2886 94.15 103.18 None **
0.548093 79.60161 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.519201 51.80182 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.415700 26.17111 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.182648 7.364205 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.008682 0.305202 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
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USA' !: ", ,,'"
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 34
Series: LNHEX LNGDP PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
L:~gsinterval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.853908 147.6749 94.15 103.18 None **
0.543814 82.27528 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.462959 55.59026 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.414744 34.45310 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.296335 16.23909 15.41 20.04 At most 4 *
0.118533 4.289701 3.76 6.65 At most 5 *
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 6 coint~ating e_g_uation(s)at 5% significance level
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Table 6-8 Johansen tests with Consumption as an independent variable
Procedure: Intercept (no trend) in Co-Integrating Equation (CE) and test VAR
Lag iDtervai pairs: {l:l}
Test assumption: Linear deterlninistic trend iD *be data
Variables: LNHE LNC, PRE DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Austria
"
-:
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: I to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.774764 129.9611 94.l5 103.18 None **
0.609614 77.78990 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.501079 44.86822 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.346102 20.53249 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.l48794 5.664340 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.000737 0.025800 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Belgium
', . .,. .,
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: I to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.773655 139.0428 94.15 103.18 None **
0.717013 87.04359 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.431146 42.86119 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.328899 23.11659 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.193387 9.157346 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.045652 l.635451 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
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". Denmark
-:>~ .r
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent I Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.637061 96.30650 94.15 103.18 None *
0.481673 60.83325 68.52 76.07 At most 1
0.383583 37.83306 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.276646 20.89897 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.198604 9.564012 15.41 20.04 At most4
0.050536 1.815002 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level
, Finland
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.689842 119.9714 94.15 103.18 None **
0.557720 78.99783 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.480030 50.44437 47.21 54.46 At most2 *
0.404180 27.55490 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.178327 9.431342 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.070450 2.556901 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection ofthe hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
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France ,~ , .•0.
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Ll!gsinterval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.811757 174.1987 94.15 103.18 None **
0.753161 115.7480 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.643180 66.78233 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.371401 30.71404 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.229752 14.46486 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.141217 5.328368 3.76 6.65 At most 5 *
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 4 coint~atin_g_ ~uation(s) at 5% significance level
Germany
. ! ' ,
~ ;}i
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHEX PHRMPCT
L~:.Ssinterval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.768099 136.9126 94.15 103.18 None **
0.647222 85.76204 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.457879 49.29499 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.328279 27.86566 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.308569 l3.93874 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.028833 1.024005 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointeg!:atin_g_~uationM at 5% significance level
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Netherlands " .' ." - ",'0
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.821646 l37.2075 94.15 103.18 None **
0.636828 76.86799 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.408503 41.41722 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.247267 23.03877 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.197931 13.09723 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.142424 5.377610 3.76 6.65 At most 5 *
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% s~ficance level
,
Portugal " ::"
.,
l , ~ __t;; i
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 25
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
L'!gs interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No. ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.925827 162.2396 94.15 103.18 None **
0.831229 97.20569 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.582652 52.72539 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.513799 30.87953 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.352187 12.85120 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.076786 1.997367 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(~ at 5% significance level
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SJ!ain. :n:" T'.
_,
'.')
"''''. " \. :' -: .
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 34
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
L,!&sinterval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.919697 200.3809 94.15 103.18 None **
0.804665 114.6346 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.518902 59.11130 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.451160 34.23407 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.297492 13.83585 15.41 20.04 At most4
0.052414 1.830490 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Sweden .," :"" .: ~Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.793185 159.5865 94.15 103.18 None **
0.679000 104.4288 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.611982 64.65781 47.21 54.46 At most 2 **
0.463916 31.52319 29.68 35.65 At most 3 *
0.141345 9.701944 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.117335 4.368344 3.76 6.65 At most 5 *
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 4 cointe-.8!:.ati~~uation(s) at 5% significance level
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Switzerland •.. _c""
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.696456 121.9177 94.15 103.18 None **
0.629284 80.18972 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.433349 45.45854 47.21 54.46 At most 2
0.401073 25.57814 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.192678 7.636628 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.004148 0.145471 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 2 coint~ating ~uation(s) at 5% significance level
United Kingdom y
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 35
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
L'$_s interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.731400 122.0363 94.15 103.18 None **
0.529333 76.02766 68.52 76.07 At most 1 *
0.508462 49.65153 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.383665 24.79394 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.197763 7.855163 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.004073 0.142850 3.76 6.65 At most 5
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 coint~atin_g_ ~uation(s) at 5% significance level
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USA
, ,.;_
__..
Sample: 1962 - 1997
Included observations: 34
Series: LNHEX LNC PHEX DEFICIT PHYSICIAN PHRMPCT
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Critical No.ofCE(s)
Value Value
0.842015 155.9719 94.15 103.18 None **
0.713104 93.23316 68.52 76.07 At most 1 **
0.462586 50.77956 47.21 54.46 At most 2 *
0.341874 29.66604 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.266974 15.44183 15.41 20.04 At most 4 *
0.133763 4.882308 3.76 6.65 At most 5 *
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% sigI!ificance level
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Table 6-9 Co-integrating regressions for each country (with GDP
included as regressor in levels)1,2,3
Austria
.'
"
,I
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -14.87825 3.756732 -3.960423 0.0004
LNGDP 1.577587 0.173074 9.115113 0.0000
DEFICIT -1.54E-05 5.07E-06 -3.031115 0.0048
PHYSICIAN -0.016639 0.200771 -0.082877 0.9345
PHEX -0.002613 0.005088 -0.513538 0.6111
R-squared 0.986659 Mean dependent var 18.37889
Adjusted R-squared 0.984992 S.D. dependent var 0.528217
S.E.ofregression 0.064711 Akaike info criterion -2.512689
Sum squared resid 0.134000 Schwarz criterion -2.294998
Log likelihood 51.48475 F-statistic 591.6728
Durbin- Watson stat 0.662044 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
Belglum ) r
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -16.50099 2.117583 -7.792372 0.0000
LNGDP -0.307964 0.632374 -0.486997 0.6299
LNGDP(-I) 1.904327 0.655663 2.904429 0.0070
DEFICIT -2.40E-06 9.95E-07 -2.415859 0.0222
DEFPCT -0.000476 0.000375 -1.269120 0.2145
PHYSICIAN 0.175155 0.107921 1.622999 0.1154
PHRMPCT -0.005941 0.002652 -2.240389 0.0329
PHEX -0.002654 0.002870 -0.924689 0.3628
R-squared 0.994175 Mean dependent var 19.58524
Adjusted R-squared 0.992768 S.D. dependent var 0.611562
S.E. of regression 0.052006 Akaike info criterion -2.886091
Sum squared resid 0.078435 Schwarz criterion -2.537784
Log likelihood 61.39268 F-statistic 707.0262
Durbin- Watson stat 0.988650 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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Denmark - "Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -31.23683 7.375623 -4.235145 0.0002
LNGDP 0.476947 0.824097 0.578751 0.5671
LNGDP(-I) 1.956821 0.658255 2.972738 0.0058
PHRMPCT -0.005035 0.004268 -1.179831 0.2473
PHEX 0.001695 0.005874 0.288622 0.7749
PHYSICIAN -0.322367 0.237500 -1.357337 0.1848
DBFICIT(-I) -1.68E-05 4.75E-06 -3.535160 0.0013
R-squared 0.959993 Mean dependent var 17.70557
Adjusted R-squared 0.951991 S.D. dependent var 0.495517
S.B.ofregression 0.108572 Akaike info criterion -1.434145
Sum squared resid 0.353638 Schwarz criterion -1.129376
Log likelihood 33.53168 F-statistic 119.9775
Durbin-Watson stat 0.954563 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
", ., Finland l;~<'~'.", ,·Si.:. :~,. :." Ii. '.W - ••• c., .'"
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -17.32966 3.712176 -4.668330 0.0001
LNGDP -0.186490 0.412392 -0.452216 0.6544
LNGDP(-I) 1.934841 0.409570 4.724078 0.0001
PHRMPCT 0.002873 0.003352 0.857288 0.3981
PHEX -0.002245 0.002273 -0.987467 0.3313
PHYSICIAN -0.016598 0.157725 -0.105233 0.9169
DEFICIT(-l) -1.09E-05 5.17E-06 -2.102029 0.0441
R-squared 0.988565 Mean dependent var 17.00460
Adjusted R-squared 0.986278 S.D. dependent var 0.538590
S.E.ofregression 0.063092 Akaike info criterion -2.519791
Sum squared resid 0.119418 Schwarz criterion -2.215023
Log likelihood 53.61614 F-statistic 432.2403
Durbin-Watson stat 0.813694 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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France .' '"" .," .'Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -14.85303 0.717568 -20.69912 0.0000
LNGDP 1.544411 0.033535 46.05307 0.0000
DEFICIT -1.27E-05 2.81E-06 -4.517662 0.0001
PHRMPCT 0.000269 0.000740 0.363308 0.7188
PHYSICIAN -0.089606 0.048375 -1.852319 0.0735
PH EX 0.003189 0.000899 3.545788 0.0013
R-squared 0.998895 Mean dependent var 19.74269
Adjusted R-squared 0.998717 S.D. dependent var 0.555977
S.E.ofregression 0.019917 Akaike info criterion -4.847098
Sum squared resid 0.012297 Schwarz criterion -4.585868
Log likelihood 95.67131 F-statistic 5604.293
Durbin- Watson stat 1.247768 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
-. -e Germany
,'c, "
~ -."';. ," r ..~
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
SampIe(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
e -18.95341 2.770290 -6.841669 0.0000
LNGDP 3.436742 4.518849 0.760535 0.4529
LNGDP(-I) -1.665951 4.420968 -0.376830 0.7090
DEFICIT -3.36E-05 1.19E-05 -2.835379 0.0081
PHYSICIAN -0.555559 0.119761 -4.638910 0.0001
DELTAGDP -0.020548 0.045207 -0.454539 0.6527
PHEX 0.015563 0.002959 5.259085 0.0000
R-squared 0.994051 Mean dependent var 19.15523
Adjusted R-squared 0.992861 S.D. dependent var 0.495454
S.E.ofregression 0.041863 Akaike info criterion -3.340177
Sum squared resid 0.052575 Schwarz criterion -3.035409
Log likelihood 68.79327 F-statistic 835.4252
Durbin- Watson stat 0.943019 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Netherlands !
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -18.26642 1.666910 -10.95825 0.0000
LNGDP 1.808672 0.086180 20.98726 0.0000
DEFICIT -2.73E-05 1.88E-05 -1.456538 0.1553
PHRMPCT 0.000329 0.000642 0.512017 0.6123
PHYSICIAN -0.581748 0.079446 -7.322581 0.0000
PHEX 0.009932 0.001898 5.233802 0.0000
R-squared 0.995121 Mean dependent var 17.18018
Adjusted R-squared 0.994334 S.D. dependent var 0.578435
S.E.ofregression 0.043540 Akaike info criterion -3.282858
Sum squared resid 0.058769 Schwarz criterion -3.021628
Log likelihood 66.73288 F-statistic 1264.537
Durbin- Watson stat 0.892112 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
Spain
"'
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -37.96181 1.790514 -21.20162 0.0000
LNGDP 2.429838 0.074809 32.48048 0.0000
DEFPCT -5.15E-05 3.57E-05 -1.442420 0.1599
PHRMPCT -0.003754 0.002529 -1.484028 0.1486
PHYSICIAN 0.076255 0.064937 1.174297 0.2498
PHEX -0.005017 0.002071 -2.421996 0.0219
R-squared 0.994855 Mean dependent var 21.56034
Adjusted R-squared 0.993967 S.D. dependent var 0.704549
S.E.ofregression 0.054722 Akaike info criterion -2.818307
Sum squared resid 0.086840 Schwarz criterion -2.551676
Log likelihood 55.32037 F-statistic 1121.427
Durbin- Watson stat 1.027906 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Sweden. .1" ,
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -22.09395 4.725752 -4.675224 0.0001
LNGDP 1.931145 0.236627 8.161137 0.0000
DEFICIT -7.15E-06 1.82E-06 -3.918949 0.0005
PHRMPCT -0.005051 0.002616 -1.931160 0.0627
PHYSICIAN 0.461611 0.187732 2.458883 0.0197
PHEX -0.013679 0.003404 -4.018096 0.0003
R-squared 0.979101 Mean dependent var 18.38300
Adjusted R-squared 0.975730 S.D. dependent var 0.432621
S.E. of regression 0.067398 Akaike info criterion -2.409019
Sum squared resid 0.140816 Schwarz criterion -2.147789
Log likelihood 50.56686 F-statistic 290.4591
Durbin-Watson stat l.201785 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
Switzerland
,- .
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -13.94538 4.182930 -3.333878 0.0022
LNGDP 1.580320 0.214900 7.353745 0.0000
DEFICIT 1.04E-05 1.63E-05 0.641798 0.5257
PHRMPCT 0.001083 0.001842 0.588066 0.5607
PHYSICIAN -0.760673 0.212308 -3.582878 0.0011
PHEX 0.016739 0.003368 4.969208 0.0000
R-squared 0.987489 Mean dependent var 16.71005
Adjusted R-squared 0.985471 S.D. dependent var 0.553388
S.E. of regression 0.066703 Akaike info criterion -2.429749
Sum squared resid 0.137927 Schwarz criterion -2.168519
Log likelihood 50.95036 F-statistic 489.3702
Durbin- Watson stat 0.821775 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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UK ,j,.-
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -8.605850 1.873367 -4.593788 0.0001
LNGDP 1.258922 0.098007 12.84517 0.0000
DEFICIT -0.000146 3.27E-05 -4.464138 0.0001
PHRMPCT 0.006085 0.003138 1.939057 0.0616
PHYSICIAN 0.422126 0.087674 4.814727 0.0000
PHEX -0.000306 0.000481 -0.635654 0.5297
R-squared 0.994460 Mean dependent var 17.09876
Adjusted R-squared 0.993567 S.D. dependent var 0.411809
S.E.ofregression 0.033030 Akaike info criterion -3.835397
Sum squared resid 0.033821 Schwarz criterion -3.574167
Log likelihood 76.95485 F-statistic 1112.989
Durbin- Watson stat 1.210651 Pro b(F -stati stic) 0.000000
USA
.. ,,"- ',-
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1996
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -19.04218 2.321317 -8.203182 0.0000
LNGDP 1.748624 0.115460 15.14478 0.0000
DEFICIT -0.000114 2.35E-05 -4.844742 0.0000
PHRMPCT -0.008820 0.003516 -2.508495 0.0180
DEFPCT -1.95E-06 2.37E-06 -0.825268 0.4160
PHYSICIAN -0.061516 0.177867 -0.345855 0.7319
PHEX 0.005009 0.001473 3.401409 0.0020
R-squared 0.997028 Mean dependent var 19.85160
Adjusted R-squared 0.996413 S.D. dependent var 0.589250
S.B. of regression 0.035289 Akaike info criterion -3.677800
Sum squared resid 0.036115 Schwarz criterion -3.369894
Log likelihood 73.20040 F-statistic 1621.562
Durbin-Watson stat 1.008715 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
335
Notes: 1 Period under investigation is 1960 - 1997.
2 Dependent variable is always the Log of health care expenditures in constant 1995
national currency units.
3 Last right hand column in each country table indicates levels of significance for each
variable.
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Table 6-10 Co-integrating regressions for each country (with
Consumption included as regressor in levels)
Austria ~
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNC 3.617917 1.460907 2.476487 0.0191
LNC(-I) -0.918852 1.474163 -0.623304 0.5378
DEFICIT 2.81E-05 9.62E-06 2.921905 0.0066
DEFPCT -7.82E-05 9.30E-05 -0.841515 0.4067
PHYSICIAN -0.264901 0.114349 -2.316596 0.0275
PHRMPCT -0.001317 0.005739 -0.229445 0.8201
R-squared 0.918080 Mean dependent var 18.40643
Adjusted R-squared 0.904426 S.D. dependent var 0.508056
S.E. of regression 0.157066 Akaike info criterion -0.713296
Sum squared resid 0.740087 Schwarz criterion -0.449376
Log likelihood 18.83932 Durbin- Watson stat 0.570092
Belgium
,
.. " ,"
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.158699 1.065562 -0.148935 0.8826
LNC 0.502179 0.596084 0.842463 0.4064
LNC(-I) 1.943381 0.642822 3.023200 0.0052
DEFICIT -1.04E-06 8.75E-07 -1.184569 0.2458
DEFPCT 0.000196 0.000305 0.643008 0.5253
PHYSICIAN -0.092547 0.095187 -0.972260 0.3390
PHRMPCT -0.005463 0.002445 -2.233884 0.0334
PHEX -0.001014 0.002514 -0.403286 0.6897
R-squared 0.995046 Mean dependent var 19.58524
Adjusted R-squared 0.993851 S.D. dependent var 0.611562
S.E.ofregression 0.047957 Akaike info criterion -3.048221
Sum squared resid 0.066696 Schwarz criterion -2.699914
Log likelihood 64.39209 F-statistic 832.2016
Durbin- Watson stat 1.130450 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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Denmark
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sarnple(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.263786 3.060700 -1.393075 0.1738
LNC 0.419079 0.911940 0.459547 0.6492
LNC(-l) 2.893385 0.905900 3.193935 0.0033
PHRMPCT -0.004885 0.004609 -1.059855 0.2977
PHEX -0.007637 0.006424 -l.188865 0.2438
PHYSICIAN 0.214029 0.255993 0.836076 0.4097
DEFICIT(-I) -l.31E-05 5.28E-06 -2.487222 0.0187
R-squared 0.953775 Mean dependent var 17.70557
Adjusted R-squared 0.944530 S.D. dependent var 0.495517
S.E.ofregression 0.116705 Akaike info criterion -l.289685
Sum squared resid 0.408598 Schwarz criterion -0.984917
Log likelihood 30.85918 F-statistic 103.1668
Durbin- Watson stat 0.823856 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
Finland
,
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 3.745804 1.491230 2.511889 0.0174
LNC 2.178478 0.277807 7.841702 0.0000
PHRMPCT 0.003469 0.003838 0.903686 0.3731
PHYSICIAN 0.009334 0.188576 0.049495 0.9608
DEFPCT 6.64E-05 0.000151 0.439006 0.6637
PHEX -0.001061 0.002642 -0.401602 0.6907
R-squared 0.983494 Mean dependent var 17.00460
Adjusted R-squared 0.980831 S.D. dependent var 0.538590
S.E.ofregression 0.074568 Akaike info criterion -2.206807
Sum squared resid 0.172374 Schwarz criterion -1.945577
Log likelihood 46.82594 F-statistic 369.4118
Durbin- Watson stat 0.522885 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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France ,
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.007667 0.271268 22.14664 0.0000
LNC 2.144060 0.047468 45.16871 0.0000
DEFICIT -1.21E-05 2.86E-06 -4.233317 0.0002
PHRMPCT 0.000506 0.000756 0.669768 0.5080
PHYSICIAN 0.086707 0.047646 1.819808 0.0785
PHEX -0.002221 0.000912 -2.434840 0.0208
R-squared 0.998852 Mean dependent var 19.74269
Adjusted R-squared 0.998667 S.D. dependent var 0.555977
S.E.ofregression 0.020301 Akaike info criterion -4.808888
Sum squared resid 0.012776 Schwarz criterion -4.547658
Log likelihood 94.96442 F-statistic 5393.960
Durbin-Watson stat 1.378606 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
Germany '.
,
, _,
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.071387 0.739397 12.26863 0.0000
LNC 3.118159 1.135023 2.747222 0.0101
LNC(-1) -1.156799 1.135130 -1.019089 0.3163
DEFICIT -2.34E-05 1.76E-05 -1.330375 0.1934
PHYSICIAN -0.425698 0.116389 -3.657541 0.0010
DELTAGDP -0.007610 0.007650 -0.994867 0.3278
PHEX 0.012096 0.003780 3.200002 0.0032
R-squared 0.988556 Mean dependent var 19.15523
Adjusted R-squared 0.986267 S.D. dependent var 0.495454
S.E.ofregression 0.058061 Akaike info criterion -2.685971
Sum squared resid 0.101134 Schwarz criterion -2.381202
Log likelihood 56.69045 F-statistic 43l.8989
Durbin- Watson stat 0.678004 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Netherlands <;
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.560563 0.627411 10.45656 0.0000
LNC 2.098353 0.128896 16.27939 0.0000
DEFICIT -1.67E-05 2.35E-05 -0.709173 0.4835
PHRMPCT 8.11E-05 0.000811 0.100049 0.9209
PHYSICIAN -0.305672 0.102608 -2.979041 0.0056
PHEX 0.005446 0.002576 2.114365 0.0426
R-squared 0.992229 Mean dependent var 17.18018
Adjusted R-squared 0.990976 S.D. dependent var 0.578435
S.E. of regression 0.054949 Akaike info criterion -2.817435
Sum squared resid 0.093601 Schwarz criterion -2.556206
Log likelihood 58.12256 F-statistic 791.6570
Durbin- Watson stat 1.042270 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
Spain I .
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample( adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5.320705 1.711743 -3.108354 0.0042
LNC 2.934808 0.196446 14.93955 0.0000
DEFPCT 0.000139 7.04E-05 1.979488 0.0573
PHRMPCT -0.005702 0.005249 -1.086435 0.2862
PHYSICIAN 0.325840 0.131655 2.474947 0.0194
PHEX -0.009620 0.004317 -2.228196 0.0338
R-squared 0.977884 Mean dependent var 21.56034
Adjusted R-squared 0.974071 S.D. dependent var 0.704549
S.E.ofregression 0.113451 Akaike info criterion -1.360093
Sum squared resid 0.373260 Schwarz criterion -1.093462
Log likelihood 29.80163 F-statistic 256.4510
Durbin- Watson stat 1.400154 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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Sweden " ""
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.039790 2.762337 -0.014405 0.9886
LNC 2.726201 0.455862 5.980320 0.0000
DEFICIT -5.74E-06 2.18E-06 -2.630854 0.0131
PHRMPCT -0.004654 0.003163 -1.471280 0.1513
PHYSICIAN 0.548017 0.234888 2.333093 0.0263
PHEX -0.017201 0.003960 -4.344063 0.0001
R-squared 0.969447 Mean dependent var 18.38300
Adjusted R-squared 0.964519 S.D. dependent var 0.432621
S.E.ofregression 0.081491 Akaike info criterion -2.029267
Sum squared resid 0.205862 Schwarz criterion -1.768037
Log likelihood 43.54143 F-statistic 196.7239
Durbin-Watson stat 1.091319 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
y,' Switzerland
.
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.475274 2.161601 2.995591 0.0057
LNC 1.837511 0.385922 4.761355 0.0001
DEFPCT -2.04E-05 1.48E-05 -1.382677 0.1777
DEFPCT(-l) -3.77E-05 1.48E-05 -2.552886 0.0164
DEFICIT -8.74E-06 2.10E-05 -0.415880 0.6807
PHRMPCT 0.001940 0.002082 0.931620 0.3595
PHYSICIAN -0.822546 0.275923 -2.981066 0.0059
PHEX 0.018417 0.004405 4.180576 0.0003
R-squared 0.983423 Mean dependent var 16.74365
Adjusted R-squared 0.979278 S.D. dependent var 0.521563
S.E.ofregression 0.075079 Akaike info criterion -2.147414
Sum squared resid 0.157833 Schwarz criterion -1.795521
Log likelihood 46.65345 F-statistic 237.2921
Durbin-Watson stat 0.838133 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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UK
-'Ii"
.,.. 'n.'
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1997
Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 10.76617 0.613660 17.54421 0.0000
LNC 1.357965 0.176423 7.697208 0.0000
DEFICIT -0.000152 4.88E-05 -3.116084 0.0039
PHRMPCT 0.007497 0.004626 1.620666 0.1152
PHYSICIAN 0.776370 0.106312 7.302773 0.0000
PHEX -0.003365 0.000941 -3.575687 0.0012
R-squared 0.987969 Mean dependent var 17.09876
Adjusted R-squared 0.986028 S.D. dependent var 0.411809
S.E.ofregression 0.048677 Akaike info criterion -3.059842
Sum squared resid 0.073452 Schwarz criterion -2.798612
Log likelihood 62.60707 F-statistic 509.1282
Durbin- Watson stat 1.015294 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
USA
Dependent Variable: LNHEX
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1996
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.243938 0.502170 18.40797 0.0000
LNC 2.045648 0.143829 14.22279 0.0000
DEFICIT -6.64E-05 2.40E-05 -2.769683 0.0097
PHRMPCT -0.009798 0.003689 -2.656017 0.0127
DEFPCT -1.48E-07 2.49E-06 -0.059422 0.9530
PHYSICIAN 0.303206 0.168500 1.799443 0.0824
PHEX 0.000253 0.001412 0.178958 0.8592
R-squared 0.996680 Mean dependent var 19.85160
Adjusted R-squared 0.995993 S.D. dependent var 0.589250
S.E. of regression 0.037298 Akaike info criterion -3.567092
Sum squared resid 0.040343 Schwarz criterion -3.259186
Log likelihood 71.20766 F-statistic 1451.116
Durbin-Watson stat 1.064992 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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Notes: 1 Period under investigation is 1960 - 1997.
2 Dependent variable is always the Log of health care expenditures in constant 1995
national currency units.
Last right hand column in each country table indicates levels of significance for each
variable.
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Table 6-11
as a regressor
Results of co-integration analysis with GDP
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after adiustin
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.028248 0.039186 -0.720870 0.4774
D(LNGDP) 1.266002 0.507061 2.496747 0.0192
D(LNGDP( -1» 0.709820 0.498769 1.423144 0.1666
D(PHRMPCT) 0.002570 0.001274 2.017902 0.0540
D(PHRMPCT(-I» 0.002772 0.001244 2.228519 0.0347
D(PHEX) 0.007856 0.008268 0.950155 0.3508
D(PHEX (-1» -0.004002 0.008804 -0.454530 0.6532
D(DEFICIT) -1.37E-05 3.42E-06 -4.001927 0.0005
ECTl 0.244156 0.127757 1.911103 0.0671
R-squared 0.514551 Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared 0.365182 S.D. dependent var
S.E.ofregression 0.042150 Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 0.046193 Schwarz criterion
Log likelihood 66.36714 F-statistic
Durbin- Watson stat 1.657732
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after adiustin
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.030712 0.034703 0.884990 0.3846
D(LNGDP) 0.980806 0.439189 2.233224 0.0347
D(LNGDP(-I» -0.267421 0.456995 -0.585173 0.5637
D(PHRMPCT) -0.002218 0.001191 -1.862598 0.0743
D(PHRMPCT(-l» -0.000414 0.001225 -0.337682 0.7384
D(PHEX) -0.010792 0.008398 -1.284984 0.2106
D(PHEX (-1» 0.008427 0.008738 0.964396 0.3441
D(DEFPCT) 1.20E-05 1.79E-05 0.674259 0.5063
ECT 0.914199 0.178717 5.115358 0.0000
ECT (-1) -0.949359 0.182444 -5.203576 0.0000
R-squared 0.630593 Mean dependent var 0.048670
Adjusted R-squared 0.497607 S.D. dependent var 0.052902
S.E. of regression 0.037497 Akaike info criterion -3.494155
Sum squared resid 0.035151 Schwarz criterion -3.049770
Log likelihood 71.14771 F-statistic 4.741786
Durbin- Watson stat 1.632239 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000960
344
Variable: D(LNHEX)
d: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
luded observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.001339 0.014699 -0.091077 0.9281
D(LNGDP) 0.089480 0.311805 0.286975 0.7763
D(LNGDP(-1» 1.324619 0.326592 4.055877 0.0004
D(DEFICIT(-l» -1.89E-06 8.43E-07 -2.241045 0.0334
D(PHRMPCT) -0.002661 0.001628 -1.635183 0.1136
D(PHRMPCT(-1» -0.003104 0.001594 -1.947191 0.0620
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.174616 0.088034 1.983518 0.0576
ECT 0.278827 0.143069 1.948901 0.0618
R-squared 0.480092 Mean dependent var 0.051435
usted R-squared 0.345300 S.D. dependent var 0.043158
S.E.ofregression 0.034921 Akaike info criterion -3.673853
Sum squared resid 0.032925 Schwarz criterion -3.318345
likelihood 72.29243 3.561746
1.647657 0.007
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.015855 0.030379 -0.521911 0.6060
D(LNGDP) 0.355807 0.421438 0.844267 0.4059
D(LNGDP(-l» 1.213848 0.354821 3.421016 0.0020
D(PHRMPCT) -0.002312 0.001755 -1.317228 0.1988
D(PHRMPCT( -1» -0.002837 0.001712 -1.657086 0.1091
D(PHEX) 0.004872 0.006355 0.766651 0.4499
D(pHYSICIAN) 0.154500 0.094743 1.630738 0.1146
ECT 0.281410 0.155547 1.809171 0.0816
0.396520 Mean dependent var 0.051435
0.240062 S.D. dependent var 0.043158
0.037623 Akaike info criterion -3.524793
0.038217 Schwarz criterion -3.169285
69.68388 F-statistic 2.534358
1.616569 0.038464
345
endent Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
uded observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.112755 0.035936 3.137685 0.0039
D(LNGDP(-1)) 0.406684 0.824522 0.493236 0.6256
D(PHRMPCT( -1)) -0.002061 0.001648 -1.251021 0.2209
D(PHEX) -0.030501 0.008026 -3.800114 0.0007
D(DEFICIT(-1)) 1.78E-07 4.63E-06 0.038362 0.9697
ECT 0.493318 0.116002 4.252668 0.0002
R-squared 0.514028 Mean dependent var 0.043808
justed R-squared 0.430240 S.D. dependent var 0.074534
S.E.ofregression 0.056260 Akaike info criterion -2.762859
Sum squared resid 0.091791 Schwarz criterion -2.496228
likelihood 54.35004 6.134849
1.478800 0.000541
endent Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after ts
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.120567 0.036924 3.265231 0.0029
D(LNGDP) -0.091015 0.759484 -0.119838 0.9055
D(LNGDP( -1)) 0.476547 0.366767 1.299319 0.2044
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000880 0.001940 0.453658 0.6536
D(PHEX) -0.031872 0.007943 -4.012442 0.0004
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.060167 0.136166 -0.441865 0.6620
D(DEFICIT) -5.10E-06 4.87E-06 -1.046133 0.3044
ECT 0.466029 0.136549 3.412899 0.0020
squared 0.530458 Mean dependent var 0.045352
usted R-squared 0.413072 S.D. dependent var 0.074043
S.E. of regression 0.056725 Akaike info criterion -2.708059
Sum squared resid 0.090098 Schwarz criterion -2.356166
likelihood 56.74507 F-statistic 4.518936
Watson stat 1.708364 0.001
346
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.001149 0.025040 -0.045867 0.9637
D(LNGDP) 8.208430 3.632229 2.259888 0.0318
D(LNGDP(-l» 0.744118 0.348504 2.135177 0.0416
D(PHRMPCT) 0.003697 0.001646 2.246683 0.0327
D(DEFICIT( -1» 2.l6E-06 4.33E-06 0.498718 0.6219
DELTAGDP -0.079348 0.035272 -2.249606 0.0325
D(PHEX) -0.002311 0.003377 -0.684246 0.4994
ECT 0.434954 0.176111 2.469776 0.0199
0.453619 Mean dependent var 0.048547
R-squared 0.317024 S.D. dependent var 0.043058
S.E.ofregression 0.035584 Akaike info criterion -3.640688
Sum squared resid 0.035455 Schwarz criterion -3.288795
Log likelihood 73.53239 F-statistic 3.320897
Durbin-Watson stat 1.427803 0.010597
Variable: D(LNHEX)
d: Least Squares
le(adjusted): 1963 1997
observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.002249 0.025296 -0.088891 0.9298
D(LNGDP) 7.426252 3.647254 2.036121 0.0517
D(LNGDP(-l» 0.952757 0.363311 2.622430 0.0142
D(PHRMPCT( -1» 0.003488 0.001484 2.350415 0.0263
D(DEFICIT(-1» 3.18E-06 4.31E-06 0.737126 0.4674
DELTAGDP -0.073110 0.035619 -2.052551 0.0499
D(PHEX) -0.001890 0.003582 -0.527650 0.6021
ECT 0.402373 0.176029 2.285831 0.0303
R-squared 0.459942 Mean dependent var 0.047852
Adjusted R-squared 0.319927 S.D. dependent var 0.043481
S.E.ofregression 0.035858 Akaike info criterion -3.620888
Sum squared resid 0.034716 Schwarz criterion -3.265380
Log likelihood 71.36554 F-statistic 3.28495
Durbin-Watson stat 1.840876 0.011718
347
Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.011126 0.011947 0.931351 0.3591
D(LNGDP) 0.687444 0.232902 2.951639 0.0061
D(LNGDP( -1)) 0.570089 0.222890 2.557718 0.0158
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000980 0.000493 1.987635 0.0560
D(PHEX) 0.000645 0.002610 0.247098 0.8065
ECT 0.586432 0.188034 3.118760 0.0040
0.635066 Mean dependent var
0.574244 S.D. dependent var
0.019162 Akaike info criterion
0.011016 Schwarz criterion
94.57294 F-statistic
l.638141
Variable: D(LNHEX)
d: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.004888 0.010549 0.463376 0.6466
D(LNGDP) 1.067951 0.233161 4.580316 0.0001
D(LNGDP(-I)) 0.370819 0.202889 1.827696 0.0779
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000729 0.000435 1.674845 0.1047
D(PHEX) 0.000405 0.002268 0.178611 0.8595
D(DEFICIT) -1.07E-05 3.26E-06 -3.281586 0.0027
ECT 0.626081 0.163761 3.823143 0.0006
0.733885 Mean dependent var 0.051786
0.678827 S.D. dependent var 0.029368
0.016643 Akaike info criterion -5.180951
0.008033 Schwarz criterion -4.873044
100.2571 F-statistic 13.3
1.998842 Prob O.
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Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.004297 0.021134 0.203309 0.8404
D(LNGDP) 0.955887 0.319773 2.989264 0.0058
D(LNGDP(-l)) 0.347108 0.204044 1.701138 0.1000
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.203622 0.111581 -1.824875 0.0787
D(DEFPCT) 2.13E-05 1.71E-05 1.243758 0.2239
D(PHRMPCT) 0.002041 0.001062 1.922073 0.0648
D(PHEX) 0.010163 0.006100 1.665986 0.1069
ECT 0.173129 0.153065 1.131080 0.2676
R-squared 0.490250 Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared 0.362812 S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression 0.031032 Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 0.026963
Log likelihood 78.46077
Durbin-Watson stat 1.691931
Variable: D(LNHEX)
. Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
uded observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.019891 0.017173 1.158275 0.2562
D(LNGDP) 0.651881 0.208118 3.132262 0.0039
D(LNGDP( -1)) 0.366949 0.205329 1.787124 0.0844
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.222573 0.111574 -1.994849 0.0555
D(PHRMPCT) 0.002257 0.001058 2.133739 0.0414
D(PHEX) 0.006592 0.005433 1.213319 0.2348
EeT 0.186471 0.l54122 1.209893 0.2361
R-squared 0.462087 Mean dependent var 0.0448
Adjusted R-squared 0.350795 S.D. dependent var 0.038875
S.E.ofregression 0.031323 Akaike info criterion -3.916268
Sum squared resid 0.028453 Schwarz criterion -3.608361
Log likelihood 77.49282 F-statistic 4.15201
Durbin -Watson stat 1.466365 0.003947
349
Variable: D(LNHEX)
Least Squares
le(adjusted): 1963 1997
observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.007851 0.013159 -0.596638 0.5557
D(LNGDP) 0.904732 0.283241 3.194216 0.0036
D(LNGDP(-I)) 0.906108 0.246951 3.669176 0.0011
D(PHRMPCT( -1)) 0.000106 0.000233 0.455997 0.6520
D(PHEX) 0.004050 0.002771 1.461727 0.1554
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.156516 0.101928 -1.535565 0.1363
D(DEFICIT) -2.30E-05 1.39E-05 -1.656730 0.1092
ECT 0.255114 0.137991 1.848771 0.0755
0.635470 Mean dependent var 0.052866
0.540962 S.D. dependent var 0.037384
0.025329 Akaike info criterion -4.316129
0.017322 Schwarz criterion -3.960621
83.53226 F-statistic 6.724001
1.479285 0.00011
Variable: D(LNHEX)
d: Least Squares
le(adjusted): 1963 1997
observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.008148 0.013562 -0.600785 0.5528
D(LNGDP) 0.792703 0.283491 2.796225 0.0092
D(LNGDP(-I)) 0.914378 0.254477 3.593161 0.0012
D(PHRMPCT( -1)) 3.66E-05 0.000236 0.155112 0.8778
D(PHEX) 0.004584 0.002836 1.616239 0.1173
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.106367 0.100316 -1.060323 0.2981
ECT 0.200223 0.138065 1.450208 0.1581
0.598413 Mean dependent var 0.052866
0.512359 S.D. dependent var 0.0373
0.026106 Akaike info criterion -4.27645
0.019082 Schwarz criterion -3.9653
81.83798 F-statistic 6.953893
1.439273 Prob 0.000133
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Variable: D(LNHEX)
Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
uded observations: 35 after ints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.038192 0.032040 1.192019 0.2440
D(LNGDP) 0.964049 0.405436 2.377807 0.0251
D(LNGDP(-I)) 0.859688 0.370351 2.321281 0.0284
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001120 0.001517 0.738505 0.4668
D(PHRMPCT( -1)) 0.001588 0.001488 1.067589 0.2955
D(PHEX (-1)) -0.010592 0.005062 -2.092567 0.0463
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.027509 0.096805 0.284171 0.7785
D(DEFICIT) -2.35E-07 4.30E-07 -0.546941 0.5891
ECT 0.391814 0.178889 2.190261 0.0377
uared 0.740113 Mean dependent var 0.076664
R-squared 0.660147 S.D. dependent var 0.064523
S.E. of regression 0.037615 Akaike info criterion -3.505785
Sum squared resid 0.036787 Schwarz criterion -3.105838
Log likelihood 70.35123 F-statistic 9.255417
Durbin- Watson stat 1.862540 0.000006
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
luded observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.038192 0.032040 1.192019 0.2440
D(LNGDP) 0.964049 0.405436 2.377807 0.0251
D(LNGDP(-I)) 0.859688 0.370351 2.321281 0.0284
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001120 0.001517 0.738505 0.4668
D(pHRMPCT( -1)) 0.001588 0.001488 1.067589 0.2955
D(PHEX (-1)) -0.010592 0.005062 -2.092567 0.0463
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.027509 0.096805 0.284171 0.7785
DCDEFICIT) -2.35E-07 4.30E-07 -0.546941 0.5891
ECT 0.391814 0.178889 2.190261 0.0377
ared 0.740113 Mean dependent var 0.076664
Adjusted R-squared 0.660147 S.D. dependent var 0.064523
S.E. of regression 0.037615 Akaike info criterion -3.505785
Sum squared resid 0.036787 Schwarz criterion -3.105838
Log likelihood 70.35123 F-statistic 9.255417
Durbin- Watson stat 1.862540 0.000006
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Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Samp1e(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after a<!i_ustingen<!Qoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.030934 0.011092 2.788871 0.0100
D(LNGDP) 0.729717 0.259705 2.809789 0.0095
D(LNGDP(-I» 0.610096 0.268332 2.273663 0.0318
D(PHRMPCT) -0.004610 0.001276 -3.614282 0.0013
D(PHRMPCT( -1» -0.000571 0.001059 -0.539297 0.5945
D(PHEX) -0.007938 0.001668 -4.758996 0.0001
D(PHEX (-1)) -0.001739 0.001590 -1.093395 0.2846
D(DEFICIT(-I» -3.88E-06 1.28E-06 -3.040615 0.0055
ECT 0.612784 0.112046 5.469037 0.0000
ECT (-1) -0.473461 0.105103 -4.504720 0.0001
R-squared 0.717296 Mean dependent var 0.039707
Adjusted R-squared 0.615523 S.D. dependent var 0.039574
S.E.ofregression 0.024538 Akaike info criterion -4.342220
Sum squared resid 0.015053 Schwarz criterion -3.897835
Log likelihood 85.98885 F-statistic 7.047983
Durbin-Watson stat 1.558126 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000051
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endent Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
luded observations: 36 after ts
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.009696 0.007763 1.248999 0.2220
D(LNGDP) 1.100393 0.110287 9.977507 0.0000
D(LNGDP(-I» 0.435536 0.110417 3.944473 0.0005
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000672 0.000205 3.282400 0.0028
D(PHEX (-1» 0.012602 0.002311 5.453677 0.0000
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.725780 0.053830 -13.48282 0.0000
ECT 0.881299 0.048476 18.18025 0.0000
ECT -0.881567 0.048697 -18.10314 0.0000
R-squared 0.950410 Mean dependent var 0.054325
Adjusted R-squared 0.938013 S.D. dependent var 0.042761
S.E.ofregression 0.010646 Akaike info criterion -6.054093
Sum squared resid 0.003174 Schwarz criterion -5.702200
Log likelihood 116.9737 F-statistic 76.66183
Durbin- Watson stat 1.960885 0.000000
ints
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.029263 0.007852 3.726934 0.0009
D(LNGDP) 1.204543 0.135607 8.882600 0.0000
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000662 0.000259 2.553187 0.0164
D(PHEX (-1» 0.007233 0.002418 2.991730 0.0057
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.715011 0.067150 -10.64802 0.0000
D(DEFICIT) 1.22E-06 6.05E-06 0.201317 0.8419
ECT 0.872524 0.060538 14.41274 0.0000
ECT -0.953514 0.057476 -16.58980 0.0000
0.922966 Mean dependent var 0.054325
0.903708 S.D. dependent var 0.042761
0.013269 Akaike info criterion -5.613631
0.004930 Schwarz criterion -5.261738
109.0454 F-statistic 47.92514
0.954954 0.000000
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Dependent V ariable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sarnple(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.028728 0.011554 2.486385 0.0197
D(LNGDP) 0.096409 0.234988 0.410274 0.6850
D(LNGDP(-l)) 0.579450 0.230409 2.514877 0.0184
D(PHRMPCT) 0.002936 0.001502 1.954744 0.0614
D(PHRMPCT(-I)) 0.001893 0.001734 1.092202 0.2848
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.037970 0.095561 0.397339 0.6944
D(PHEX (-1)) -0.002429 0.001582 -1.535829 0.1367
D(DEFICIT) -7.71E-05 2.81E-05 -2.743836 0.0109
ECT 0.339892 0.173036 1.964286 0.0603
R-squared 0.452678 Mean dependent var 0.038342
Adjusted R-squared 0.284272 S.D. dependent var 0.023507
S.E.ofregression 0.019887 Akaike info criterion -4.780417
Sum squared resid 0.010283 Schwarz criterion -4.380470
Log likelihood 92.65730 F-statistic 2.688007
Durbin- Watson stat 2.114842 Prob(F -statistic) 0.026791
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Table 6-12 Results of co-integration analysis with
consumption as a regressor
ependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.012723 0.033043 0.385041 0.7033
D(LNC) 0.817320 0.452444 1.806456 0.0824
D(LNC(-I» 0.314063 0.467397 0.671941 0.5075
D(PHRMPCT) 0.002476 0.001406 1.761025 0.0900
D(PHRMPCT(-I)) 0.003434 0.001266 2.712343 0.0117
D(PHEX) 0.009801 0.008589 1.141024 0.2643
D(PHEX( -1)) -0.008348 0.008507 -0.981345 0.3355
D(DEFICIT) -6.99E-06 3.71E-06 -1.884568 0.0707
ECT1 0.131301 0.060029 2.187274 0.0379
R-squared 0.444002 Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared 0.272926 S.D. dependent var
.E. of regression 0.045109 Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 0.052906 Schwarz criterion
likelihood 63.99256
1.657976
ependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
SampJe(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.000238 0.033812 -0.007030 0.9944
D(LNC) 1.037071 0.457350 2.267564 0.0316
D(LNC(-I» 0.235414 0.487031 0.483365 0.6327
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001515 0.001371 1.105034 0.2789
D(PHRMPCT(-l» 0.003356 0.001324 2.535146 0.0173
D(PHEX) 0.010799 0.008969 1.204043 0.2390
D(PHEX (-1» -0.005092 0.008714 -0.584298 0.5639
ECT 0.162682 0.060337 2.696195 0.0119
squared 0.368053 Mean dependent var 0.04867
justed R-squared 0.204215 S.D. dependent var 0.052902
S.E.ofregression 0.047192 Akaike info criterion -3.071533
Sum squared resid 0.060132 Schwarz criterion -2.716025
Log likelihood 61.75184 F-statistic 2
Durbin-Watson stat 1.621122 0.061535
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Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.008107 0.014252 0.568863 0.5742
D(LNC) 0.525931 0.422876 1.243699 0.2243
D(LNC(-l» 1.203120 0.447106 2.690907 0.0121
D(PHRMPCT) -0.002931 0.001713 -1.710935 0.0986
D(PHRMPCT(-l» -0.002528 0.001685 -1.499903 0.1452
D(DELTAGDP) -0.005265 0.002635 -1.998374 0.0558
D(DEFICIT( -1)) -1.13E-06 8.87E-07 -1.269011 0.2153
ECT 0.345849 0.162861 2.123578 0.0430
R-squared 0.421060 Mean dependent var 0.051435
Adjusted R-squared 0.270965 S.D. dependent var 0.043158
E. of regression 0.036850 Akaike info criterion -3.566308
Sum squared resid 0.036663 Schwarz criterion -3.210800
g likelihood 70.41038 F-statistic 2.805282
Watson stat 1.684497 Prob 0.024874
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Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
ample(adjusted): 1962 1997
luded observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.087414 0.025655 3.407348 0.0019
D(LNC) -0.244487 0.490575 -0.498369 0.6220
D(LNC(-l» 0.832749 0.460571 1.808078 0.0810
D(pHRMPCT) 0.004323 0.001947 2.220043 0.0344
D(PHEX) -0.023767 0.007668 -3.099459 0.0043
D(pHYSICIAN) 0.180802 0.139060 1.300172 0.2038
-9.97E-06 4.92E-06 -2.025584 0.0521
squared 0.399446 Mean dependent var 0.045352
Adjusted R-squared 0.275193 S.D. dependent var 0.074043
S.E. of regression 0.063037 Akaike info criterion -2.517520
Sum squared resid 0.115237 Schwarz criterion -2.209614
Log likelihood 52.31537 F-statistic 3.214789
-Watson stat 1.844234 0.015209
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.090503 0.023692 3.819947 0.0007
D(LNC) -0.245659 0.452419 -0.542991 0.5914
D(LNC(-l» 1.219481 0.452701 2.693791 0.0118
D(pHRMPCT) 0.003348 0.001839 1.821123 0.0793
D(PHEX) -0.027384 0.007222 -3.791874 0.0007
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.185622 0.128259 1.447237 0.1589
D(DEFICIT) -1.04E-05 4.54E-06 -2.284504 0.0301
ECT 0.254387 0.103016 2.469396 0.0199
R-squared 0.506846 Mean dependent var 0.045352
Adjusted R-squared 0.383558 S.D. dependent var 0.074043
S.E. of regression 0.058134 Akaike info criterion -2.65
Sum squared resid 0.094628 Schwarz criterion -2.3071
Log likelihood 55.86194 F-statistic 4.111061
Durbin- Watson stat 1.789597 Prob 0.003203
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Variable: D(LNHEX)
Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.031522 0.011272 2.796420 0.0096
D(LNC) 0.449339 0.158470 2.835485 0.0087
D(LNC(-I» 0.889268 0.180914 4.915427 0.0000
D(pHRMPeT) 0.004540 0.000967 4.694811 0.0001
D(PHEX) 0.004538 0.003422 1.326331 0.1963
D(PHEX (-1» -0.006630 0.003597 -1.842991 0.0768
D(DEFICIT) -6.71E-07 2.15E-06 -0.312086 0.7575
D(pHYSICIAN) -0.140257 0.073106 -1.918551 0.0661
ECT 0.660921 0.104719 6.311398 0.0000
EeT -0.638020 0.088435 -7.214547 0.0000
0.824040 Mean dependent var 0.048547
Adjusted R-squared 0.763130 S.D. dependent var 0.043058
S.E. of regression 0.020956 Akaike info criterion -4.662636
Sum squared resid 0.011418 Schwarz criterion -4.222769
Log likelihood 93.92744 F-statistic 13.52895
Watson stat 1.613564 0
endent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.031792 0.011049 2.877321 0.0077
D(LNC) 0.436870 0.150765 2.897684 0.0074
D(LNC(-I» 0.886527 0.177654 4.990180 0.0000
D(pHRMPCT) 0.004617 0.000919 5.023770 0.0000
D(PHEX) 0.004268 0.003254 1.311429 0.2008
D(PHEX (-1» -0.006239 0.003315 -1.881897 0.0707
D(pHYSICIAN) -0.142759 0.071440 -1.998317 0.0558
EeT 0.668836 0.099889 6.695817 0.0000
ECT -0.641243 0.086350 -7.426106 0.0000
R-squared 0.823381 Mean dependent var 0.048547
Adjusted R-squared 0.771049 S.D. dependent var 0.043058
S.E. of regression 0.020603 Akaike info criterion -4.714452
Sum squared resid 0.011461 Schwarz criterion -4.318572
likelihood 93.86014 F-statistic 15.73388
in-Watson stat 1.587798 0
359
Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
uded observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.003517 0.010998 0.319784 0.7514
D(LNC) 1.351456 0.247045 5.470490 0.0000
D(LNC(-I)) 0.641028 0.226307 2.832555 0.0083
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000861 0.000435 1.979950 0.0573
D(PHEX (-1)) -0.000237 0.002097 -0.113186 0.9107
D(DEFICIT) -7.45E-06 2.96E-06 -2.517977 0.0176
ECT 0.668052 0.168578 3.962856 0.0004
R-squared 0.728334 Mean dependent var 0.051786
Adjusted R-squared 0.672127 S.D. dependent var 0.029368
S.E.ofregression 0.016816 Akaike info criterion -5.160306
squared resid 0.008201 Schwarz criterion -4.852400
likelihood 99.88551 12.95813
2.006869 0.000000
endent Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.009130 0.011689 0.781071 0.4409
D(LNC) 1.152657 0.254071 4.536751 0.0001
D(LNC(-I)) 0.679563 0.245063 2.773017 0.0095
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001058 0.000464 2.278787 0.0300
D(PHEX (-1)) -0.000587 0.002271 -0.258520 0.7978
ECT 0.601183 0.180684 3.327269 0.0023
0.668940 Mean dependent var 0.051786
0.613764 S.D. dependent var 0.029368
0.018251 Akaike info criterion -5.018136
0.009993 Schwarz criterion -4.754216
96.32645 F-statistic 12.12362
1.790520 0.000002
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Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.030927 0.015722 1.967134 0.0588
D(LNC) 1.030362 0.307310 3.352838 0.0022
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.177481 0.098687 -1.798412 0.0825
D(DEFPCT) 5.34E-06 1.24E-05 0.431726 0.6691
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001924 0.000838 2.296447 0.0291
D(PHEX) 0.001608 0.004501 0.357159 0.7236
ECT 0.268846 0.089397 3.007329 0.0054
R-squared 0.567659 Mean dependent var 0.044800
Adjusted R-squared 0.478210 S.D. dependent var 0.038875
S.E.ofregression 0.028081 Akaike info criterion -4.134751
Sum squared resid 0.022868 Schwarz criterion -3.826844
Log likelihood 81.42551 F-statistic 6.346124
Durbin-Watson stat 1.545707 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000238
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.020806 0.009992 2.082262 0.0466
D(LNC) 0.610389 0.190122 3.210519 0.0033
D(LNC(-1» 0.960568 0.189578 5.066864 0.0000
D(PHRMPCT) 7.31E-06 0.000239 0.030642 0.9758
D(PHEX) -0.001339 0.002679 -0.499760 0.6211
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.105485 0.095522 -1.104306 0.2789
D(DEFICIT) -2.04E-05 1.37E-05 -1.487218 0.1481
ECT 0.380543 0.103140 3.689563 0.0010
R-squared 0.620306 Mean dependent var 0.05392
Adjusted R-squared 0.525382 S.D. dependent var 0.037385
S.E.ofregression 0.025756 Akaike info criterion -4.287196
Sum squared resid 0.018574 Schwarz criterion -3.935303
Log likelihood 85.16953 F-statistic 6.534795
Durbin- Watson stat 1.329328 0.000128
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1997
Included observations: 36 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.001141 0.002451 -0.465303 0.6453
D(LNC) 2.097603 0.077782 26.96755 0.0000
D(LNC(-l» -0.037589 0.059725 -0.629367 0.5342
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000149 5.32E-05 2.796309 0.0092
D(PHEX) 0.006076 0.000670 9.068655 0.0000
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.286635 0.023267 -12.31960 0.0000
ECT 0.986596 0.035662 27.66491 0.0000
ECT -1.011809 0.043248 -23.39562 0.0000
0.980062 Mean dependent var 0.053920
Adjusted R-squared 0.975078 S.D. dependent var 0.037385
S.E.ofregression 0.005902 Akaike info criterion -7.233950
Sum squared resid 0.000975 Schwarz criterion -6.882057
Log likelihood 138.2111 F-statistic 196.6250
Durbin- Watson stat 2.182371 0.000000
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.108853 0.015949 6.825042 0.0000
D(LNC) 0.447283 0.187781 2.381937 0.0248
D(LNC(-1» 0.291379 0.174197 1.672701 0.1064
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001202 0.001412 0.851672 0.4022
D(PHRMPCT( -1» 0.001831 0.001372 1.334448 0.1936
D(PHEX (-1» -0.018056 0.003560 -5.071657 0.0000
D(DEFICIT( -1» 9.14E-07 4.15E-07 2.201254 0.0368
ECT 0.088676 0.073401 1.208107 0.2379
R-squared 0.764624 Mean dependent var 0.074734
Adjusted R-squared 0.701253 S.D. dependent var 0.064460
S.E.ofregression 0.035233 Akaike info criterion -3.651362
Sum squared resid 0.032275 Schwarz criterion -3.292219
Log likelihood 70.07316 F-statistic 12.06591
Durbin-Watson stat 1.666634 0.000001
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.100526 0.016405 6.127775 0.0000
D(LNC) 0.420359 0.191414 2.196074 0.0365
D(LNC(-1» 0.342063 0.179425 1.906442 0.0669
D(PHRMPCT) 0.001984 0.001454 1.364420 0.1833
D(PHRMPCT(-I» 0.002249 0.001442 1.559677 0.1301
D(PHEX (-1» -0.016645 0.003720 -4.474225 0.0001
ECT 0.039308 0.067709 0.580541 0.5662
R-squared 0.723818 Mean dependent var 0.076664
Adjusted R-squared 0.664637 S.D. dependent var 0.064523
S.E.ofregression 0.037366 Akaike info criterion -3.559261
Sum squared resid 0.039094 Schwarz criterion -3.248191
Log likelihood 69.28706 F-statistic 12.23043
Durbin-Watson stat 1.931559 Prob 0.000001
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Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after adlustil!B_endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.005051 0.009092 0.555533 0.5839
D(LNC) 1.866451 0.271815 6.866617 0.0000
D(LNC(-I» 0.944573 0.269314 3.507327 0.0019
D(PHRMPCT) -0.003595 0.000967 -3.717837 0.0011
D(PHRMPCT(-I» -0.001176 0.000784 -1.499221 0.1474
D(PHEX) -0.009825 0.001614 -6.088272 0.0000
D(PHEX(-I» -0.002771 0.001362 -2.034823 0.0536
D(DEFICIT(-I» -3.37E-06 9.00E-07 -3.745633 0.0011
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.264231 0.069113 3.823179 0.0009
ECT 0.639861 0.083769 7.638433 0.0000
ECT(-I) -0.424647 0.117308 -3.619940 0.0014
ECT(-2) -0.225379 0.073318 -3.074010 0.0054
R-squared 0.871692 Mean dependent var 0.039707
Adjusted R-squared 0.810328 S.D. dependent var 0.039574
S.E. of regression 0.017235 Akaike info criterion -5.017902
Sum squared resid 0.006832 Schwarz criterion -4.484640
Log likelihood 99.81329 F-statistic 14.20515
Durbin-Watson stat 1.755267 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000
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endent Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.034081 0.017702 1.925202 0.0652
D(LNC) 0.617766 0.319473 1.933702 0.0641
D(LNCC-l)) 0.453987 0.314293 1.444470 0.1606
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000629 0.000683 0.921850 0.3651
D(PHEX (-1)) 0.006398 0.005765 1.109726 0.2773
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.537419 0.166725 -3.223386 0.0034
D(DEFICIT) -1.72E-05 1.43E-05 -1.203861 0.2395
ECT 0.435964 0.117812 3.700506 0.0010
ECT -0.525151 0.l25997 -4.167963 0.0003
R-squared 0.494361 Mean dependent var 0.051996
justed R-squared 0.338780 S.D. dependent var 0.041002
S.E.ofregression 0.033341 Akaike info criterion -3.747008
Sum squared resid 0.028903 Schwarz criterion -3.347061
Log likelihood 74.57264 F-statistic 3.177513
Durbin-Watson stat 2.038135 0.011954
Variable: D(LNHEX)
Least Squares
Sarnple(adjusted): 1963 1997
uded observations: 35 after ts
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.036383 0.018596 1.956524 0.0617
D(LNC) 0.594771 0.327802 1.814423 0.0816
D(LNC(-l)) 0.411520 0.331020 1.243189 0.2253
D(PHRMPCT) 0.000399 0.000843 0.472697 0.6405
D(PHRMPCT( -1» -0.000397 0.000826 -0.481288 0.6345
D(PHBX (-1» 0.005847 0.005963 0.980673 0.3361
D(PHYSICIAN) -0.538943 0.169274 -3.183845 0.0039
D(DEFICIT) -1.80B-05 1.46E-05 -1.231742 0.2295
ECT 0.433561 0.119697 3.622171 0.0013
BCT -0.516871 0.129053 -4.005106 0.0005
squared 0.499003 Mean dependent var 0.051996
usted R-squared 0.318644 S.D. dependent var 0.041002
S.E.ofregression 0.033845 Akaike info criterion -3.699088
Sum squared resid 0.028637 Schwarz criterion -3.254703
Log likelihood 74.73404 F-statistic 2.766724
Durbin-Watson stat 2.022957 0.021398
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Variable: D(LNHEX)
Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.001760 0.003674 0.479079 0.6359
D(LNC) 1.210346 0.100510 12.04202 0.0000
D(PHRMPCT) 0.006622 0.000535 12.38068 0.0000
D(PHRMPCT(-I» -0.000269 0.000538 -0.500796 0.6207
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.687890 0.049341 13.94146 0.0000
D(PHEX (-1» -0.002037 0.000477 -4.268960 0.0002
D(DEFICIT) -0.000133 9.68E-06 -13.78458 0.0000
ECT 0.857056 0.065070 13.17122 0.0000
ECT -0.875913 0.052566 -16.66297 0.0000
R-squared 0.940914 Mean dependent var
justed R-squared 0.922734 S.D. dependent var
S.E.ofregression 0.006534 Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 0.001110
g likelihood 131.6131
-Watson stat 2.085616
Variable: D(LNHEX)
: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1997
Included observations: 35 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.041215 0.006499 6.341564 0.0000
D(LNC) 0.123295 0.160781 0.766847 0.4501
D(LNC(-I» -0.137176 0.216316 -0.634145 0.5315
D(PHRMPCT) 0.003739 0.001341 2.788606 0.0098
D(PHRMPCT( -1» -0.000193 0.001523 -0.126598 0.9002
D(PHYSICIAN) 0.201443 0.092173 2.185482 0.0381
D(PHEX (-1» -0.002641 0.001306 -2.022816 0.0535
D(DEFICIT) -7.79E-05 2.39E-05 -3.254918 0.0031
ECT -0.346071 0.107773 -3.211107 0.0035
R-squared 0.553579 Mean dependent var 0.0383
Adjusted R-squared 0.416219 S.D. dependent var 0.0235
S.E.ofregression 0.017961 Akaike info criterion -4.9841
Sum squared resid 0.008388 Schwarz criterion -4.584245
Log likelihood 96.22336 F-statistic 4.03012
Durbin-Watson stat 2.387610 0.003168
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Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sarnple(adjusted): 1963 1996
Included observations: 34 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.039113 0.010082 3.879336 0.0007
D(LNC) 0.981813 0.265263 3.701278 0.0011
D(LNC(-l» -0.270781 0.147108 -1.840693 0.0776
D(PHRMPCT) -0.005474 0.001991 -2.749775 0.0109
D(PHRMPCT( -1» -0.000927 0.001348 -0.687488 0.4981
D(PHEX) -0.001438 0.001611 -0.892258 0.3808
D(pHYSICIAN) 0.157838 0.067844 2.326488 0.0284
ECT 0.493900 0.154382 3.199213 0.0037
ECT -0.500703 0.137101 -3.652082 0.0012
0.484969 Mean dependent var 0.05621
Adjusted R-squared 0.320159 S.D. dependent var 0.014976
S.E.ofregression 0.012348 Akaike info criterion -5.728704
Sum squared resid 0.003812 Schwarz criterion -5.324667
Log likelihood 106.3880 F-statistic 2.942597
Durbin-Watson stat 1.161612 0.018355
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEX)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1996
Included observations: 34 after
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.039747 0.008470 4.692830 0.0001
D(LNC) 0.546857 0.154646 3.536192 0.0017
D(LNC(-l» 0.328530 0.156600 2.097898 0.0466
D(PHRMPCT) -0.001334 0.001371 -0.972824 0.3403
D(PHRMPCT( -1» -0.002606 0.001335 -1.951516 0.0628
D(PHEX (-1» -0.001280 0.001484 -0.862406 0.3970
DCDEFICIT( -1» -3.31E-05 1.09E-05 -3.047377 0.0055
D(DELTAGDP) -0.001372 0.001033 -1.327998 0.1967
ECT 0.231618 0.090200 2.567834 0.0169
ECT -0.325660 0.084666 -3.846425 0.0008
0.568228 Mean dependent var 0.056217
0.406314 S.D. dependent var 0.014976
0.011539 Akaike info criterion -5.846210
0.003196 Schwarz criterion -5.397280
109.3856 F-statistic 3.509435
Watson stat 1.937937 0.006677
Note: I ECT: Error Correction Tenn.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS, POLICY
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has shown that the determinants of health care expenditures are simply too diverse
amongst different countries to be brought within a common denominator as implied by the
use of exchange rates, purchasing power parities (PPPs), cross-sectional or, even, pooled
cross-sectional analysis. Their diversity also implies that the use of GDP does very little in
terms of contributing to an understanding of the fundamental issues affecting their size and
can potentially offer at most a measure of the impact of the macro economy on health
spending. This gives strong credence to the argument that casual empiricism and analytical
convenience have preceded methodological correctness.
The thesis has also shown that the assumption that health care is a homogeneous good across
countries is an over-simplistic and arbitrary assumption that does not correspond to reality.
Furthermore, the thesis has found ample evidence showing that health care is not a luxury
good and that GDP is only weakly associated with health spending, instead of being a major
determinant of it. In reaching these results, the thesis contributes to knowledge and,
ultimately, to the process of health policy-making on methodological, theoretical and
empirical grounds as outlined below.
7.2 Methodological contribution
In terms of methodology, the thesis has shown that there are significant flaws in several areas
that influence our thinking concerning the determinants of health care expenditures, which
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were initially thought to be robust, and has offered alternative ways of analysis and appraisal.
In particular, flaws were shown to be present in:
(a) The conceptual issues around: (i) the relationship between health expenditure and
GDP; (ii) the extent to which GDP and other variables provide robust estimates of the
variation in health care expenditures; and (iii) the importance of factors such as
ageing, the macroeconomic context and the burden of disease;
(b) The measurement of key variables used in empirical analysis, such as health
spending, national income, technology, and health prices;
(c) The method of analysis that has been pursued and the fact that it most frequently
entails simultaneously analysing countries which are vastly different from each other;
(d) The conversion factors used to bring translate prices and monetary variables from
different countries into a single and comparable denominator.
A more detailed treatment of the above four issues is offered in the sections that follow.
7.2.1 Conceptual issues arising from the literature
The thesis has shown that the Aggregate Health Care Expenditure to GDP relationship is
subject to six significant qualifications. The first qualification is related to the method of
analysis. A meta-analysis of the literature in chapter 2 showed that the results can be sensitive
to the estimation technique used (whether cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional or time-
series). It was shown that although it was common for the income elasticity of demand to
exceed unity in bi-variate and multi-variate cross-sectional analyses, it was less common in
pooled cross-sectional and time-series studies. Overall, the initial, apparently, overwhelming
evidence about the income elasticity of demand for health care being greater than unity faded
in subsequent studies, so that hypotheses have been advanced that health care is neither "a
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necessity" or "a luxury", but, somewhat implausibly, "both" since the income elasticity varies
with the level of analysis. Nevertheless, regardless of the value of the elasticity, the literature
concluded that income was positively correlated with health expenditure and statistically
significant. In contrast, the methodological approach adopted in this thesis demonstrated that
even this empirical finding was deeply flawed. It was also shown that the relationship
between GDP and health expenditure was not significant in the majority of countries
analysed.
Second, whereas factors other than income were identified in the literature to be significant
explanatory factors for the variance in health care expenditure, the thesis has examined the
robustness of the results obtained and concluded that these are contestable and that the
relationships found are inconsistent. This, in turn, reflects the absence of a theoretical
framework underpinning the empirical analysis and the multiplicity of hypotheses tested
within a single empirical model. Another concern is the use of large numbers of dummy
Variables in empirical investigations. Authors make excessive use of dummy variables
without taking into account the well-known problems related to their use, particularly the
problem of inter-relationships between dummies. In addition to the cautious use of dummies,
the thesis has shown that systemic variables associated with the measurement of the impact of
reforms in certain countries (for example, the impact of the market-oriented reforms in the
UK over the 1991 - 1997 period), or associated with exogenous factors having an impact on
key variables (such as German re-unification) had remained unaccounted for.
Third, although several of the studies reviewed draw criticism because of misspecification
problems and unexplained omissions in the analytical models, further issues remain
unresolved. These relate to the actual choice of variables and their comparability across
countries and over time. They also relate to the lag structure in individual models, which
often appears to be contrary to what (economic) theory would predict. A characteristic
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example in this context is the relationship between income and health care expenditure. If one
accepts the validity of public choice theory, as many authors have done, then current levels of
health care expenditure should be determined by past levels of GDP plus the trend of GDP or
its growth, rather than current GDP levels. Yet, there has not been a single study in the
literature until now that has tested this particular hypothesis.
Fourth, while there appears to be a great deal of concern about the economic interpretation of
an elasticity of demand greater or smaller than unity and the robustness of econometric
technique in deriving one or the other, what is conspicuous by its absence is the discussion of
the policy relevance of the findings obtained and how they could be translated into policy
recommendations for individual health systems or groups of health care systems. Similarly,
as presented, the empirical cross-country literature has hardly contributed to the policy debate
about whether there is an optimal level of resources to be spent on health.
Fifth, with regards to population ageing, several empirical studies have attempted to analyse
its effects as a determinant of health spending. A number of macro-level studies of the
determinants of health care expenditures have included ageing as an explanatory variable and
have found a positive and significant relationship between the two. On the other hand,
although ageing is an important contributor to social security costs, its true value in pushing
health care costs up has been disputed in micro-level studies and only a weak association
between health expenditure and ageing has been found in the literature. The thesis has
advanced the view that ageing, expressed as a proportion of the population over 65, is
irrelevant as what really matters is intensity of health service utilisation during the last
months of life. The thesis has therefore explicitly excluded ageing as a potential determinant
of health care expenditures on conceptual grounds.
Finally, the thesis has discussed other potential determinants of health care expenditures. In
doing so, it highlighted the importance of macroeconomic factors, such as the fiscal deficit
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and total public consumption on goods and services, but also the significance of measures of
disease burden, the relevance of consumer expectations about health services and the extent
to which expectations shape demand. While some of these variables are measured quite
accurately by national statistics (e.g. fiscal deficit, total public consumption), the thesis has
strongly criticised the inclusion of lifestyle variables - such as tobacco consumption, alcohol
consumption or fat consumption per capita - in empirical analysis on two grounds: first, due
to imperfect data, which have significant gaps in the respective time-series, and, second, on
the grounds that these variables have been arbitrarily included without proper account of the
lag structures involved in the genesis of disease. The thesis has further argued for better data
sources and understanding of causal pathways in this area that would facilitate their inclusion
in empirical studies. Although the importance of measures of disease burden was
acknowledged, current knowledge of their impact on need for health services is still
inadequate.
7.2.2 Measurement of variables
The thesis has placed a great deal of attention on the measurement of key variables
particularly GDP and health expenditure and has shown that gross disparities exist across
available data sources, which make cross-country comparisons within a cross-sectional or
pooled cross-sectional setting virtually meaningless. It has also examined the use of
technology and health prices, both from a methodological and empirical point of view.
7.2.2.1 On the validity of GDP as a proxy for national income
Whereas the entire body of empirical literature uses GDP as a proxy for income, the thesis
has demonstrated that the different systems of national accounts provide non-comparable
GDP estimates across countries, yielding biases to all estimates obtained through cross-
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sectional or pooled cross-sectional analysis. Furthermore, there are certain aspects of
economic activity which cannot be captured by GDP in the empirical investigation. One very
important aspect is the considerable impact of the parallel economy in a number of
(developed) countries and its potential size both in terms of contribution to national income
and voluntary contributions for health services. On those grounds, the thesis queried and
criticised the use of GDP as a proxy for national income and suggested that total personal
consumption should be used as a more representative proxy, since it reflects (household)
decisions based on aggregate household income; the latter includes non-financial as well as
financial wealth, and may to a certain degree also capture the extent of activities in the
shadow economy.
7.2.2.2 On the validity of Health Expenditure measurements
It has been shown that the methodology for measuring health expenditures varies by country,
as do accounting practices, often resulting in measurements that provide little basis for
comparison across countries. The thesis has argued that any cross-section or pooled cross-
section analysis of the determinants of health care expenditures is flawed, in that it implicitly
assumes perfect comparability of health care expenditure data and their measurement across
countries and over time. The way forward would of course be to standardise the measurement
and reporting of health care expenditure data, work that is currently being undertaken by the
WHO in its programme to strengthen national health accounts. While this would possibly be
the most robust strategy, a country-by-country, time-series analysis of the determinants of
health care expenditures would partly address the issue of data comparability across
countries.
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7.2.2.3 On the validity of technology measurements
The thesis acknowledged the complete absence of "technology" considerations from the
empirical (econometric) literature of the determinants of health care expenditures, despite the
latter being credited to have been a net and consistent contributor to increasing health care
costs in most industrialised countries. Indeed, medical technology has very rarely appeared
explicitly in empirical analysis, despite arguments that it is one of the most dynamic
components of growth in health spending. This has been due to the inadequacy of data on
technology spending and utilisation, as well as the absence of a definition of what is
technology. In recognising the imperfections arising from data sources, the objective of the
thesis was, among other things, to contribute to the debate around the impact of technology
and to highlight areas for further research. Nevertheless, in acknowledging the importance of
technology an attempt has been made to incorporate technology explicitly in the analysis of
the determinants of health care expenditures. Despite the complexity of the issues
surrounding technology, two potential proxies - rate of growth in pharmaceutical
expenditure, and prices of health care goods - were suggested as ways to provide estimates of
its impact on health care expenditure.
7.2.2.4Measuring Health Prices
The thesis has criticised the use in the literature of health prices. A number of important
conclusions were also reached with regards to the importance of prices and the relative price
of health care. For instance, omission of a price variable might affect the value of the income
elasticity of demand. Similarly, the relative price of health care in pooled cross-sectional and
time-series analysis is a key factor as price movements are important determinants of changes
in health care expenditures. The thesis makes use of price indices which capture movements
374
in prices of health goods and services over the period under investigation, in order to enable
dynamic effects as well as technological innovations to be represented adequately.
7.2.3 Conversion factors
The thesis has discussed the validity of different conversion factors employed in cross-
country comparison, sharply criticising the use of exchange rates and PPPs (Health- and
GDP-PPP). Whereas exchange rates have also been criticised widely in the literature, by
default the use of PPPs has been widely accepted. However, the thesis has shown
conclusively that Health-PPPs are severely biased towards pharmaceuticals whilst, at the
same time, they cannot capture the extent of innovation because they are static over the short-
term as they are not updated annually, but only once every five years. Empirical research has
also shown that results are often sensitive to the choice of conversion factor. This leaves the
health expenditure-related variables without a credible deflator over time that would produce
comparable health expenditure data in different countries. Given that neither exchange rates
nor purchasing power parities enable a robust comparison across countries, the thesis has not
used any of these in the empirical analysis and has resorted to all financial variables being
expressed in national currency units (NCUs) deflated by the 1995 GDP deflator in each
country. This has also meant an important deviation from the previous paradigm of cross-
sectional or pooled cross-sectional analysis, as elaborated below.
7.2.4 Estimation methodologies
The thesis has assessed the relative advantages and disadvantages of different estimation
methodologies (cross-sectional, pooled cross-sectional, and time-series analysis) used in
estimating the importance of different variables as determinants of health care expenditures.
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With regard to the estimation methodology it is important in any econometric modelling to
provide a comprehensive understanding of particular sequences. It has been argued that it is
doubtful whether this can be done in cross-sectional studies and the value of reducing
institutional developments to a dummy variable in either cross-sectional or pooled cross-
sectional analysis is questionable.
The thesis has thus supported the use of individual country time-series analysis to address the
question of the determinants of health care expenditures, on theoretical and conceptual
grounds. Through time-series analysis for individual countries, it has become possible to
explore the long-term relationships between predictors of health expenditures at country
level. The methodology used in this thesis looks at the health production function within each
individual country over a predetermined period without converting economic variables into a
common currency. It therefore avoids the methodological problems that both the use of
exchange rates and Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) present in similar analyses for both
macroeconomic and health indicators without sacrificing the possibility of comparing results
across countries for similar variables. It also avoids the methodological problems arising
from the same variables being collected and/or reported in different ways in different
countries. Finally, by studying individual countries, time-series analysis also enables policy
conclusions specific to particular health systems to be drawn.
7.3 Theoretical contribution
The thesis has argued that there is no existing theoretical or conceptual framework on which
to base the health expenditure - income relationship; one can seek a relationship between
health spending and any other macroeconomic variable and still come up with statistically
significant results. The empirical analysis that has hitherto taken place and was reviewed in
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chapter 2, is therefore ad hoc and does not per se add to the existing pool of knowledge.
Furthermore, there is very little analysis or theory of what actually determines health
spending; rather, there is an ad hoc use of those factors which can be measured and are thus
readily available for econometric analysis.
Having recognised the absence of an analytical framework, the thesis has provided the
theoretical arguments for the treatment of health care systems and the determinants of health
care expenditures on an individual and intertemporal basis. The theoretical approach
presented in chapter 5 of the thesis deviates from the existing literature of the determinants of
health care expenditures in a number of ways.
First, it proposes a conceptual framework that explicitly links the determinants of health care
expenditures to the theory of public finance, and allows flexible adjustments by decision-
makers to account for changes in technology, population structure, prices, and the
macroeconomic environment. The conceptual framework recognises that budgets for health
care may need to be adjusted over time because of these changes. Their extent will determine
the optimal size of the "health budget". In doing so, the thesis assumes that health care is at
least a quasi-public good.
Second, the analysis explicitly attempts to assess the impact of the macro economy on health
spending in two different ways. First, it investigates whether the rate of growth of income in
the economy has any influence on the demand for health. Second, it investigates whether
each country's public finances impact on health spending and to what extent.
Third, the proposed framework attempts to incorporate technology in order to analyse its
impact on health care expenditures. This is an advance from the published literature, which
has almost invariably considered technology as a residual factor. In particular, the impact of
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technological change is investigated in two separate ways: first, as an expenditure effect,
thereby incorporating prices and volumes, and, secondly, as a price effect, analysing the
impact of prices of health care goods and services over time on health care expenditures.
Fourth, it recognises that the lag structure of the model, the availability of data, and
knowledge of the relationship between disease and need for services are not sufficient to test
for the impact of lifestyle and disease factors on health spending. Unfortunately, there is no
means currently available to test this complex relationship. This is clearly a gap, which future
research and policy needs to address.
7.4 Empirical evidence
The thesis highlighted the limitations of the empirical literature in explaining the inter-
temporal variation in health care expenditures and suggested a number of alternatives which
were subsequently tested in each of the (13) countries analysed for a 39 year period. The
analytical methodology therefore pursued a country-by-country investigation on a time series
basis, rather than a cross-sectional or a pooled cross-sectional analysis.
Conclusive evidence is provided on the non-importance (and, very frequently, irrelevance) of
GDP in explaining part of the variation in health care spending over time, as well as the value
of the income elasticity of demand. While the available empirical evidence suggests that GDP
is an important determinant of health spending, the present investigation has concluded that
its significance has been at best overrated and in many countries fails to explain any of the
variation in health spending over time. In the majority of countries examined, the value of the
income elasticity of demand is significantly lower than unity, implying that health care is a
normal rather than a luxury good. Similar results emerge for the rate of growth of GDP. Both
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results question the appropriateness of GDP in (partly) explaining health spending and stress
the need for alternative macroeconomic variables that are more relevant to the health care
sector.
In addition, the thesis has confirmed a number of observations and arrives at a number of
conclusions in relation to policy on cost containment in health systems. As expected, the
results vary by country, which is an effect of different organisation and delivery mechanisms
as well as different needs across countries. However, some major trends have been identified
as follows:
• First, consumption is found to be a generally weak predictor of health expenditures;
• Second, technology is an important cost-push factor in some countries.
• Third, the cost of human resources versus the cost of technology has been evaluated
with the use of average wages in the health sector. Ceteris paribus, average wages
have exerted a significant upward pressure on health care costs in most countries, with
few exceptions. In the former, the positive contribution of wages to health care costs
is associated with a relative reduction in hospital costs, possibly indicating a cost-
saving technology; in the latter, the static downward pressure of wages on health care
costs is associated with a relative increase in hospital costs, indicating cost-increasing
technology and the preponderance of technology over human resources.
• Fourth, the macro economy exerts, in general, significant pressure on health care
expenditure, as indicated by the fiscal stance variable.
• Fifth, the impact of health care reforms, as expressed by dummy variables in specific
countries, appeared to be weakly and positively associated with health care
expenditure, though not statistically significant.
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• Finally, the number of doctors per capita appears to have little or no association with
health care expenditures, with the exception of Finland and Spain, where positive and
statistically significant associations were found.
7.5 Policy relevance
The thesis has acknowledged the absence of policy-relevant results from the empirical
literature. The main finding from that literature, that health care is a lUXUrygood, has also
been left without policy interpretation. The exception, perhaps, was the interpretation that if
health care is a luxury good, the marginal units purchase care rather than cure. However, it is
questionable whether a cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional analysis of many countries
can lead to any specific policy conclusions at national (system) level. Cross-sectional and
pooled cross-sectional analysis brings together countries with vastly different backgrounds and
efforts should be made to take into consideration measurement differences and other
methodological imprecisions. In that respect, the available empirical literature, provides little
insight for policy-making.
By identifying a country-by-country model that helps explain the determinants of health care
expenditures, the thesis has also contributed to the policy debate: first, because the analysis is
conducted at national level, thereby all estimates are relevant to the policy-making
community of each particular country. For instance, the finding that health care is a normal
rather than a luxury good over time implies that, despite cyclical or countercyclical pressures
on the macro economy, health care expenditure is increasing in line with national resources.
This is quite different from health care spending increasing faster than national resources
over a period of time; in this case, remedial action may be needed at the macro as well as the
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micro level, whereas in the former case, remedial action may only be needed at the micro
level.
Second, by measuring individual variables, the thesis has provided estimates of their
importance at national level, which can subsequently be taken further by decision-makers.
Third, a comparative element has also been included in the analysis in that the same model
applies to the 13 different countries and for the same time period, thereby allowing policy
conclusions to be drawn on the relative importance of individual determinants on a country-
by-country basis.
7.6 Limitations and further research
In pursuing an aggregate (macroeconomic) type of analysis, its limitations are recognised.
The thesis has not addressed the question of the discrepancies between income elasticities of
demand in macro- and micro-economic studies, but the gaps and inconsistencies that the
literature on aggregate demand for health care has revealed. To that end, the thesis has used
the same or similar data sources as those used by other researchers, but it also points to gaps
in these data sources. The limitations briefly outlined below, can serve as the basis for future
research.
First, most, if not all, of the empirical studies to date appear to have been driven by the
availability of data. This begs two related questions: first, can the available data be better
utilised so that they can make more sense for policy development? Second, what
improvements might we need in order to better analyse and understand the determinants of
health care expenditures and for that analysis to make sense for the development of a policy
agenda? The thesis has argued that better estimates of health expenditure figures, national
income figures, technology figures, lifestyle data, but, also, measurements of health status are
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needed. Identifying data sources, and generating and collecting the relevant data is an issue
not only for researchers but also importantly of national governments and international
organisations.
Second, aggregate income, consumption, public debt and total public expenditure may
provide the key to the evolution of a country's health spending; however, the thesis has
strived to show that there is an additional series of variables that provide the usual above
trend rise in health expenditures. These variables may include the impact of patient
satisfaction with the health service, patient expectations and the pressures that these impose
on the funding of the health service; measurements of "health", and the impact of new
technology, viewed both as a small ticket and as big ticket technology. The thesis has also
argued that the implicit assumption of linear improvement in technology development is not
valid. Incorporating the above concepts in empirical research, desirable though as it may be,
would imply the need for better data sources.
Third, we need to better understand the impact of the determinants of population health, the
mechanism through which they operate, as well as improve the collection and reporting of
data over time.
Finally, a further understanding of the nature and extent of the informal (but legal) sector and
the impact it is having on individual income and health spending also needs to take place.
This is because the informal sector contributes to national income in many OEeD countries
and the majority of developing and transition countries quite significantly. Few studies exist
that measure this problem, and even fewer have attempted to demonstrate the way the
informal sector contributes to national income. An additional area of research is the way
income from the informal sector finds its way into health services and health care delivery.
Initial studies based on anecdotal evidence and household-level research have demonstrated
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the existence of this phenomenon (Lewis, 2002; Anderson, 2000; Delcheva et aI, 1997; Gaal,
1998), but have not quantified it at aggregate level.
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